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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main purpose of this thesis is to develop tools for reasoning about the
actions of free agents and for reasoning about the moral evaluation of these
actions and their outcomes. Broadly speaking, the work is carried out within
the tradition of philosophical logic. More specifically, contributions are made
to deontic logic and to the logic of action. Even more specifically, the foun-
dations of most of the work in this thesis are provided by stit theory.1 In
this introduction, I will say a bit about these topics in reverse order, start-
ing out with some basic stit theory. The idea of the introduction is both to
situate the thesis in a broader context and to introduce some philosophical
assumptions about agency, values, situations and so on, which have guided
the theoretical work to be presented in the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Stit theory for strategic situations
Stit theory (stit is an acronym for ‘sees to it that’) is a formal theory in the
tradition of modal logic, which has been used to clarify questions arising in
the philosophy of action and in the philosophy of norms, see Belnap et al.
(2001), Horty (2001). The stit theory of Belnap, Perloff, Xu and Horty is
set in a branching time indeterministic framework. Time is represented by
a tree, the maximal branches of which are called histories. Any choice of
an agent restricts the future to a subset of these histories. In this thesis, I
will generally abstract away from time. This I do in order to focus on other
aspects of situations than temporal ones, as witnessed by the rest of this
thesis. The primary object of this reduced stit theory I will call a strategic
situation or simply a situation. I take a strategic situation to consist of at
least a set of agents, a set of actions for each agent and a set of outcomes for
each action. Each outcome has an associated value.2 These basic strategic
situations will be extended with intentions, knowledge and action types in
1 The exception is Chapter 7.
2 The name strategic situation is derived from that of a strategic game in game theory.
There is one main technical difference between a strategic game and a strategic situation
and one main conceptual difference. The technical difference is that an action profile does
not have to determine a single outcome in stit theory. The conceptual difference is that
values do not represent instrumental rationality. Also, the objectives of stit theory differ
from those of most game theory in being more affiliated with philosophy than economics.
These points are elaborated on in the rest of this introduction.
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the course of this thesis. Situations are represented formally by utilitarian
strategic models. When no confusion is likely to arise, I use the term situation
for both the real or imagined situation to be represented and for the formal
model representing it. I will now say a bit about the individual components
which constitute a strategic situation.
1.1.1 Outcomes
On several occasions in Horty (2001), the histories of stit models are referred
to as ‘possible outcomes of actions’ e.g.:
...we speak of the histories belonging to an actionK as the possible
outcomes that might result from performing this action.
(Horty; 2001, p.13)
Since the temporal aspects of situations will not be represented directly in
this thesis, there will be no further mention of histories. Instead, situations
are simply said to have various possible outcomes. These outcomes are for-
mally the same as the possible worlds of standard relational semantics, see
e.g. Chellas (1980). Indeed, it is also common to talk about possible worlds
as outcomes in other areas of philosophical logic, especially when connections
to probability theory are considered.
Most representations of uncertainty . . . start with a set of possible
worlds, sometimes called states or elementary outcomes.3
Halpern (2003)
An outcome represents one possible way the world may turn out as a
result of the various choices of the agents. I usually write that a formula is
true with an outcome. I also adopt the custom from probability theory of
speaking of a set of outcomes as an event (in philosophical logic it is more
common to call this a proposition).
1.1.2 Actions
The actions or choices of agents are represented by sets of outcomes. Thus
each action or choice of each agent delimits the set of possible outcomes of
3 That the outcomes are elementary means (in standard probability theory) that they
are equally likely, an assumption not adopted in this thesis.
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a situation. In stit theory two fundamental assumptions are made about
choices. The choices of each agent partition the outcomes and the indepen-
dence of agents condition.
The choices partition the outcomes
That the choices of an agent partition the outcomes of a situation implies
that there is no such thing as an empty choice, a choice with no possible
outcome. It also implies that every possible outcome of a situation is the
outcome of some choice of each agent.
Independence of agents
Informally, independence of agents is the condition that each possible choice
of each agent is consistent with every choice of every other agent. That two
choices are consistent is taken to mean that they have at least one outcome in
common (thus distinct choices of the same agent are never consistent). This
condition implies that each choice of each agent is always open to that agent
in the situation, no action of any agent depends on what any other agent does.
Naturally, one could introduce such dependencies but doing so lies beyond
the scope of this thesis. Throughout, the independence of agents condition
is assumed to hold. Formally, independence of agents as described above is
equivalent to the condition that each atomic action profile (one atomic choice
for each agent) is non-empty. The independence of agents condition is rather
strong and absolutely central to the account of agency offered by stit theory.
Indeed, if some of the results in this thesis seem puzzling at first, it might in
some cases be a good idea to check if they are related to the independence
of agents condition.4
1.1.3 Agents
It will usually be assumed that the agents to be modeled are free and ac-
countable in informal senses of those words. In particular, the concepts of
4 Although rather strong, these two fundamental assumptions about agency are also
part of the foundations of main stream game theory for strategic games. In game theory
the action profiles are usually identified with the outcomes of the game - one way of
understanding this is that game theory requires that the combined choices of all agents
determine a unique outcome. This assumption is not part of stit theory.
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responsibility presented in Chapter 3 and used in later chapters work best
under those assumptions. I refrain, however, from a lengthy discussion of the
concept of free will ( Chapter 6 is somewhat of an exception to this), but refer
the reader to works in mainstream philosophy, such as van Inwagen (1983),
Kane (1998), Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Fischer (2005b), Mele (2006). In
this thesis, the many interesting discussions on free will be crudely reduced
to the following principle.
Principle 1.1. Free will presupposes indeterminism, control and purpose.
Agents cannot be free in a deterministic universe.5 However, ontological
indeterminism alone is not sufficient to establish free will. A random agent
is not the same as a free agent. We also require that agents have at least
some control over the way things turn out. But even mechanical devices can
be used to control how events turn out. Free agents act with a purpose.
Although agents may not be able to guarantee how things turn out they cer-
tainly intend things to turn out in a specific way by acting. I operationalize
Principle 1.1 by representing all three factors in the formal models of situa-
tions. Indeterminism is represented by allowing more than one outcome of
a situation. Control is represented by the agents’ actions or choices which
partition the outcomes. Purpose is represented by singling out a subset of
outcomes of each action as intended outcomes. A sceptic might ask how we
know that the agents make their choices freely? Which choice they finally
make might e.g. be governed by a function from the available choices to
a specific choice making the agents deterministic rather than free. Or there
might be an objective probability connected to each choice making the choice
random rather than free. This argument misses the point of formal modeling.
The aim is not to explain why agents have a free will. It is assumed that they
do. Rather, the aim is to find formal ways of representing these assumptions.
The back and forth between informal discussions and the logical implications
5 In modern philosophy this position is especially connected to the name of Inwagen, see
van Inwagen (1983) and Kane (1998). Examples of philosophers, who accept the opposing
compatibilist view that agents actually can be free given determinism are Fischer and
Ravizza, see Fischer and Ravizza (1998). Mele defends both views in order to make the
disjunction of the views more plausible and save free will from scepticism, see Mele (2006).
Mele’s book also contains a philosophical critique of the results of Libet, who argues against
free will on the basis of his experiments in neuroscience. Chapter 6 of this thesis primarily
consists in a discussion with a prominent compatibilist thought experiment, see Frankfurt
(1969).
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o1: Good o3: Bad o5: Bad o6: Worst
o2: Good o4: Good o7: Best
K1 K2 K3 K4
a1
Fig. 1.1: Four choices facing an agent a1
of the theory will help determine how natural this representation is. The fact
that the models might be used equally well to represent artificial, determined
agents is also besides the point. The point is that the underlying assumptions
lend plausibility to the more precise concepts defined later in the thesis.
Example
Figure 1.1 provides an illustration of some of these concepts. There is just
one agent in the situation, the agent a1. There are 7 possible outcomes,
o1, . . . , o7. a1 has four possible choices, K1, . . . , K4. Each choice, except for
K3, restricts the possible outcomes to two. The labels ‘Good’, ‘Bad’ and
so on can be regarded as propositional variables reflecting the value of the
outcome. They are true with outcomes where they occur and only with
these outcomes. They can be read: ‘something good happens’, etc. The
two fundamental modalities in Horty’s version of stit theory are the Chellas
stit operator [ai cstit] and the deliberative stit operator [a dstit].
6 With the
present non-temporal version of stit theory, an agent sees to it that φ with an
outcome according to the Chellas stit operator if and only if, every outcome
of the choice made with that outcome makes φ true. For an agent to see
to it that φ according to the deliberative stit operator, it is further required
that it is possible that φ is false with some outcome of that situation. This
rules out the possibility that an agent sees to necessary truths and events
that happen to obtain in the entire model.7 Nonetheless, in large parts of
this thesis I stick to the simple Chellas stit operator as the primary action
6 I deviate from Horty (2001) and Belnap et al. (2001), but follow recent practice in the
literature on stit theory (and standard modal logic) by writing the complement φ of a stit
operator outside of the square brackets, i.e. [ai cstit]φ instead of [ai cstit : φ].
7 We might say that the latter are presupposed in the situation. Thus, in most situations
(where agents do not die), we presuppose that air is present with every outcome, but we
would not say that any agent sees to it that air is present.
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modality (an exception is the joint deliberative stit operators in Chapter 4,
and the concepts of responsibility in Chapter 3 are also mostly connected
to the deliberative stit operator.) Now return to Figure 1.1. By making
choice K1 the agent sees to it that something good happens with either stit
operator, because with every possible outcome of that choice ‘Good’ is true,
and there is another outcome, e.g. o3, where ‘Good’ is not true.
1.1.4 Values
The role values attached to outcomes play in this thesis differs from the role
values play in main stream game theory or the role preferences play in main
stream social choice theory. In this thesis, values or utilities are not consid-
ered to be connected to the preferences of a specific agent or a specific group
of agents. In game theory, for instance, the utility functions represent the
private preferences of individual decision makers. This is not an assumption
made here. Rather, values represent legal or moral evaluations of outcomes.
One purpose and effect of this is that values or preferences are severed from
individual or group choice - the idea that choice is revealed preference is
not adopted in this thesis. The ultimate choice of an agent in a given sit-
uation cannot be calculated from the legal values of the outcomes of the
situation. Rather, the focus is on situations where agents might do what is
wrong legally or morally. One way of conceptualizing this difference between
kinds of values is by making a distinction between public and private sources
of values. This distinction is an analogy to objective vs. subjective sources of
information, as considered for epistemic modalities, see e.g. (Portner; 2009,
p. 108). The legal values and moral values are more public than personal
tastes and desires of an agent. In main stream game theory a common strat-
egy is to consider a public source of values such as morality or the law as
an influence on private values. These kind of considerations lie beyond the
scope of this thesis. It should also be noted that although they are more
stable than personal preferences, legal or moral values are not stable across
all situations. Normally, in Denmark, an agent may not cross a red light in
an intersection. If the agent sees a child in the street and she also sees a car
approaching from far away and she still has plenty of time to save the child,
the legal preference changes. If she does nothing and the child is run over
she might get up to two years in prison for neglecting to help a human being
in a life threatening situation when there is no particular risk to herself, see
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(Greve; 2004, p. 49). A starting point for developing tools to analyze how
legal preferences change over situations could be Liu (2008). However, this
task is beyond the scope of this thesis.
1.1.5 Modalities in situations
The level of abstraction of situations
In this thesis, as in everyday life, situations are described via sentences.
However, the languages used here are logical languages. To make the use of
logic more clear it will be useful to go a bit more in depth with the anatomy
of situations. Let me first indicate which level of abstraction I take sentences
about a strategic situation to be on, as compared to some other theories.
The following table goes from the more specific to the more abstract.
1. Utterances in a context. (Speech act theory).
2. Sentences in a context. (Kaplan’s theory of Indexicals)
3. Sentences in a stit model (stit theory in Belnap et al. (2001))
4. Sentences in a situation (Game theory for strategic games, this thesis)
We can understand this as moving towards more and more abstraction in the
following way. Kaplan abstracts away from concrete utterances of sentences
in a context of utterance in order to preserve logical relationships between
sentences and to be able to have sentences be present simultaneously in the
same context. Thus, for a context c and a domain of objects U:
. . . the notion of φ being true in c and U does not require an
utterance of φ.
(Kaplan; 2004, p. 781)
Belnap, Perloff, and Xu abstract speaker and place away from Kaplan’s con-
texts, but keep the temporal aspects of contexts. Thus a formula such as
[ai cstit]φ is true or otherwise in a stit model, quite independently of who
speaks and where that person is. In situations we also abstract away from
time. Abstracting away from time is technically the same as confining stit
theory to a single moment, as done in Kooi and Tamminga (2006). Infor-
mally, though, it gives us a bit more freedom in the way we think about
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situations. For instance, I do not wish to require that all actions are mo-
mentary or that outcomes of the same action or different actions available
to the agent occur in the same moment of time. There might be situations
where an agent can choose to ‘do the same thing’ fast or slowly or ‘today’ or
‘tomorrow’, although we represent it as two concurrent choices in the same
situation. The following discussion gives a bit more precise overview over
how I consider modalities to be connected with situations.
Kinds of modalities and their relation to situations
The following modalities will be considered in this thesis: deontic, ability,
action, intention, judgement and epistemic modalities. Further, it will be
assumed that are three primary temporal perspectives on situation: before,
during, and after. The modalities tend to be connected to one specific tem-
poral perspective, excepting epistemic modalities, see Chapter 3. Figure 1.2
sum up this way of classifying the modalities. The first kind we call situation
modalities. What an agent ought to do or is permitted to do (as expressed in
sentences with deontic must or may), is able to do (as expressed with ability
can) is usually considered before a situation takes place, and we think of
these modalities as directed towards the future. Intuitively, these modalities
are evaluated before an agent has chosen what to do. Since these modalities
are considered before a certain outcome is determined and even before the
agent is committed to a specific action, they are most naturally thought of
as settled either true or false in the whole situation, i.e. for each of these
modalities m and a situation S and a formula φ, we have either M  mφ
or M 2 mφ (where M  φ is defined as M, o  φ for each o ∈ dom(M)).
We say that these modalities are settled in a situation or situation deter-
minate.8 The second kind we call action modalities, because they are most
closely connected to a specific action that an agent is committed to.9 In
stit theory, an agent’s actions partition the domain of the model, so an ac-
tion is a set of outcomes. Where A is an action, let us define M,A  φ as
M, o  φ for each o ∈ A. For action modalities M (such as sees to it that,
8 This terminology comes from Horty, who calls the historical modalities moment de-
terminate. The universal modalities A and E (corresponding to Horty’s historical) are of
course also situation determinate.
9 The term action modality will thus be used in two ways: in a narrow sense about the
specific action modalities sees to it that and allows it that and in a broad sense, including
the intention modality.
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Modalities Deontic, ability Action, intention Judgement
Time Before During After
Settled in Situation Action Outcome
Fig. 1.2: Modalities in situations
allows it that, intends it that), given a situation M and an action A, we
have M,A  mφ or M,A 2 mφ. We say that these modalities are settled
with an action or action determinate. Intuitively, sentences containing these
modalities refer to a time after the agent has chosen what to do, but before
the actual outcome has been determined. I think of this time as during the
situation. The reason I group the intention modalities here, is that I see
intentions as relative to actions, see Chapter 3 for more details. Finally, the
most unstable modalities are the outcome modalities to which belong the
various concepts of responsibility considered in Chapter 3. These are only
settled with specific outcomes. These modalities have to do with judgement
and achievement. What an agent can be held responsible for might vary
from outcome to outcome. For instance, if an agent does not succeed in
what he intended to do, we do not hold him responsible for doing it, only
for attempting it. Here, the primary temporal perspective is looking back
at a situation after the situation has terminated in a specific outcome. It
is only for this latter type of modalities, I talk about an actual outcome as
opposed to other possible outcomes. The fact that I embrace indeterminism
prohibits me from saying about any specific outcome that it is (or will be)
the actual outcome during or before a situation. When I want to single out
an outcome for evaluation in these cases, I prefer to call the outcome singled
out the considered outcome (as opposed to other possible outcomes).
1.1.6 Recent work on stit theory
Stit theory is not old for a philosophical theory, but it makes sense to divide
its brief history into two phases. The early work in stit theory was primarily
philosophically motivated. This phase culminated in the two major works,
Belnap et al. (2001) and Horty (2001). These books contain most of the
material published in philosophical journals in the 1990’s and extends it in
new ways. In this decade, however, most of the work in stit theory has
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been done by people in computer science, where the focus is more technical
and aimed at feasible implementations. Much of this work has focussed on
proof theory and connections to other multi agent formalisms. Xu was the
first to axiomatize stit theory, Xu (1998). Alternative axiomatizations are
presented in Balbiani et al. (2008). Wansing provided a tableaux system,
Wansing (2006). These axiomatizations are in effect restricted to a single
moment. In Herzig and Schwarzentruber (2008) it is shown that stit theory
with the joint Chellas stit operator is not axiomatizable. Formal translations
between stit logic and coalition logic and ATL are presented in Broersen
et al. (2006a), Broersen et al. (2006b). These papers are mainly of interest
because of complexity, axiomatizability and decidability results. It would
also be interesting to undertake a more conceptual comparison between the
formalisms on the basis of these results, but I leave this for somebody else.
More conceptually oriented work has also been done within this community.
In Broersen (2008), the task of integrating epistemic modalities with the stit
framework is begun, see also Chapter 3 for an alternative. Some work on
stit has been done in philosophy, in particular by Thomas Mu¨ller. His work
on stit theory has been centered around the connection between action and
time. In Mu¨ller (2006), he considers trust over time. In Mu¨ller (2005), he
considers the duration of actions. In Kooi and Tamminga (2006), stit theory
is reduced to a single moment, a reduction that technically corresponds to
what is done in this thesis, and utility functions for each agents are used to
formalize game theoretical reasoning. A very interesting paper written by
people in the computer science community is Troquard et al. (2006). Here
the authors combine the modal or intensional view of agency provided by
stit theory with a first-order view on actions considered as a kind of objects.
In philosophy this roughly translates into integrating Davidson’s view with
that of stit theory. I will return to that issue in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8,
but the more technical work referred to above is not the main concern of this
thesis.
1.2 Deontic logic
My personal starting point for this work is an interest in deontic logic, see
McNamara (2006) for a survey. In this thesis specific deontic logics will be
considered and developed. For now, I will confine myself to a few remarks on
the fundamental question, whether it makes sense to assign truth values to
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deontic sentences in order to reason with them logically, a problem known as
Jørgensen’s dilemma, see Jørgensen (1937), Hansen et al. (2007), McNamara
(2006). As mentioned above, this thesis mainly concerns public values such
as legal and moral values. These are ‘social facts’ to such a degree that it
makes sense to assign truth values to sentences on the basis of them relative
to situations. Thus in a specific situation, it can be true (or false) that a
person is allowed to cross the street. This truth value is relative to a situation
and further it must be independent of a particular outcome, i.e. situation
determinate to account for the future directed nature of deontic sentences.
Are deontic sentences performative or descriptive?
Some linguists think that deontic ‘must’ and ‘may’ are always performative
in the sense that their utterances create an obligation or a permission for
an addressee, see (Portner; 2009, p. 190). I do not agree with this posi-
tion. I have no interest in arguing that there is such a thing as ‘objective’ or
‘eternal’ values. On the other hand, the public nature of some values make
these speaker independent (e.g. independent of the particular authority of
the speaker or a certain ‘chain of command’). They are generally accepted by
some community.10 Further, it makes sense to abstract away from specific ut-
terances of deontic sentences. The meaning of these sentences can be derived
from the values given to outcomes in particular situations. Thus, relative to
a situation and a set of values, deontic sentences have a truth value. On the
other hand, I agree that deontic ‘must’ and ‘may’ can have interesting per-
formative functions and that these functions have not been studied enough
in the literature. Presumably, if we want to stick to the present theoreti-
cal framework, the performative aspect of such deontic sentences could be
considered as the situation changing potential of these sentences. Naturally,
such performative sentences will not have determinate truth values in any
of the senses considered above, as they dynamically change the ‘ontology’ of
the situation, e.g. by changing the values of outcomes or choices of agents.
Rather they could be considered functions that gives a new situation from an
old one, see also Chapter 7. Extending the present theory with tools of this
kind lays beyond the scope of this thesis. Here deontic ought, must and may
10 Whether and how the public values are or should be generated from the private values
of some group of individuals is not considered in this thesis, see e.g. Kooi and Tamminga
(2006).
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are always used as descriptive terms relative to given valuations of outcomes
of specific situations.
1.3 Logic of action
Above I have described how agency is conceived in this thesis. Historically,
the modern origin of agency logic is with von Wright, but formally stit theory
owes most of its debts to Chellas. Chellas’ account of agency, which has been
adopted by stit theory, has been criticized by Segerberg. In the following
quotation the ‘cones’ are the actions of an agent considered as subsets of
histories:
While this is not implausible, it would have been interesting
to have been told something about the connexion between the
agent and those cones. What is it that makes an initial history
continue in one fashion rather than another? Does the agent ”do”
anything at t - 1 to define a certain cone – does action consist in
choosing or somehow committing oneself to a cone? Otherwise,
where does action come from? And when does it take place – at
t - 1, at t, at the interval [t - 1, t], or what?(Segerberg; 1992, p.
373)
The main competitors to stit theory are variants of dynamic logic, see
also Chapter 7. From computer science (but with many philosophical impli-
cations) we have dynamic logic which is related to concurrent dynamic logic,
see e.g. Goldblatt (1992), which is related to game logic which is related
to coalition logic, see Pauly (2001). For a survey of some agency logics up
until 1992, see Segerberg (1992). For a bibliography up until then, see Se-
lective Bibliography in the Logic of Action (1992). For surveys of the later
development, see Lindstro¨m and Segerberg (2007), Segerberg et al. (2009).
1.4 Philosophical logic
Portner distinguishes the goals of logic and semantics in linguistics as follows.
. . . the primary goal of the semanticist is to provide a precise the-
ory of the meaning of modal expressions across languages. . . The
goal of the logician is to systematize and understand important
features of reasoning with the concepts of necessity, obligation,
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and so forth.
(Portner; 2009, p. 29)
With this definition, the aims of the thesis are clearly logical rather than
linguistic. I am not primarily engaged in finding the meaning of natural
language words but in a creative exploration of concepts in order to clarify
and even develop those concepts themselves. Further, I do find the idea of
semantic facts that we need to discover or predict a bit unsettling. The
definitions of concepts given in this thesis are meant as suggestions which
are open to discussion and revision. To a philosopher it should not be a
problem that the object of exploration changes as a consequence of that very
exploration. Rather, this must be considered philosophical progress. Perhaps
the empirically minded linguist would have a problem with this (in the sense
that changing the meaning of a word as a result of her very semantic analysis
of it would require some explanation on her part). However, I am perfectly
ready to learn otherwise, and nothing in this thesis really hinges on these
remarks. Finally, very austere logicians might not even agree with me that
this a work of logic, since, all through the thesis, I only present (syntax and)
semantics and not any proof theory of the logics. The focus is conceptual.
1.5 The problems confronted in this thesis
The following is a brief description of the central problems to be confronted
and attempted solved in this thesis. The first two problems can be viewed
as limitations of stit theory as it has been developed up until now. The
third problem comes from deontic logic. The fourth problem comes from the
philosophy of action and linguistics and the fifth problem comes from ethics.
1. Intentions in stit theory.
2. Action types in stit theory.
3. Deontic paradoxes.
4. Ability modalities.
5. Frankfurt Examples.
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1. Intentions do not form part of the stit theory presented in Horty
(2001), Belnap et al. (2001). In fact, Horty explicitly mentions some diffi-
culties with implementing intentions into the models. On the other hand,
intentions are getting studied in other closely related areas, see Rao and
Georgeff (1997), Roy (2008), and they play a crucial role when assigning
legal and moral responsibility for events to agents. Therefore intentions are
introduced explicitly in Chapter 3. 2. Stit theory has been criticized by
Segerberg for not being able to talk directly about actions. In Chapter 7 and
8 I interpret this as a lack of being able to apply modal operators to action
types. In particular, the deontic and ability modalities, i.e. the situation
modalities, seem to be applied to action types in natural language, as in ‘you
must swim’, etc. 3. There are many deontic paradoxes, but in this thesis I
treat only on the ones connected to disjunction and conjunction, Ross’ para-
dox and free choice inferences. This is also done in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8
. The other big cycle of paradoxes connected to the conditional, see Prior
(1954), Chisholm (1964), Castan˜eda (1981), Forrester (1984), Prakken and
Sergot (1997), I leave alone, partly because I think they can be treated quite
accurately with the tools provided in Horty (2001). Some of them can be
solved by the temporal framework (temporal versions of the good samari-
tan), and some of them by conditionalizing over relevant subsets and then
restricting the values to those sets (for instance, the Gentle Murder paradox,
see Forrester (1984), might be solved by restricting the attention to the out-
comes where there is a murder and then taking the optimal action relative
to this, see (Horty; 2001, chp. 5)). I am sure much more could be said, but
I do not have anything else to say and I will not return to the conditional
paradoxes again in this thesis. 4. In Horty (2001) a concept of ability is
formalized within stit theory as (with present notation) E[ai cstit]φ inspired
by Brown (1988). I formalize some related ability modalities in Chapter 4.
5. Finally, I investigate some philosophical thought experiments known as
Frankfurt examples within the theoretical framework provided by stit theory.
The main results, I achieved by working with these problems are the
following.
• A formalization of various concepts of responsibility.
• A deontic logic for action types.
Minor results are the transposing of iterated removal of dominated actions
into the framework of stit theory, the cube of opposition for ability modalities
1. Introduction 16
and a proof that if God exists he is solely responsible for everything.
A chapter by chapter overview is provided as part of the summary.
Chapter 2
Deontic logic and iterated removal of dominated
actions
Trust is a solution for specific problems of risk.
Luhmann (1990)
2.1 Introduction
It is said that we can make the world a better place, if we allow ourselves
to trust one another. In this chapter, I show situations where this is the
case. I also show some situations, where it is not the case. The main con-
tribution is a generalization of John Horty’s account of individual ought to
do, see Horty (2001), based on what game theorists call iterated removal of
dominated choices in strategic games, see e.g. (Osborne; 2004, chapter 12).
Conceptually, this means an extension of the stit framework to deal with
situations of trust and in particular iterated reciprocal trust, e.g. a trusts
that b trusts a. Consider the following examples.
Example 2.1. The Victim is held up by the evil guy. He is wondering whether
to attempt to resist the evil guy or not. The Hero is wondering whether to
help or not. The best outcome is when the Victim tries to resist the evil guy
and the Hero helps. Nobody gets hurt, the evil guy goes to jail. With the
second best outcome, the Hero helps but the Victim remains inactive. Here
the evil guy gets killed and the Hero and the Victim will both suffer some
bad wounds. The third best outcome is when the Hero does not help and
the Victim does not resist. The Victim will get killed but without too much
suffering. The worst outcome is when the Victim tries to resist and is not
helped. In this case the evil guy tortures him to death.
What should the Hero and the Victim do in this situation? The Hero
can reason with the sure thing principle as follows. Given that the Victim
resists, it is better for me to help, in which case all is well, than not to help,
which would yield the worst possible outcome. On the other hand, given
that the Victim does not resist, it is still better for me to help, because the
good guys suffering some wounds and killing the bad guy, is still better than
letting the Victim die. What should the Victim do? It seems impossible to
say. Of course, if the Hero helps, he is a lot better off resisting, the best
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possible outcome of the situation. On the other hand, if the Hero does not
help, he will be tortured to death by making this choice, which would be
absolutely terrible. If he does not resist, he might get rescued anyway if
the Hero decides to help, but the rescue will come at a high cost. On the
other hand, if the Hero decides not to help, he will at least die a clean death
and not be tortured. It is really a predicament. But assume now that the
Victim trusts the Hero to be a good utilitarian. Suppose, in particular, that
he trusts the Hero to not make a choice which is strictly dominated. In that
case, the Victim trusts the Hero to help. The Victim can now reason with
the sure thing reasoning as follows. If I resist, then we will easily overcome
the evil guy together. On the other hand if I don’t resist, I leave all the dirty
work to the Hero who will have to kill the bad guy and we will both get hurt.
It is thus better for me to resist.
Here is another example, which requires two levels of reasoning.
Example 2.2. The Doctor needs to reach town fast from the jungle to get
medicine. It is a difficult journey. She can walk through the mountains or
travel by boat down the river. She can also decide to abandon the journey
altogether. Nearby lives the Guide, who has heard about this. He has to
decide whether to come and guide the Doctor on the journey. Naturally, if
the Doctor stays home, he would rather stay home, too. But if the Doctor
should decide to either walk or go by boat he will be able to get her there
faster either way, possibly saving lives. In particular, if the Doctor goes by
boat, the Guide’s navigational skills makes him very useful. It would yield
the best possible outcome, if he were to decide to come and the Doctor were
decide to go by boat.
What should the Doctor do? Go by boat, walk through the mountains
or abandon the journey? In this example it is not enough that the Doctor
trusts the Guide. This is so, because what the Guide should do, depends
on what the Doctor does. If the Doctor decides to abandon the journey, the
Guide should stay home. If she goes on the journey by foot or by boat, he
should help. However, suppose staying home is a morally bad choice for the
Doctor no matter what. If the Guide trusts the Doctor, he knows that the
Doctor will either go by boat or walk. And if the Doctor trusts the Guide
and she trusts that the Guide trusts her, then she trusts the Guide will come
to help. So in that case, the Doctor ought to go by boat, ensuring the best
possible outcome. In other words, because the Guide trusts the Doctor he
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ought to come help. And because the Doctor trusts the Guide to trust her
and she trusts the Guide, she ought to go by boat.
I will present a way of formalizing the reasoning above. First, I consider
some important elements of an informal theory of trust developed by Niklas
Luhmann.
2.2 Luhmann on trust
In sociologist Niklas Luhmann’s view trust presupposes a situation of risk.
More specifically,
If you choose one action in preference to others in spite of the pos-
sibility of being disappointed by the action of others, you define
the situation as one of trust.(. . .) Moreover, trust is only possible
in a situation where the possible damage may be greater than the
advantage you seek. Otherwise, it would simply be a question of
rational calculation and you would choose your action anyway. . .
(Luhmann; 1990, pp. 97-98)
One example of trust given by Luhmann is hiring a babysitter for the evening
and leaving him or her unsupervised. Clearly, this gives us a situation anal-
ogous to the informal examples spelled out above. As a way of contrast,
Luhmann makes a distinction between confidence, which we may capture as
an attitude to a wider and more basic class of situations, and trust, which
is related to specific situations. As an example of this distinction, we need
confidence in the use of the evaluative object money (perhaps this confidence
is based on a social contract), but we need trust when entering into specific
situations of investment. The theory developed here, really concerns what
Luhmann calls trust. Whereas lack of confidence will result in alienation,
Luhmann claims the following.
The lack of trust, on the other hand, simply withdraws activities.
It reduces the range of possibilities for rational action.
(Luhmann; 1990, p. 104)
And further,
Mobilizing trust means mobilizing engagement and activities, ex-
tending the range and degree of participation.
(Luhmann; 1990, p. 99)
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Although the present theory is an extension of stit theory, which gets its
justification independently of Luhmann, I think the relation to Luhmann’s
theory is clear enough to be interesting. If we take a narrow definition of
individual rational choice as resulting from reasoning by Savage’s sure thing
principle ( I do not think this is too far from what Luhmann has in mind), it
is clear that the theory we will present extends the possibilities for rational
action. This is what I mean by a generalization of Horty’s individual ought
to do. Also, the informal examples given above fulfil the conditions given by
Luhmann to be characterized as situations of trust. The agents cannot expect
to get to the best outcomes by only trusting themselves. Furthermore, by
trusting each other they risk greater damage than if they did not trust (e.g.
the Victim risks to be tortured to death by trusting the Hero, a fate which he
considers worse than simply dying). Moreover, in contrast to Luhmann, who
does not emphasize this aspect, the theory makes it apparent that individuals
trusting other individuals, in itself is not always enough. As the example with
the Doctor’s journey shows, the Doctor needs to trust that the Guide trusts
the Doctor in order to make the choice that leads to the best outcome. Thus
we really need reciprocal and iterated modes of trust - by the way, I trust
that Luhmann would not deny the importance of this. The formal theory
enables us to spell out such conditions clearly and to give reasons to trust
based choices, which we make intuitively all the time. Before I turn to the
formal frame work, I spell out a bit, what we mean by agents being in specific
situations.
2.3 Strategic situations
In the version of stit theory studied here, we do not consider time, see also
Chapter 1. Formally, it corresponds to stit theory reduced to a single mo-
ment, as studied, e.g. in (Belnap et al.; 2001, Chapter 16), Kooi and Tam-
minga (2006). Intuitively, since we use only operators, whose satisfaction
(in the full stit framework including time) would not depend on histories,
throwing away these histories from the models at the outset should not mat-
ter logically. It makes the model theory simpler, since we essentially reduce
the models to standard relational models known from modal logic, see e.g.
Chellas (1980), Blackburn et al. (2001). For a formal mapping between the
two kinds of models, see, Herzig and Schwarzentruber (2008). Conceptually,
I do not think we should consider the models as representing single moments.
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Rather, we should consider them as strategic situations, which is to say that
agents act independently (meaning that each of their choices is consistent
with any choice of any other agent), but not necessarily simultaneously. In
the informal examples presented in this chapter the agents are in different lo-
cations, and they cannot communicate. Further, in these models, each agent
is aware of all possible consequences of the different combination of choices
and this awareness is common knowledge. Also, agents agree on which utility
to assign to outcomes (only ordinal aspects of utilities are used), and this
evaluation is also common knowledge. The conceptual difference between the
account given here and those based on instrumental rationality such as in
game theory (a difference which really only exists at a meta level) is that we
do not require the utilitarian values to correspond to the individual utility
functions of agents (these are not part of the formal framework). For more
about knowledge and stit, see Broersen (2008), and for knowledge in strategic
situations in game theory, see van der Hoek and Pauly (2007). The agents do
not know which particular choices the other agents will make. The examples
suggest that there might be many situations, where these assumptions are
quite natural. The deontic operators presented here for the first time, repre-
sent reasoning about what such an agent ought to do in such situations given
various levels of trust. What is also new is the construction of submodels
using positive formulas. This construction is applied in the iterative removal
of strictly dominated choices.
2.4 Utilitarian strategic models
Throughout this thesis, I presuppose rudimentary set theory, see e.g. Devlin
(1992)1, as well as classical logic, see e.g. Smullyan (1968), Ebbinghaus et al.
(1996), as parts of the meta langauge. Otherwise, the following presentation
of the formal framework is self contained. For information about deontic
logic, see von Wright (1951), Hilpinen (1971) Chellas (1980), Hilpinen (1981),
Nute (1997), McNamara (2006). Introductions to standard game theory are
Osborne (2004), Myerson (1997).
Formally, we use utilitarian strategic models (or simply models) consist-
ing of outcomes, agents, choices, a utility function on the outcomes and a
valuation function.
1 In this thesis, ⊂ always denotes strict inclusion between sets.
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Let Φ be a denumerable set of propositional variables. (The rest of the
language will follow later).
Definition 2.1 (Utilitarian strategic model). A utilitarian strategic model
is a structure M = 〈W,Agent, {Choicei | ai ∈ Agent}, u, V 〉, where
1. W is a non-empty set of outcomes.
2. We have finite, non-empty set of agents, Agent = {a1, . . . , an}
3. For each agent ai ∈ Agent, we have a finite, non-empty set Choicei of
choices or actions, Choicei = {Ai1, . . . , Aimi}, 0 < mi, (agent ai has
mi choices). ∅ 6= Aij ⊆ W . Furthermore,
(a) For any agent ai, the elements of Choicei partition W .
(b) Let A1j1 ∈ Choice1, . . . , Anjn ∈ Choicen, where 1 ≤ ji ≤ mi.
Then (A1j1 ∩ . . . ∩ Anjn) 6= ∅. (Independence of agents)
4. u is a utility function assigning a real number to to each outcome, i.e.
u : W → R. Intuitively, the real number represents the moral or legal
value of the outcome.
5. V is a valuation function from propositional variables to subsets of W ,
i.e. V : Φ→ P(W )
When M = 〈W,Agent, {Choicei | ai ∈ Agent}, u, V 〉 is a model, I some-
times write dom(M) for W (the domain of M). An event is defined as a
subset of the domain. It should be noted that these models obey the finite
choice condition, each agent only has a finite number of choices. The choices
of a group of agents Γ ⊆ Agent is defined as follows, see (Horty; 2001, p.
31). Let Choice =
⋃
ai∈Agent
Choicei. Let Select = {s | s : Agent→ Choice
and s(ai) ∈ Choicei} be the set of selection functions assigning to each agent
an action of that agent. If Γ = ∅, then ChoiceΓ = dom(M) × dom(M). If
Γ 6= ∅, then:
ChoiceΓ = {
⋂
ai∈Γ
s(ai) | s ∈ Select}
Note that Choice{i} = Choicei. The set of states confronting an agent
ai ∈ Agent in a situation is defined as the possible choices of the rest of the
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agents considered as a group, see (Horty; 2001, p. 67):
Statei = ChoiceAgent−ai
In order to get to sure thing reasoning the utility function on outcomes is
lifted to a dominance ordering on actions in two steps. First, the utilities of
outcomes are lifted to a weak preference ordering on arbitrary events S, T ⊆
W , in the following way.
Definition 2.2. LetM be a utilitarian strategic model and S, T ⊆ dom(M).
Then S ≤ T (T is weakly preferred to S) iff u(o) ≤ u(o′) for each o ∈ S and
each o′ ∈ T .
≤ is a transitive relation on P(W ). A strong preference ordering on
propositions is defined as S < T iff S ≤ T and not T ≤ S. < is a strict
partial ordering (transitive and irreflexive) on P(W ).
Next, this preference ordering is used to define a dominance ordering on
actions based on Savage’s sure thing principle. Intuitively, this principle has
the following content. A choice dominates another choice whenever the first
choice is preferred in every state confronting the agent. It is presupposed that
the states (the possible joint actions of the rest of the agents) are causally
independent of the choices made by the agent.
Definition 2.3. Let ai ∈ Agent and let Aij , Aik ∈ Choicei. Then Aij  Aik
(Aik weakly dominates Aij), iff. Aij ∩ S ≤ Aik ∩ S for each S ∈ Statei.
Aij ≺ Aik (Aik strongly dominates Aij) iff Aij  Aik and not Aik  Aij .
 is transitive relation on Choicei and ≺ a strict partial ordering on
Choicei.
The following result is almost immediate.
Fact 2.4. Aij ≺ Aik iff Aij  Aik and Aij ∩S < Aik ∩S for some S ∈ Statei.
Horty’s terminology deviates a bit from the standard terminology of game
theory here. The concept referred to above as strong dominance game the-
orists often call weak dominance, see (Osborne; 2004, pp. 46-47) . They
will then refrain from naming the concept called weak dominance by Horty.
The concept referred to by game theorists as strong dominance, in Myerson
(1997), or strict dominance in Osborne (2004) is stronger yet. To distinguish
the three concepts we will refer to the latter as strict dominance with the
understanding that this is to be taken as different from strong dominance.
To get there we define the following strict preference ordering on events.
2. Deontic logic and iterated removal of dominated actions 24
Definition 2.5. LetM be a utilitarian strategic model and S, T ⊆ dom(M).
Then S <s T (T is strictly preferred to S) iff u(o) < u(o
′) for each o ∈ S and
each o′ ∈ T .
Thus strict preference requires that every outcome in one event has a
strictly higher utility than every outcome in another event. It is a strict
partial ordering. This ordering is then lifted to a strict dominance ordering
on actions in the following way.
Definition 2.6. Let ai ∈ Agent and let Aij , Aik ∈ Choicei. Then Aij ≺s Aik
(Aik strictly dominates Aij), iff. Aij ∩ S <s Aik ∩ S for each S ∈ Statei.
Strict dominance requires that one choice is strictly preferred to another
in each state. It is obvious that if choice strictly dominates another choice it
strongly dominates it, but not necessarily vice versa.
We define the set of optimal choices for an agent ai in a model M , denoted
Optimali as the set of actions for that agent that are not strongly dominated.
Definition 2.7. Optimali = {Aim ∈ Choicei |there is no Ain ∈ Choicei,
such that Aim ≺ Ain}.
Fact 2.8. (Horty 2001) For any agent ai, Optimali 6= ∅.
Proof. We repeat Horty’s proof in the current (atemporal) framework for
the convenience of the reader. Assume Optimali = ∅. Let Ain ∈ Choicei.
Since Ain 6∈ Optimali, and ≺ is irreflexive there is a different action Ail ∈
Choicei such that Ain ≺ Ail. By assumption Ail 6∈ Optimali either, and ≺
is transitive and irreflexive, so cycles cannot occur. Hence we can iterate the
argument indefinitely, giving us an infinite subset of Choicei contradicting
that an agent has only finitely many actions.
2.5 Iterated removal of dominated actions
Intuitively, iteratively removing dominated actions involves removing dom-
inated actions from the model, which may in turn make it possible to re-
move other dominated actions, and so on. The reasoning leading to the
removal of these choices is based on trust between agents. In the examples
given above the right results can be obtained by removing either strongly
dominated choices or strictly dominated choices. However, when removing
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a
A1 o1 : u(o1) = 2 o2 : u(o2) = 2
A2 o3 : u(o3) = 0 o4 : u(o4) = 1
A3 o5 : u(o5) = 1 o6 : u(o6) = 0
B1 B2
b
Fig. 2.1: Removing dominated actions
strongly dominated choices (what game theorists call removing weakly dom-
inated choices), the following complication arises: the choices which remain
after the process has been completed depends on the order in which choices
are removed. As an example consider Figure 2.1.
If we first remove a’s strongly dominated choice A3, then we can remove
the dominated B1, leaving b with B2 as her only optimal choice. On the
other hand, if we first remove a’s strongly dominated choice A2, then we
can remove B2, leaving b with B1. It can be proven that the order does not
matter when iteratively removing strictly dominated choices, see (Osborne;
2004, Chapter 12). The connection between such an algorithm and dynamic
epistemic logic has been investigated (as well as other connections) , see van
Benthem (2007). It could be shown that a deontic operator based on the
choices remaining after this algorithm had come to an end would be logically
independent of Horty’s deontic ought to do. For that reason, since the aim
here is to generalize Horty’s account of deontic logic, we will deal with the
order problem mentioned above in another well-known way: each step in the
algorithm will be to simultaneously remove every strongly dominated action
of every agent. Clearly, for a given agent ai, the set of strongly dominated
choices Choicei−Optimali is fixed. Intuitively, this algorithm can be justified
by requiring that agents trust that other agents will reason by the sure thing
principle.
Now for a formal account. We call an action Aij ∈ Choicei, where 1 ≤ j ≤
mi, an atomic action. For an agent ai ∈ Agent, we call the union of ki
(ki > 0) actions from Choicei, a complex positive action and we denote such
a complex positive action αi, i.e.
αi = Aisi1 ∪Aisi2 ∪ . . . ∪ Aisiki where 1 ≤ si1 ≤ si2 ≤ . . . ≤ siki ≤ mi
(One may think of αi as successively picking or leaving out each atomic action
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from Choicei, possibly leaving out some, but picking at least one). Given a
complex positive action αi for each ai ∈ Agent, we define an action profile,
denoted P , as the intersection of the complex actions, i.e.
P =
⋂
ai∈Agent
αi
When the action profile contains exactly one action for each agent we call
it an atomic action profile (otherwise complex).
Let M be a model, and let P be an action profile. We define the sets
of actions of agents restricted to the profile, denoted Choicei|P as follows,
Choicei|P = {Aij ∩ P | Aij ∩ P 6= ∅, j = 1, . . . , mi}. We now define the the
model restricted to P , denoted M |P , as follows.
Definition 2.9. M |P = 〈P,Agent, {Choice′i | ai ∈ Agent}, u
′ : P → R, V ′〉,
where
1. Choice′i = Choicei|P
2. u′ = u|P (u restricted to P ).
3. For each p ∈ Φ, V ′(p) = V (p) ∩ P .
We need to show that M |P fulfils the conditions of Definition 2.1, in
particular that the actions of agents partition dom(M |P ) and that M |P
fulfils the independence of agents condition. We show only the latter.
Proof. Independence of agents Let A′1j1 ∈ Choice
′
1, . . . , A
′
njn
∈ Choice′n.
Each A′iji = Aiti ∩P for some Aiti ∈ Choicei. We have P = ((A1s11 ∪A1s12 ∪
. . .∪A1s1k1 )∩. . .∩(Ansn1∪Ansn2∪. . .∪Ansnkn )) ⊇ (A1t1∩. . .∩Antn). Therefore,
(A′1j1∩ . . .∩A
′
njn
) = ((A1t1∩P )∩ . . .∩(Antn∩P )) = ((A1t1∩ . . .∩Antn)∩P ) =
(A1t1 ∩ . . . ∩Antn) 6= ∅ by Independence of Agents for M .
From this we get the following.
Fact 2.10. Let M be a strategic model and P an action profile. M |P is a
strategic model.
Although restricting a model to an action profile is a sufficient condition
for getting a new strategic model it is not necessary. The main thing is
that the new model needs to fulfil the independence of agents condition.
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This rules out reductions based on the truth set of any formula, as in the
public announcements considered in dynamic epistemic logic, see e.g. van
Ditmarsch et al. (2007).
Given a model M , we order the set of models MP = {M |P | P is an
action profile} as follows. M |P ′ <c M |P , iff P ⊂ P
′.
Fact 2.11. MP is finite. <c is a strict partial order on MP with the atomic
action profiles as maximal elements and M as minimal element.
Proof. Since each agent has a finite number of actions, there is only a finite
number of profiles, so MP is finite. The strict partial order is forced by set
inclusion. Obviously for any profile P , P ⊆ M . If P is an atomic profile
there can be no profile P ′, such that P ′ ⊂ P , because that would require
taking an action away from at least one agent, leaving us with an empty
action for that agent, which violates the definition of an action profile.
Now, fix a model M .
⋂
(
⋃
ai∈Agent
Optimali), is an action profile, which
we denote OptimalM . So, by Fact 2.10, M |OptimalM is a strategic model.
We define a model Mn with level of trust n as the model resulting from n
rounds of simultaneously removing each strongly dominated action of each
agent.
Definition 2.12. 1. M0 =M.
2. Mn+1 =Mn|Optimal
Mn.
Fact 2.13. 1. dom(Mn+1) ⊆ dom(Mn).
2. If m < n, then dom(Mn) ⊆ dom(Mm).
3. There is an m, s.t. Mn = Mm, for all n ≥ m. We call this model Mm,
Optimus′.By Optimus′i we mean Optimal
Mm
i .
Proof. 1. Obvious from Definition 2.9.
2. Since n > m, Mn is obtained fromMm in a finite number of steps for each
of which 1. holds, so we have dom(Mn) ⊆ dom(Mm).
3.For any n, either Mn+1 =Mn or for some agent some action is dominated,
in which case OptimalMn+1 ⊂ OptimalMn , i.e. Mn <c Mn+1. Now, since
for any n, Mn ∈ MP , and <c yields a finite partial order, this process must
come to an end eventually, at the latest when it hits a maximal element (an
atomic action profile, i.e. each agent is down to one non-dominated action).
The models can only get smaller and they never become empty.
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Furthermore, we have the following.
Fact 2.14. For any n and ai ∈ Agent, {Aij ∈ Choicei | Aij ∩ Optimal
Mn
i 6=
∅} 6= ∅.
In words there is a non-empty subset of actions from the original model
consistent with the actions of the model restricted to OptimalMn . We denote
this set Optimalni , i.e. Optimal
n
i = {Aij ∈ Choicei | Aij ∩ Optimal
Mn 6= ∅},
call it the n-optimal actions for agent ai. Similarly, for {Aij ∈ Choicei |
Aij ∩Optimus
′
i}, we write Optimus
′
i. We have the following.
Fact 2.15. 1. Optimalni ⊆ Optimal
m
i , for m < n.
2. There is an m, such that Optimalmi = Optimal
n
i , for any n > m.
2.6 New deontic operators
We are now going to do deontic logic with the models constructed above.
Based on the set of propositional variables, Φ, we build a language by the
following rule. We use agents as names for themselves.
Definition 2.16. ai ∈ Agent, p ∈ Φ.
φ ::= p |⊥| φ1 → φ2 | ©φ | Aφ | [ai cstit]φ |
⊙
n[ai cstit]φ |
⊙
[ai cstit]φ
We define the rest of the propositional connectives, ¬,∧,∨,↔, in the
standard way, (¬φ is defined as φ →⊥, and so on). As usual, we write
M, o  φ, for φ is true with outcome o of model M . The truth conditions for
atomic sentences, the propositional constant, and propositional connective
are standard:
Definition 2.17. 1. M, o  p iff o ∈ V (p), where p ∈ Φ (p is atomic).
2. M, o ⊥ never.
3. M, o  φ→ ψ iff, if M, o  φ, then M, o  ψ.
We define the event expressed by a formula φ, denoted |φ|M as the set of
outcomes where the formula is true, i.e. |φ|M = {o | M, o  φ}. As usual,
by φ being true in a model, written M  φ, we mean that φ is true with
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all outcomes of that model (for any o ∈ dom(M), M, o  φ). By φ being
valid, written  φ, we mean true in all models (for any model M , M  φ).
By logical consequence, written Γ  φ, where Γ is a set of formulas and φ is
a formula, we mean that for any outcome o, of any model M , if M, o  ψ
for all ψ ∈ Γ, then M, o  φ. The deontic ought to be operator © has the
following truth condition.
Definition 2.18. M, o ©φ iff. there is an outcome o′, such that M, o′  φ
and for all o′′, such that u(o′) ≤ u(o′′), M, o′′  φ.
This is a normal modal operator, validating e.g. D (¬(©φ ∧©¬φ)) and
4 (©φ → ©© φ). Let ai be an agent and o an outcome. By Choice
M
i (o)
we mean a function which picks out the unique action Aim ∈ Choicei, such
that o ∈ Aim. The Chellas stit operator
2 has the following truth condition.
(The following definitions and validities apply to any ai ∈ Agent).
Definition 2.19. M, o  [ai cstit]φ iff. Choice
M
i (o) ⊆ |φ|M .
The A operator is a universal modality.
Definition 2.20. M, o  Aφ iff. for any o′ ∈ dom(M), M, o′  Aφ.
Its dual E is defined as ¬A¬. The Chellas stit operators and the universal
modality are both S5 operators, and further:
Fact 2.21.  Aφ→ [ai cstit]φ
We give the ‘ought to do’ operator with a level of trust n > 0 the following
truth condition.
Definition 2.22. M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ iff. for each K ∈ Optimal
n
i , K ⊆
|φ|M .
The intuition behind this operator is that if φ being true is a necessary
condition for ai to perform an optimal action given a level of trust n, then
φ is obligatory for ai. Setting n = 1, we get Horty’s deontic ought to do
operator as defined in (Horty; 2001, p. 78). We define the individual ought
to do operator without subscript on Optimus′i. We give the individual ought
to do operator without subscript the following truth condition.
2 Our syntax deviates a bit from the one found in Horty (2001), Belnap et al. (2001),
where the Chellas stit is written [ai cstit : φ].
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Definition 2.23. M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]φ iff. for eachK ∈ Optimus
′
i,K ⊆ |φ|M .
The following facts contain some validities for these operators.
Fact 2.24. For any n,m > 0,
1.  φ implies 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ
2. 
⊙
[ai cstit]n(φ→ ψ)→ (
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ→
⊙
[ai cstit]nψ)
3.  ¬(
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ ∧
⊙
[ai cstit]n¬φ)
4. 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ→
⊙
[ai cstit]mφ, for n < m.
5. 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ→
⊙
[ai cstit]φ
6. There is somem, such that for all n ≥ m 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ↔
⊙
[ai cstit]φ
Proof. 1. Assume  φ. Let o ∈ dom(M) = W for some M . |φ|M = W .
Let K ∈ Optimalni . Since K ⊆ W , it follows that K ⊆ |φ|M , so M, o ⊙
[ai cstit]nφ. Hence 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ. 2. Assume M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]n(φ →
ψ) and M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ. Let K ∈ Optimal
n
i . Since K ⊆ |φ|M and
K ⊆ |φ → ψ|M = −|φ|M ∪ |ψ|M , K ⊆ |ψ|M . Hence, M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]nψ.
3. Assume for the sake of a contradiction that there is some model M and
some outcome o, such that M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ∧
⊙
[ai cstit]n¬φ. Hence for
each K ∈ Optimalni , K ⊆ |φ|M and K ⊆ |¬φ|M , so K ⊆ (|φ|M ∩ |¬φ|M) = ∅.
Hence K = ∅, so Optimalni = ∅, which contradicts Fact 2.14. 4. Assume
M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ and n < m. By Fact 2.15 Optimal
m
i ⊆ Optimal
n
i .
Hence each for K ∈ Optimalmi , K ⊆ |φ|M , and hence M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]mφ
5. Assume M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ. Let K ∈ Optimus
′
i. Since Optimus
′
i ⊆
Optimalni , K ⊆ |φ|M , and hence M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]φ. 6. Take m to be such
that OptimalMm = Optimus′. For any n such that n ≥ m, Optimus′i =
Optimalni , so 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ↔
⊙
[ai cstit]φ.
Since the set of valid formulas is obviously closed under Modus Ponens
(we have {φ, φ → ψ}  ψ), 1. (Necessitation) and 2. (K) show that⊙
[ai cstit]n is a normal modal operator. It is easily shown for the operator
without subscript,
⊙
[ai cstit], as well. 3. (D) is the characteristic deontic
formula, saying that if we are on one level of trust, there can be no moral
conflicts. Again, it holds for
⊙
[ai cstit], also. 4. shows that there is also
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consistency across levels of trust, in the sense that no obligation is lost when
going to higher levels of trust. From these two validities, it follows that no
obligation can be contradicted on a higher level of trust. 5. and 6. show some
rather obvious interactions between the subscripted and non-subscripted op-
erators. That any obligation is preserved by the non-subscripted operator,
and that there is a finite level of trust from which adding more levels of trust
is unnecessary, since it just gives the same obligations. In stit theory ability
is expressed by E[ai cstit]φ. One can think of this formula as expressing ‘ai
has the choice to enforce φ.’ We have the following important principle of
ought implies can.
Fact 2.25. For any n 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ→ E[ai cstit]φ
Proof. Assume M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]nφ. Then for each K ∈ Optimal
n
i , K ⊆
|φ|M . Since Optimal
n
i 6= ∅, let K ∈ Optimal
n
i and let o
′ ∈ K. Now
ChoiceMi (o
′) = K ⊆ |φ|M , henceM, o
′  [ai cstit]φ. HenceM, o  E[ai cstit]φ.
This validity says that we do not demand too much of the agents in the
following sense. If an agent ought to do φ, she in fact can see to it that
φ. Furthermore, all deontic operators are settled in the sense that they are
either true in the whole model or false in the whole model. I.e.
Fact 2.26. For any level of trust m and any o ∈ W , M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]mφ
iff M 
⊙
[ai cstit]mφ
Proof. Right to left is trivial. For left to right, assume M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]mφ
and let o′ ∈ dom(M). Since, for each K ∈ Optimalmi , K ⊆ |φ|M , M, o
′ ⊙
[ai cstit]mφ.
Thus we are justified in talking about what agents ought to do at the
level of models, i.e. in a strategic situation, rather than just with particular
outcomes of such a situation. (Naturally, we can talk about the latter as
well, but the fact shows that there is no difference).
2.7 Formalizing the examples
The first example is represented by Figure 2.2. The atomic formula R is true
iff the Victim resists. The atomic formula H is true iff the Hero helps.
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Hero
Help o1 : R,H, u(o1) = 4 o2 : H, u(o2) = 3
Don′t help o3 : R, u(o3) = 1 o4 : u(o4) = 2
Resist Don′t resist
V ictim
Fig. 2.2: Hostage situation
Doctor
Walk o1 : u(o1) = 5 o2 : u(o2) = 4
Go by boat o3 : B, u(o3) = 6 o4 : B, u(o4) = 3
Stay home o5 : u(o5) = 1 o6 : u(o6) = 2
Go help Stay home
Guide
Fig. 2.3: The doctor’s journey
Considered as a formal model, M , we have M 2
⊙
[ai cstit]1R, with
agents who only trust themselves, it is not the case that the Victim ought
to resist. On the other hand we have M 
⊙
[ai cstit]2R, with agents trust-
ing themselves and each other, the Victim ought to resist. In this case,
since we are down to one action per agent, we have M2 = Optimus
′, so
M 
⊙
[ai cstit]2φ ↔
⊙
[ai cstit]φ. Adding further levels of trust will not
give us any more obligations. This example also shows that for some model,
M 2
⊙
[ai cstit]φ →
⊙
[ai cstit]1φ. The account thus generalizes Horty’s
individual ought to do, Horty (2001), which is our
⊙
[ai cstit]1, because more
propositions may be obligatory on this account. It is of course a matter of
context, whether agents are justified in trusting each other and the indexed
operator gives us flexibility to meet different modeling needs in this respect.
The second example is treated in a similar way. It is represented by Fig-
ure 2.3. B is a propositional atom meaning that the Doctor goes by boat.
Here we have dom(M1) = {o1, . . . , o4} (The Doctor staying home is domi-
nated), and dom(M2) = {o1, o3} (The Guide staying home is dominated).
We have dom(M3) = {o3} (The Doctor walking is dominated). Since we are
down to an atomic action profile, no further levels of trust will subtract more
from the model. We thus have M 
⊙
[Doctor cstit]B, the Doctor ought to
go by boat.
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Friend 1
Go o1 : G1, u(o1) = 3 o2 : G1, u(o2) = 1
Stay o3 : u(o3) = 1 o4 : u(o4) = 2
Go Stay
Friend 2
Fig. 2.4: Friends meeting in town
2.8 The Meinong-Chisholm thesis
The Meinong-Chisholm thesis3 is the following claim:
An agent ai ought to see to it that φ, if and only if, it ought to be the case
that the agent ai sees to it that φ.
The Meinong- Chisholm thesis stands refuted with the theory presented
here. There are cases where it ought to be that the agent sees to it that φ is
still not equivalent to that the agent ought to do to it that φ, for instance,
we might have M, o  ©[ai cstit]φ, but not M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]φ. In certain
situations, genuine group reasoning (individuals acts as parts of groups) can
get us closer, e.g. in hi-low scenarios. Here is an example of such a scenario.
Example 2.3. Two friends, Friend 1 and Friend 2, (who cannot communicate
beforehand) both face the choice of going to town to meet their buddy. It
would yield the best outcome if they both went. However, going to town
alone is futile and a big waste of energy. So the two outcomes, where one
friend goes and the other stays home, are the worst. If both Friends stay
home, it is better than if one goes in vain, but not as good as both meeting
up in town.
Formally, the situation looks like in Figure 2.4, where G1 is a propositional
atom, which means ‘Friend 1 goes to town.’
Even though this situation appears to have a similar structure to the
first example, they are in fact essentially different. The difference is simply
that none of the actions of either agent are strongly dominated. Therefore
M |optimalM = M . It follows that e.g. M, o1 2
⊙
[Friend1 cstit]G1, we
cannot say that Friend 1 ought to see to it that he goes. On the other hand
going is a necessary condition for obtaining the best outcome in the situation,
3 See (Lindstro¨m and Segerberg; 2007, p.1204). This thesis was originally called the
Meinong/Chisholm analysis by Horty, see (Horty; 2001, p. 45).
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so we haveM, o1 ©[Friend1 cstit]G1. It ought to be that Friend 1 sees to it
that he goes. One way of getting there is to extend the theory to also cover
agents trusting in groups. This extension, which is postponed for further
research, could be based on Horty’s group ought operator, see Horty (2001).
Even such an account, however, would not validate the Meinong-Chisholm
thesis, since there are pure coordination situations, where the agents simply
cannot know what they ought to do, whether they identify with a group or
not. We can transform the situation above into a pure coordination situation,
by assuming that the utility of both agents staying home is exactly the same
as of meeting up in town. Here, conditional accounts of ought to do (given
that Friend 1 stays, friend 2 ought to stay, etc), seem appropriate, but this
too, is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is clear, though that such conditional
oughts cannot tell agents what to do in a pure coordination situation as a
whole, but only when fixing certain circumstances, which we take as the
antecedent of the conditional ought.
Chapter 3
Responsibility formalized
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I formalize concepts of responsibility within stit theory. The
focus is on responsibility for events, formally considered as subsets of out-
comes of situations. We distinguish two main kinds of responsibility, positive
responsibility connected to the idea of seeing to it that, and negative respon-
sibility connected to the idea of being able to prevent. First, we introduce the
basic agentive concepts we need, allowing, being able to, refraining, prevent-
ing. Next, we introduce intentions into the situations. Finally we introduce
the concepts of responsibility.
3.2 Allowing
There is an agentive, non-normative, non-evaluative way of using the word
‘allow’, a sense of simply letting something happen. In particular, allowing
in this sense does not imply giving a permission. Consider the following
examples:
Example 3.1.
1. ‘Peter is allowing the window to be open.’
2. ‘Anne allows her hair to grow long.’
In this thesis I will permit myself to paraphrase sentences like the ones
above as follows:
1.’ ‘Peter allows it that the window is open.’
How can we formalize this agentive concept of allows it that within stit
theory? Consider Figure 1.1 again. By making choice K4, even if the best
is true with the outcome (o7 is the actual outcome), the agent a1 did not
see to it that the best happened, because there is another possible outcome
of the same choice, (o6), where the very worst happens. There are many
situations like this, which involve choosing between taking a great risk and
going for a safe bet. Now consider the situation where the worst actually
does happen. We would here not say either that the agent saw to it that
the worst happened. We would say, however, that the agent allowed it to
happen, since the agent made the choice that made it possible. Similarly, if
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the best happens it was also allowed by the agent, in the sense that the agent
made the choice, which made it possible, or that it was a possible outcome
of a choice made by the agent. Although the outcomes are assigned moral
qualities (good, bad, and so on) in this example, these moral qualities are
not essential for this definition of allowing. It works just as well in morally
irrelevant examples such as the following. If an agent can choose to roll a die
or not roll a die, and she rolls it and it shows two spots, the agent allowed it
that the die shows 2 spots.
In general, an agent allows it that φ if and only if φ is true with a pos-
sible outcome of that agent’s choice. It is easily seen that this suggestion
corresponds exactly to interpreting the dual of the Chellas stit operator here
written 〈ai cstit〉 as allows it that. Since the dual is defined as ¬[ai cstit]¬
this operator gets the following truth condition.
Fact 3.1. M, o  〈ai cstit〉φ iff. Choice
M
i (o) * (dom(M) \ |φ|M).
In other words, 〈ai cstit〉φ is true with an outcome o, iff there is some
o′ ∈ ChoiceMi (o) , such that M, o
′  φ. Since the Chellas stit is an S5
modality, T, φ → 〈ai cstit〉φ, is valid. Thus anything that happens to be
the case with the actual outcome of any choice the agent allows to happen.
Children are dying in Africa. I am allowing that to happen. Even things
outside the visible universe, I have no chance of knowing about, I am allowing.
Furthermore, since 4 is valid, we have 〈ai cstit〉〈ai cstit〉φ → 〈ai cstit〉φ.
Things that might have been happening with my choice but are not, I am also
allowing. Before completely dismissing this as absurd, consider the following.
There are cases where we are held responsible for events that might have
obtained as a consequence of our choice, events we allowed to happen, even
when they did not. For instance, agents might be criticized and even be
penalized in a court of law for taking a risk, even if the actual outcome was
not harmful. An everyday example is getting a penalty for driving while
being intoxicated.
Still, the agents seem to have too little control over events they allow in
this sense to hold them responsible for these events. In view of this we will
not hold agents responsible just because they allow things in the very weak
sense conveyed by the dual of the Chellas stit. It will take more than that
to be responsible for an event.
We also note that an analogy to a traditional problem in the philosophy
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of language arises, Ross’ paradox, see Ross (1941).1 The following inference
is an example.
Example 3.2. 1. ‘Anne allows her hair to grow long.’
2. ‘Anne allows her hair to grow long or to burn.’ (From 1.)
Finally, in this chapter I waver a bit between using present tense as op-
posed to past tense (the agent allows it that vs. the agent allowed it that).
In view of the discussion of the different modalities in the introduction, it is
most natural to use past tense when talking about responsibility, since this
can only truly be assigned when the situation is settled in a certain outcome.
In particular, a specific outcome is needed in order to determine whether an
event actually obtained or just might have obtained.
3.3 Being able to, refraining and preventing
In Chapter 2, the Chellas stit was introduced. It is now time to introduce
the deliberative stit operator [ai dstit]. For this to be true an added negative
condition must be fulfilled.
Definition 3.2. M, o  [ai dstit]φ iff. Choice
M
i (o) ⊆ |φ|M and for some
o′ ∈ dom(M), M, o′ 2 φ.
Intuitively, an agent can only truly be said to see to it that an event
obtains, if the choice made by the agent is sufficient for ensuring that the
event obtains and it is at least possible that this event did not obtain in the
given situation. The ability concepts to follow will be defined for both the
Chellas stit and the deliberative stit. Stit theory offers the following account
of individual ability. The concept of an agent a being able to φ is defined
with the formulas E[ai dstit]φ or E[ai cstit]φ.
2 In the semantics the latter
1 Ross formulated his paradox for imperatives , which he took to include what is now
called deontic sentences. The example shows that there is a similar problem in the con-
text of agentive sentences. In Belnap et al. (2001), it is argued that imperatives can be
represented with stit sentences, but I do not wish to commit to that standpoint.
2 In general, at least two concepts of ability can be distinguished, one agent based,
related to what different people under normal circumstances are able to do (as in he is
able to speak), and one situation based related to what can be done in a specific situation
(as in he is able to speak right now). It is the situation based concept of ability that I
am considering in this thesis. Similar remarks apply to the concept of being responsible
below.
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formula is true with an outcome, iff a has some choice where φ is true with
all the outcomes of that choice. Informally, if a can do φ. In Chapter 4 I
analyze this composite or double modality notion of ability in greater detail.
Right now, it would disturb the flow of my argument too much to do so. We
need the concept, however, in order to understand the definition of refraining.
Refraining is defined as having the ability to see to something but allowing
it not to happen, formally an agent a refrains from φ iff. E[ai cstit]φ ∧
〈ai cstit〉¬φ or with the deliberative stit E[ai dstit]φ ∧ ¬[ai dstit]φ. Finally,
we define an agent a preventing φ, simply as [ai cstit]¬φ or [ai dstit]¬φ , the
agent sees to it that φ does not happen.
3.4 Intentions in ethics and legal theory
Intentions are important in ethics and legal theory. Culpability or blame-
worthiness, for instance, is often defined in terms of the intentions of the
moral or legal agent. We judge agents harder for doing things on purpose
than by accident or even by not paying sufficient attention. How can we
ever hope to represent e.g. legal responsibility without considering what the
agents intended to do? However, so far intentions are not considered in stit
theory. On the other hand intentions have been considered in BDI (Belief
Intention Desire) logic, see Rao and Georgeff (1997) and Meyer and Veltman
(2007) for references. Here the basic idea is that intentions function as a filter
on desires and desires function as a filter on beliefs. In Meyer and Veltman
(2007) a very simple multi-agent ‘Belief-Intention’ logic is suggested, where
intentions are just serial relations on a set of possible worlds. This comes
very close to what we will do here, except in the stit framework actions are
given explicit treatment. A suggestion which is even closer in spirit to what
we will do is the theory presented in Roy (2008). Roy represents intentions
by sets of outcomes in a way very similar to what will be done here. The
main difference comes from the fact that he applies his theory to problems
in game theory. Thus he is interested in connecting intentions to an agent’s
utility functions and to solution concepts in game theory. Since I mainly
consider cases where an agent’s values diverge from e.g. legal or moral values
and we only represent the legal values, these sort of connections are not very
relevant. The main intuition underlying my account is that each action token
has a non-empty subset of intended outcomes, which is only relative to this
particular action and not to the overall situation.
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3.5 Intentions in situations
Intentions are represented indirectly by means of the outcomes. It will be
assumed that for any action A there is a non-empty subset IA of intended
outcomes of A. Thus intended outcomes are relative to an action. If an agent
picks up an apple, the intended outcomes are ones where she has picked up
the apple. If an agent closes the door, the intended outcomes are the ones
where the door is closed. Thus the focus is not on what the agent finally
decides to do given a situation, but on what the agent intends to happen
given some choice in a situation. The set of intended outcomes may be seen
to represent the purpose of that particular action, seen from the perspective
of the agent.
Definition 3.3. For each ai ∈ Agent, and each action Aij ∈ Choicei, there
is a non-empty subset IAij ⊆ Aij, called the set of intended outcomes of Aij
We define a utilitarian strategic model with intentions as a utilitarian
strategic model with a set of intended outcomes for each action of each agent
as defined above. We introduce an intention operator [ai iit] for each agent.
The informal reading of [ai iit]φ is ‘ai intends it that φ.’ The set of well formed
formulas is suitably extended and the truth condition for this operator is as
follows.
Definition 3.4. M, o  [ai iit]φ iff. IChoiceMi (o) ⊆ |φ|M .
Informally, an agent intends it that φ with an outcome o, if φ is true with
all intended outcomes of the choice made at o, ChoiceMi (o). The ‘intends it
that’ operator is a normal D45 operator, which validates K, necessitation
and the following.
Fact 3.5. 1. ¬([ai iit]φ ∧ [ai iit]¬φ)
2. [ai iit]φ→ [ai iit][ai iit]φ
3. ¬[ai iit]φ→ [ai iit]¬[ai iit]φ
4. [ai cstit]φ→ [ai iit]φ
1. An agent cannot intend φ and its negation. 2. If an agent intends it
that φ, then the agent intends it that the agent intends it that φ. 3. If an
agent does not intend it that φ, then the agent intends it that the agent does
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not intend it that φ. 4. If an agent sees to it that φ with the Chellas stit, then
the agent intends it that φ. From 4. it follows that [ai dstit]φ→ [ai iit]φ .
Although an agent cannot see to it that φ without intending it that φ, it
is possible for an agent to allow it that φ and intend it that ¬φ. Should
intentions be closed under logical consequence? Horty does not seem to
think so.
. . . one could imagine that an agent might see to it that A holds
and that B holds as well without intentionally seeing to it that
they hold jointly. . .
(Horty; 2001, p. 17)
With the present proposal, this is clearly not possible. We have ([ai iit]φ∧
[ai iit]ψ) → [ai iit]φ ∧ ψ and [ai dstit]φ → [ai iit]φ. Therefore [ai dstit]φ
and [ai dstit]ψ clearly contradicts ¬[ai iit]φ ∧ ψ. In general, this question
opens a number of possible objections related similar problems in deontic
and epistemic contexts. Suffice it to give two examples.
Donald Davidson considers a case, where an agent has to decide to flip a
light switch and turn on the light. Unbeknownst to the agent, a prowler is
waiting outside. The outcomes where the light is turned on are exactly the
same as the ones where the prowler is alerted. Yet, we do not wish to say that
the agent intended to alert the prowler. (Davidson; 1963, p. 24). At first,
it may seem that Davidson’s problem is not really relevant to the situations
represented in this thesis. Since we only consider situations where every
agent knows every possible outcome, the agent does know that turning on the
light is equal to alerting the prowler (with the terminology used later in the
chapter the validity in the model of L↔ P implies the validity in the model
of Kprei (L ↔ P )). For this reason, we might say Davidson’s example lies
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the problem is much more general
and not essentially connected to the epistemic conditions of situations. It
is related to what is called double effects in Ethics and Law, see e.g. Duff
(1982), Chisholm (1970), Greve (2004). Although it is inevitably painful to
get an injection, the doctor does not intend to cause me pain. Technically,
double effects concern the counterfactual nature of intentions. One way of
seeing this problem, is that a formula expressing a set of intended outcomes
seems to be more stable under some counterfactual circumstances than the
contingent logical equivalences given by the actual situation. The example
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given by Roy, see (Roy; 2008, p. 27), taken from Bratman, concern two
different decision makers who are going to bomb a munitions plant placed
next to a school. We assume that the decision makers are completely aware
that they cannot bomb the munitions plant without bombing the school and
vice versa. Yet, there is a difference between terror bomber, who primarily
wants to bomb the school and strategic bomber, who wants to bomb the
munitions plant. In particular, strategic bomber can claim that he does not
intend to bomb the school with the following argument: had the school been
placed elsewhere, he would still intend to bomb the munitions plant. Roy’s
suggested way of getting out this problem involves redescribing the situation
to bring out the counterfactual aspects, however, he does not pursue a theory
of such alternative descriptions systematically, (the problem is not central to
his thesis) and I shall also not pursue this strategy further here. On the one
hand, this leaves us with the following immediate problem: the representation
of intentions via intended outcomes makes our concept of intention diverge
some from the concept as used in natural language. On the other hand, the
fact that intentions are closed under logical consequence, does not seem any
more or less serious than other propositional attitudes to propositions. For
instance, in possible worlds semantics:
. . . we seem to predict wrongly that a person who believes a propo-
sition p should also believe any proposition that is true in the
same worlds as p. (Kratzer; 2007, p. 4-5)
Perhaps some of the various ways of dealing with this problem for other
attitudes could be adapted for intentions. For instance, we might distinguish
between what an agent implicitly intends and explicitly intends in a way
similar to implicit vs. explicit knowledge, see Fagin et al. (1995). A specific
suggestion quite similar to that will be made in Chapter 8. An alternative
more in tune with the counterfactual understanding of double effects would
be to extend the models to sets of possible situations with a suitable cor-
respondence between outcomes of these. The set of intended outcomes of a
situation would then be defined across a subset of these possible situations.
This suggestion comes very close to the way the problem is dealt with in the
seminal paper on BDI logic, see Rao and Georgeff (1997). For now, however,
I leave this problem and concentrate on defining concepts of responsibility
using the simple concept of intentions presented above.
3. Responsibility formalized 42
3.6 Responsibility
By positive responsibility we mean the kind of responsibility an agent has for
whatever she deliberatively sees to. So we define it as follows.
Definition 3.6. An agent ai is positively responsible for φ at o, iff M, o 
[ai dstit]φ
Thus, formally there is no difference between being positively responsible
for φ and seeing to it that φ. By negative responsibility we mean the kind
of responsibility an agent has for whatever she could have prevented. There
are two subcases of negative responsibility, strict liability and liability for
risking. Strict liability is defined as follows.
Definition 3.7. An agent ai is strictly liable for φ at o, iff. M, o  φ ∧
E[ai dstit]¬φ
An agent is strictly liable for φ iff. φ happened and the agent could have
prevented φ by making another choice. In determining strict liability, the
intentions or mens rea of the agent does not matter. This is typically the
case in situations of omissions or neglect. An agent did not intend for φ, but
she did not do what was required to prevent it. A related concept is that of
being liable for risking φ. This is defined as follows.
Definition 3.8. An agent ai is liable for risking φ at o, iff. M, o  ¬φ ∧
〈ai cstit〉φ ∧E[ai dstit]¬φ
Thus an agent is liable for risking φ, if φ did not actually happen, but
it could have happened with the choice made by the agent, and the agent
could have prevented φ by making another choice.
3.7 Guilt
In determining the guilt of an agent, the intentions of the agents are impor-
tant. We say that an agent is guilty of φ iff she is responsible for φ and
intended it that φ. If an agent is positively responsible for φ, she is auto-
matically guilty of φ, as established by the validity [ai dstit]φ → [ai iit]φ.
However, we also say that an agent ai is guilty of φ, if ai is strictly liable for
φ and ai intended it that φ.
Definition 3.9. An agent ai is guilty of φ at o, iff either
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1. ai is positively responsible for φ at o, or
2. M, o  φ ∧E[ai dstit]¬φ ∧ [ai iit]φ
Thus the second sufficient condition of guilt is defined by adding the
intention on top of strict liability. When we want to distinguish the two
kinds of guilt we call the latter negative guilt . We define an agent as guilty
of attempt at φ if the agent is liable for risking φ and the agent intended it
that φ.
Definition 3.10. An agent ai is guilty of attempting φ at o, iff. M, o 
¬φ ∧ 〈ai cstit〉φ ∧E[ai dstit]¬φ ∧ [ai iit]φ
The concept of negative guilt and the concept of guilt of attempt are es-
pecially relevant in cases where the agent cannot see to it or enforce an event,
but where the final outcome of the situation depends on luck or favorable
circumstances. For instance, an assassin might not be able to see to it that
she hits and kills a politician, but we will still consider her guilty of murder,
if she kills the politician, intended to kill him and could have refrained from
killing him. We will consider her guilty of attempted murder, if the same
obtains, except that she misses her intended target.
We define the abilitive concept regulative control over φ as the simulta-
neous ability to see to it that φ and to prevent φ in a situation. Thus an
agent is both negatively responsible and positive responsible for φ, if she has
regulative control. A lot of the everyday events we are responsible for are
of this kind, we can ensure them or prevent them at will, especially events
closely connected to the control we have over own bodies. The concept of
guilt as defined above is not evaluative, being guilty of φ does not imply that
φ is good or bad, right or wrong. To get to the concepts of blameworthiness
and praiseworthiness, we use the deontic operators defined in Chapter 2.
3.8 Moral blameworthiness and praiseworthiness
In order to be morally or legally blameworthy for φ is it not enough to be
guilty in the sense defined above. It must also be wrong to do φ. Likewise
there is a deontic condition for praiseworthiness. We now define concepts of
moral blameworthiness, in terms of ought to do operators from the previous
chapter. We say that an agent is blameworthy of φ, if the agent is guilty of
φ, and φ ought to be prevented.
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Definition 3.11. An agent ai is blameworthy of φ at an outcome o, iff ai is
guilty of φ at o and M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]¬φ.
This concept of blameworthiness does not distinguish between guilt be-
cause of positive responsibility and guilt because of negative responsibil-
ity. However, in the following definitions of blameworthiness of attempting,
blameworthiness by neglect and blameworthiness of risking only negative
responsibility comes into play. Intuitively, an agent deserves blame for at-
tempting φ, if the agent ought to have prevented φ , φ did not actually
happen, but the agent intended it that φ.
Definition 3.12. An agent ai is blameworthy of attempting φ at o, iff ai is
guilty of attempting φ at o and M, o 
⊙
[ai cstit]¬φ.
Intuitively, an agent is deserves blame of φ because of neglect, if φ hap-
pened, the agent did not intend φ to happen, the agent could have prevented
φ and the agent ought to have prevented φ.
Definition 3.13. An agent ai is blameworthy of φ because of neglect at o, iff
ai is strictly liable for φ at o and M, o  ¬[ai iit]φ ∧
⊙
[ai cstit]¬φ.
An agent is blameworthy of risking φ, if φ did not happen but might have
happened with the choice of the agent, the agent did not intend it that φ,
the agent could have prevented φ and the the agent ought to have prevented
φ.
Definition 3.14. An agent ai is blameworthy of risking φ at o, iff ai is liable
for risking φ at o and M, o  ¬[ai iit]φ ∧
⊙
[ai cstit]¬φ.
If we interpret
⊙
[ai cstit]¬φ as ‘φ is illegal’ the defined concepts corre-
spond to legal concepts. Blameworthiness corresponds to legal culpability of
an event and blameworthiness of attempting an event corresponds to legal
culpability of attempt. Blameworthiness by neglect and blameworthiness of
risking corresponds to legal culpability of an event and of risking an event
due to an omission.
In the simplest case assigning praise is symmetrical to assigning blame.
An agent deserves praise for φ if the agent sees to it that φ (the first sufficient
condition for being guilty) and the agent ought to do φ.
Definition 3.15. An agent ai is positively praiseworthy of φ at an outcome
o, iff M, o  [ai cstit]φ ∧
⊙
[ai cstit]φ.
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o1 : D,¬L, u(o1) = 10 o3 : ¬D,¬L, u(o3) = 5o2 : ¬D,L, u(o2) = 1
A11 (F ly) A12 (Don
′t f ly)
Skywalker
Fig. 3.1: Skywalker’s choice
However, things can become more interesting, when we start thinking
about negative responsibility and praise. There are situations, where no ac-
tion is dominated, and yet an agent can deserve praise for doing or attempting
something. Consider the following example.
Example 3.3. In Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope (1977) Luke Skywalker
has to make a very unlikely shot from his space ship to destroy the Death
Star. If he had decided not to fly this dangerous mission, he would not have
been to blame (we may assume). However, if he decides to fly it and succeeds
he deserves praise. If he gets killed, he even deserves praise for trying.
This example is represented by Figure 3.1. Here D means that the Death
Star is destroyed, and L means that Luke dies. We assume that the best
possible outcome is when the Death Star is destroyed and Luke survives,
the worst is when the Death Star is not destroyed and Luke dies and that
the outcome where Luke survives but the Death Star is not destroyed has
an intermediate value. In this case none of Luke’s actions dominates the
other. In particular, it is not the case that Skywalker ought to see to it that
the Death Star is destroyed, since ought implies can and Skywalker cannot
guarantee a hit. On the other hand, it ought to be that the Death Star is
destroyed, since D is true with the best possible outcome of the situation.
Since Skywalker’s intention by flying is to destroy the Death Star, we have
IA11 = {o1}. We have IA12 = {o3}. We have that Skywalker is guilty of
destroying the Death Star at o1, and guilty of attempting to destroy the
Death Star at o2. We say that an agent ai is negatively praiseworthy for
doing φ, if ai is negatively guilty of φ and it ought to be that φ.
Definition 3.16. An agent ai is negatively praiseworthy for doing φ at an
outcome o, iff. ai is negatively guilty of φ at o, and M, o ©φ.
We say that an agent ai is praiseworthy of trying to do φ, if ai is guilty
of attempting φ and it ought to be that φ.
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Definition 3.17. An agent ai is praiseworthy of attempting φ at an outcome
o, iff. ai is guilty of attempting φ at o, and M, o ©φ.
In some cases, it is considered an omission if an agent does not make an
attempt. In cases where somebody might risk ruining his own or somebody
else’s property in order to save another human being (e.g. throwing a valuable
floating object into a lake to try to save a person from drowning ) without
putting their own life at risk, they might be legally responsible for neglect if
they do not do anything.3 The structure of such cases are the same as in the
Skywalker example. Here the worst outcome is when the object is destroyed
and the person is not saved from drowning, the intermediate outcome is when
the person is not saved and the object is not destroyed and the best outcome
is when the person is saved from drowning and the object is destroyed.
The most important precursor of this work is Stig Kanger’s definition of
individual responsibility. I would like to conclude this chapter by compar-
ing the definitions given above with Kanger’s. However, Kanger’s definition
explicitly refers to the knowledge of agents. Thus, in order to make a full
comparison, it is necessary to spell out the epistemic conditions of agents.
3.9 Knowledge in situations
The primary aim of this thesis is to analyze concepts related to actions,
ability and norms. The following discussion of epistemic notions will be kept
brief.
In accordance with the three temporal views on situations discussed in
the introduction, three kinds of knowledge may be distinguished. It is possi-
ble to distinguish between an agent’s knowledge before, during, and after a
given situation. Rather than explicitly introducing a temporal structure to
situations (as would be the common way to go in stit theory), the strategy
here is a little different. Each agent ai will be given 3 partitions representing
her knowledge before, during, and after a situation. These will be denoted
∼prei , ∼
dur
i , ∼
post
i . So far (and also henceforth), the different outcomes of situ-
ations are meant to represent ontological uncertainty. Now, we can also talk
about the epistemic uncertainty of agents. There are several options when
deciding how to define these epistemic accessibility relations, but the condi-
tions stipulated as follows are probably the simplest. They utilize already
3 This is for instance the case according to Danish law, see (Greve; 2004, p. 131).
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used partitions. Before the situation the epistemic uncertainty is total i.e. it
is exactly the same as ontological uncertainty. For a situationM and for each
agent ai, ∼
pre
i = dom(M) × dom(M). During the situation the agent knows
what choice she has made but not what choices the other agents have made,
i.e. ∼duri = Choicei (the partition given by the actions of the agent). After
the situation there is no epistemic uncertainty, i.e. the epistemic relation is
the identity relation on the domain. For any o, o′ ∈ dom(M), o ∼posti o
′ iff.
o = o′. To the symbols are added three epistemic operators for each agent ai,
written Kprei , K
dur
i , K
post
i , and the set of well-formed formulas is extended as
expected. We define a utilitarian strategic models with intentions and knowl-
edge as a utilitarian strategic model with three epistemic relations for each
agent as defined above. The truth conditions of the epistemic operators are
defined as usual.
Definition 3.18. 1. M, o  Kprei φ iff for each o
′, such that o ∼prei o
′,
M, o′  φ.
2. M, o  Kduri φ iff for each o
′, such that o ∼duri o
′, M, o′  φ.
3. M, o  Kposti φ iff for each o
′, such that o ∼posti o
′, M, o′  φ.
The following validities give the flavor of these epistemic conditions. In
general, before the situation, agents have knowledge of the modalities which
are settled in the situation, i.e. the deontic modalities and the ability modal-
ities. During the situation, agents also have knowledge about the action
modalities, i.e. the stit and iit modalities, and after the situation the agents
also have knowledge about everything, including the various concepts of re-
sponsibility.
Fact 3.19. 1. All operators are normal S5 modalities.
2.  Kprei φ→ K
dur
i φ→ K
post
i φ (Knowledge is not forgotten).
3. 
⊙
[ai cstit]φ→ K
pre
i
⊙
[ai cstit]φ.
4.  E[ai dstit]φ→ K
pre
i E[ai dstit]φ
5.  [ai dstit]φ→ K
dur
i [a dstit]φ.
6.  [a iit]φ→ Kduri [a iit]φ.
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7. Let φ be a formula expressing one of the formulas of responsibility
above for the agent a.  φ→ Kposti φ.
Proof. I sketch a proof of 1.,2., and 7. 1. follows from the fact that the three
relations are equivalence relations. 2. follows from the fact that the identity
relation is a sub relation of the relation given by the partition of the actions,
and this is a sub relation of the universal relation. 7. follows from the fact
that an agent has total knowledge of any formula φ after the situation. Let
o be an outcome and φ be any formula , s.t. M, o  φ. Since o is identical to
o and only identical to o, we have M, o  Kposti φ.
More interesting concepts of knowledge could be introduced, for instance,
the uncertainty after the situation can be increased by loosening the restric-
tion that ∼posti are the singleton sets. This uncertainty is purely epistemic,
not ontological. I leave the evaluation of these options to somebody else. The
main purpose of introducing these epistemic concepts here was to facilitate
a comparison with Kanger’s interesting concepts of responsibility.
3.9.1 Kanger on responsibility
Kanger’s definition of individual responsibility was presented in Kanger (1971).
His definition of ai being responsible for φ is that ai is either blameworthy or
praiseworthy for φ. Thus he defines responsibility as always already contain-
ing an evaluative component. This is in opposition to our strategy, which
assumes that there are both agentive and intentional concepts of responsibil-
ity (and guilt), which are morally or legally neutral. It seems that agents are
responsible for quite a few things that are neither forbidden or obligatory,
for example, I am responsible for writing this chapter right now. Blame and
praise are evaluations based on an added normative component. Here this
added normative component is the utilities of outcomes. In the following
I transpose Kanger’s definition of being blameworthy into the models pre-
sented in this thesis. Apart from agentive and alethic concepts it involves
deontic and epistemic concepts. In the following I use the Chellas stit.
Definition 3.20 (Kanger). An agent ai is blameworthy for φ if,
1. ©¬φ,
2. [ai cstit]φ,
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3. ¬A[ai cstit]φ,
4. EKi ©¬φ
5. EKi[ai cstit]φ
6. EKi¬A[ai cstit]φ
The first three parts of the definition consist of a deontic condition, an
action condition and an ability condition. An agent ai is blameworthy for φ,
if φ is wrong, ai has done φ, and it is not the case that ai cannot avoid doing
φ, (equivalent in our system to it is possible for ai to allow ¬φ). The last
three parts of the definition consist of a sort of ‘epistemic closure’ of the first
three parts. It is required that it is possible that ai knows that it is wrong,
it is possible that ai knows what he did, and it is possible that he knows, he
did not have to do it. To be praiseworthy replace ©¬φ with ©φ in parts 1
and 4 of the definition. Now for the comparison with the theory presented
in this chapter. Part 2 and part 3 of the definition together imply the dstit
operator (if we had used the dstit operator to begin with the third clause
would be superfluous, since it is already a tautology). Kanger does not make
the distinction between ought to be and ought to do observed in this thesis.
Let us restrict our attention to ought to do. Thus, we replace Kanger’s first
condition with
⊙
[ai cstit]¬φ. After that the three first parts corresponds
to the definition given of blameworthiness in Definition 3.11, leaving out the
intentions. It is not obvious from Kanger’s paper whether we should consider
the knowledge of the agent before during or after a situation. However, it
seems natural to require that the agent knows before the situation that she
ought not to do φ. Further, she also knows beforehand that there are other
choices available to her where she does not see to it that φ. Finally, she
should know what she is doing during the situation. In fact, the fulfilment
of these three requirements follows from the first three parts of the definition
with the way knowledge is represented here. The fourth part follows from
the validity
⊙
[ai cstit]¬φ→ K
pre
i
⊙
[ai cstit]¬φ. The fifth part follows from
the validity [ai cstit]φ → K
dur
i [ai cstit]φ. The sixth part follows from the
validity E〈ai cstit〉¬φ→ K
pre
i E〈ai cstit〉¬φ. Thus, when restricting ourselves
to knowledge as presented above, Kanger’s epistemic closure conditions are
already met, or actually something stronger since we do not have to add the
possibility operators in front of the epistemic operators. These outermost
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possibility operators on the conditions follow from the validity φ → Eφ. It
is possible that Kanger by adding these possibility operator wanted to add
epistemic uncertainty for the observer of the situation i.e. it is possible to the
observer that the agent had this knowledge and thus the observer is justified
in assigning blame or praise. Here, the focus has been not on epistemic
justifications of assigning blame but on being blameworthy and praiseworthy
in an ‘objective’ sense. The reason for the quotes around objective is that
all is relative to a given representation of a given situation and a certain
set of values. When that is assumed, I think that the defined concepts
capture quite well an intuitive sense of objective fairness, also in the sense of
giving sufficient and necessary reasons for being justified in assigning blame
according to a certain set of values. If all the conditions for an agent to
be blameworthy obtain, then it is fair to assign blame to him. If one of
the conditions does not obtain then it is not fair to assign blame to him.
For instance, if φ did not happen but might have happened with the actual
choice of an agent, the agent could and ought to have prevented φ and the
agent did not intend it that φ, it is not fair to hold that agent responsible for
attempting φ, although it is fair to hold the agent responsible for risking φ.
In other words, the theory reinstates a fruitful distinction between being
responsible (guilty, etc. ) and merely being assigned responsibility.
Chapter 4
Ability modalities and the metaphysics of agency
4.1 Introduction
This chapter contains a systematic analysis of ability modalities, also called
dynamic modalities. The distinctions provided by this conceptual analysis
are applied in a metaphysical discussion of ability. The focus of this chapter
is the ability modality can and some related ability modalities. Thus I do
not consider e.g. deontic and quantificational can(as in ‘screwdrivers can be
dangerous’). A distinction between agent capability can (general ability of an
agent, as in ‘she can swim’) and situation ability can (the ability of a specific
agent in a particular situation) is also relevant to this analysis. Vaguely
stated, the connection between the two is that with the preconditions for
a certain event in place, agent capability normally implies situation ability.
E.g., An agent may be capable of swimming in general, but since a normal
precondition for swimming is the presence of a body of water of some size,
she might not have situation ability to swim in a given situation. This
distinction is not the focus of this chapter, where the aim is exclusively to
analyze situation ability, concerning what particular agents can (and may,
might or must) do in specific situations.
4.2 The Brown-Horty double modality analysis of ability
In this section I summarize the discussion leading to the Brown-Horty def-
inition of ability following Brown (1988), Brown (1992), (Horty; 2001, pp.
2-24), see also (Portner; 2009, Chapter 4). The double modality definition
of ability given by Brown and Horty provides the starting point for the more
general and systematic analysis of ability modalities within the stit frame-
work presented here. Kenny argued that a normal modal logic possibility
operator cannot capture a natural concept of ability, see Kenny (1976). This
is so because the validities φ→ ♦φ and ♦(φ∨ψ)→ (♦φ∨♦ψ) contradict our
intuitions about this concept. From the fact that an agent is lucky enough to
hit the bull’s-eye it does not follow that she has an ability to do it. From the
fact that an agent is able to hit the top half or the bottom half of the dart
board it does not follow that she has the ability to hit the bottom half or she
has the ability to hit the top half. The latter might require more control over
the dart than she has. The first objection can be met by not requiring that
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the accessibility relation for the modality is reflexive. The second objection
applies to all normal modal logics (for a definition of a normal modal logic,
see e.g. Chellas (1980)). As a consequence, Brown responded to Kenny by
a move to non-normal modal logics. He introduced an ability operator in
possible worlds models with the following semantics: A set of propositions
are singled out as relevant - they represent actions. The worlds that are
elements of each action/set represent outcomes of that action. We can now
both quantify over actions and over outcomes. The ability operator corre-
sponds to existential quantification our actions and universal quantification
over outcomes : For some action all outcomes make φ true. The dual of this
gives us universal quantification over actions and existential quantification
over outcomes. This Brown refers to as a concept of might : for any action,
some outcome makes φ true. An even weaker concept of might is existential
quantification over actions and existential quantification over outcomes: with
some outcome of some action, φ is true. The strongest concept is universal
quantification over actions and universal quantification over outcomes: With
all outcomes of any action, φ is true. This Brown calls a concept of will.
In Brown (1992) the analysis of ability is recaptured with two normal
modalities one alethic possibility operator and one action or brings it about
that operator. The other ability modalities (will, might) are not investigated
in that paper. It is further investigated (following a suggestion made to
Brown by David Lewis) that the action operator could be an S5 operator.
Horty captures Brown’s ability operator in the specific stit setting by the
composite formula E[ai cstit]φ.
1 The most rigid translation into natural
language of this Brown-Horty double modality definition of ability is ‘it is
possible that the agent sees to it that φ.’ However, given that the choices
partition the outcomes, and so any outcome is a member of some choice, it
is also fair to translate this: ‘the agent has the choice to see to it that φ.’.
This comes fairly close to ‘the agent is able to φ.’ from this there is not far
to ‘the agent can φ.’ At least, if we restrict our attention to what an agent
can do in a specific situation. In the following we will transpose the rest of
Brown’s ability modalities to the stit setting using the universal modality
and the ‘sees to it that’ and ‘allows it that’ modalities.
1 A minor difference between Horty’s and Brown’s analysis is that Brown considers the
alethic possibility relation to be only reflexive, whereas Horty considers it the universal
(an equivalence) relation.
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ability modal Formula Rigid translation
The agent
A[ai cstit]φ
It is necessary that
must φ the agent sees to it that φ
The agent
E[ai cstit]φ
It is possible that
can φ the agent sees to it that
The agent
A〈ai cstit〉φ
It is necessary that
may φ the agent allows it that φ
The agent
E〈ai cstit〉φ
It is possible that
might φ the agent allows it that φ
Fig. 4.1: Ability modalities
4.3 Ability must, can, may and might
The following four different concepts connected to ability will be considered:
must, can, may, might. They are presented in Figure 4.1.
There is no doubt that the rigid translations of the formulas are fine,
given that the definitions of seeing to it that and allowing it that are fine.
There is also no doubt that the ability modalities occur in natural language.
The strongest of these I call ability must . This name replaces Brown’s will.
Will seems to be more connected to intentions than to ability. However, this
is not an important matter, the semantics is the same as the one suggested
for will by Brown. Although ability must is rare, it does occur, e.g. in the
question ‘must you breathe so loud?’ Instead of using the word might in two
different ways, I introduce may for the concept which is the dual of can and
reserve might for the dual of must. For can and may the following dialogue
will serve as an example.
Example 4.1.
Hector: ‘Bob can run the ten kilometers.’
Andrea: ‘No, he is not in very good shape, so he may stop after five kilome-
ters.’
Here, Andrea takes Hector to mean that Bob has the ability to ensure
that he runs the distance. She contradicts this by claiming that he does not
have this ability in view of his poor physical shape. Are these statements
really contradictory? I shall argue that they are, given the following proviso
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regarding the distinction between may and might. The distinction that I
have made between may and might is clearly artificial and does not occur
in natural language. The underlying conceptual difference underlying this
distinction was observed by Brown and it is obviously relevant. With the
present theory, ’He may φ’, means that no matter what choice he makes
(how or what he does), φ is a possible consequence. We may assume this
is what Andrea meant by may in the previous example, although she easily
could have used might to get at the same meaning. With our theory, ‘He
might φ’, refers to Brown’s weaker might. It means that with one of his
choices, φ is a possible consequence. The meaning of this latter is perhaps
captured in a dialogue like the following.
Example 4.2.
Hector: ‘Should I throw the dart?’
Andrea: ‘Yes, you might hit the bull’s eye.’
The meaning of the latter ‘might’ seems to be that given that Hector
chooses to throw the dart there is a possibility that he hits the bull’s eye.
This is what we shall mean by ‘might’ in this chapter. I don’t consider it a
very serious objection that the distinction between ability may and ability
might is not present in natural language, since my prior concern is not to
make a theory of natural language, but rather to analyze interesting modal
concepts within an already given theory of agency. I consider it sufficient
reason to fix the distinction that these different concepts seem to underlie
different uses of the ability modalities in natural language. Another more
serious objection will be discussed towards the end of the chapter.
4.4 Logical relations between ability modalities
It is well known that for any modal logic with at least a serial accessability
relation (i.e. also including reflexive relations as for the stit modality and the
universal modality ) the traditional square of opposition holds, see e.g Fitting
and Mendelsohn (1998). For the sees to it that and allows it that operators,
it looks as in Figure 4.2. Two formulas are contradictory iff they cannot both
be true and they cannot both be false. Two formulas are contraries iff they
cannot both be true. Two formulas are subcontraries iff they cannot both be
false. A formula is a subaltern of another iff it is implied by it but not the
other way around. Since there are 8 ability modalities, it is not possible to
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sub-contraries
contraries
〈ai cstit〉¬φ〈ai cstit〉φ
[ai cstit]¬φ[ai cstit]φ
su
b
altern
su
b
altern
co
nt
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di
ct
or
ies
contradictories
Fig. 4.2: Square of opposition for action modalities
make a square of opposition for these. For a combination of two modalities,
a cube of opposition can be constructed, as in Figure 4.3 (to make simpler,
explicit reference to the agent is omitted.) I will just give one example of how
to test these logical relations. Assume, M, o  A[ai cstit]φ ∧ E[ai cstit]¬φ,
(i.e. the agent ai must φ and can ¬φ.) From the second conjunct, there is an
outcome o′, such that M, o′  [ai cstit]¬φ, hence M, o
′  ¬φ From the first
conjunct, M, o′  [ai cstit]φ, hence M, o
′  φ, contradiction.
The corner that cannot be seen containsmay¬φ. Imagine the cube tilted
forward 45 degrees so that the corners with mustφ and must¬φ are on top.
The diagonal planes are hidden in the figure. The diagonal plane consti-
tuted by must, might and their negations constitutes a regular square of
opposition mustφ and might¬φ are contradictories and so on. The other
diagonal plane, constituted by canφ,mayφ and their negations, is extracted
in Figure 4.4.
The only logical relation from the traditional square of opposition that
holds between these duals and their negations is that a formula is the con-
tradictory of its dual with the complement negated. If the two top formulas
are both true, then, of course, the two bottom ones are both false. In this
case the agent has what we called regulative control over φ in the previous
chapter. If the two bottom formulas are both false, φ is what we may call
totally contingent for the agent, which means that it is completely out of
control of the agent. No matter what she does, it is φ is true with some
outcome and it is false with some other outcome.
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Fig. 4.3: Cube of opposition for ability modalities
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Fig. 4.4: Square of opposition for can and may
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4.5 The Metaphysics of agency
The formal models used in this thesis are mainly meant as idealized repre-
sentations of situations that might actually occur. Since the work is purely
conceptual (no experiments, no serious appeal to any science other than
mathematics) large parts of this thesis may be considered metaphysical.2
However, so far I have limited myself to what was called metaphysics with
a small ‘m’ in (Belnap et al.; 2001, p. v). The way I see it, rather than be-
ing a precise distinction, this indicates a commitment to everyday intuitions
when introducing primitives, defining concepts, and so on. In this section, I
momentarily free myself of this commitment and digress into loftier areas of
the Metaphysical realm, spelled with a capital ‘M’. I even have a proposition
about that most elusive of beings to the effect that if there is an omnipotent
god it is unique and solely responsible for everything.3
First, however, I would like to note that in situation models ability must and
might are somewhat trivial, since ability must is equivalent to alethic must
and ability might is equivalent to alethic might. The following are valid.
A[ai cstit]φ↔ Aφ and E〈ai cstit〉φ↔ Eφ.
Further, if we use the deliberative stit and formalize must φ as A[a dstit]φ
then there is nothing any agent must do, because ¬A[a dstit]φ is valid.
Either there is some indeterminacy or there is no deliberative action. Some
might think this is okay, there is no event you must see to, you always have
the choice to refrain (making it at least possible that the event does not
occur), if this event is count as the result of an action. Others might use this
fact to question the presented concept of ability must. That in turn might
lead them to question the stit formalization of choice as a partition of all
outcomes. If they want to keep the general idea they could move to a variant
of the more liberal theory presented in Brown (1988), where choices are still
subsets of outcomes but do not partition the outcomes. That would be a
way to distinguish ability must from alethic must. I will not explore this
option here. Instead, I will take the chapter in a rather different direction.
2 Chapter 7 is an exception with its appeal to ordinary linguistic intuitions. That
chapter can be considered independently, as contributing to the philosophy of language.
3 Chapter 6 contains another kind of digression from metaphysics with a small ‘m’. In
that chapter, I do not consider unrealistic agents in order to say something about agency,
but unrealistic situations in order to say something about responsibility.
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The conceptual distinctions offered by the cube of opposition present an
interesting way of characterizing various possible philosophical positions on
the relation between agency and contingency, which will now be investigated.
4.5.1 Four reductionist positions about being and ability
Stit theory offers many ways of contrasting how agents may relate to contin-
gent events and the cube of opposition offers one way of comparing them. It
is, for instance, an interesting exercise to investigate different metaphysical
views on agent ability. In order to make the discussion more interesting we
might establish the common ground among these views that agents cannot
do anything about tautologies and contradictions, and so the discussion will
center around the status of contingent formulas and their negations (also
contingent.) Moving from the top down in the cube, we first consider the
position that everything that you do you must do or must not do i.e. for an
agent a and for any contingent p, either A[ai cstit]p or A[ai cstit]¬p. We
call such an agent determined . As we have just seen, determinism about
action implies alethic determinism and so this view trivializes agent choice.
There is no moral responsibility for determined agents, neither positive or
negative, using the definitions of these concepts offered in Chapter 3. For the
next positions it seems most interesting to consider conjunctions of ability
formulas. Another possible position is that for an agent, and for any contin-
gent p, E[ai cstit]p and E[ai cstit]¬p holds, i.e. that the agent has regulative
control over any contingent fact. Such an agent I call omnipotent. An om-
nipotent agent is responsible for everything that happens, since she either
sees to it or could have prevented it! In most everyday situations, consid-
ering any agent to be omnipotent seems to imply a serious confusion of the
real and the imaginary, and further it implies a certain kind of solipsism as
shown below, since there can be at most one omnipotent agent in any given
situation. Hence if two agents regard themselves omnipotent, at least one of
them is wrong. A more subtle and interesting position is the one contrary to
this. This is the position, for an agent a that she can never see to anything
or prevent anything in the strong sense of stit theory. Let us call a person
adopting this view an ability sceptic.4 No matter what you say an agent sees
to, the ability sceptic will respond that it was a possibility that things did
not turn out this way. Further, whatever contingent event did not occur,
4 I will briefly return to this view in Chapter 8.
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it could have happened no matter what you did to try to prevent it. The
ability scepctic holds that for any p, A〈ai cstit〉p and A〈ai cstit〉¬p . We
call such an agent very weak. Like a determined agent, a very weak agent is
also not responsible for anything in either the negative or the positive sense
of the definitions in the previous chapter. The last position is indeterminism
without control. We take this position to reduce all contingencies to Ep and
E¬p. An agent for which this holds we call undetermined . Whereas this does
not rule out any of the other positions except determinism, indeterminism is
not this is not enough to establish moral responsibility in either of the two
senses. For example, an undetermined agent might be very weak and thus
not responsible for anything.
In my view, none of these positions are very appealing since they all rule
out important aspects of ability. Ability determinism rules out the possibil-
ity that agents can control some things, which seems to be contradicted by
everyday human experience. On the other hand, indeterminism in itself is
not enough to establish this control. It seems obviously wrong to consider
human beings omnipotent, there are things we cannot either prevent or guar-
antee, such as the weather on distant planets. At any rate the existence of
omnipotent agents is strictly contradicted by naturalist realism, which claims
that there are some contingencies which are totally contingent for any agent.
It is hardest to respond to the claim that all agents are very weak in the sense
defined above. In fact, I am not sure that I can give a completely convincing
reply within the present framework. In Chapter 8 a different definition of
ability can is given, which is not affected by this objection. Somebody mak-
ing this claim will grant that we have some control, we just can’t ever 100
percent guarantee or prevent any contingency. Take an assertion about the
result of a simple action, such as ‘my right hand is lifted.’ The position does
not rule out that this is true because of my decision to lift my right hand a
moment ago, i.e. I have causal responsibility for the event. What is claimed is
that it is always the case that given my choice to raise my hand the sentence
might in principle have turned out false, say by some freak quantum event
disintegrating my entire body. If I had decided not raise my hand a sudden
brain malfunction might have made me do it anyway. Thus just enough is
claimed to undermine responsibility in the two agentive senses defined in the
last chapter. Since the objection trivializes the theory I will offer a defence
against it. The defence is pragmatic in nature. It will enable us to keep using
the theory in face of the scepticism outlined above. In any discourse, certain
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kinds of factors may be considered relevant or otherwise. For instance, in
a court of law, low probability quantum events of the kind described above
are not considered relevant. In a philosophical discourse more factors may
be considered relevant. When modeling situations, we should restrict our at-
tention to factors and agents, which may be considered relevant to the kind
of situation we are modeling. Local Scepticism about specific contingencies
in specific situations will play a big role in the chapter Frankfurt Examples.
An interesting elaboration of the exercise is to consider that some agents are
different from others. Let us be traditional and call an agent who is om-
nipotent in every situation a ‘god.’ We can logically establish that there can
be only one god, so let us spell it with a capital G. Further, the existence
of such an agent implies that all other other agents are very weak. Thus, if
God has regulative control over all contingent facts, it implies that no human
being is responsible for anything. It further implies that God is responsible
for everything. For simplicity contingencies are represented by propositional
variables. Also an explicit theory of dependencies between contingent facts
(e.g. a person cannot have brown eyes and blue eyes at the same time) will
not be presented . Such dependencies are not essential to this application.
It will simply be assumed that the omnipotent being can enforce or prevent
each individual contingent fact. Further, for this application, it is assumed
that agents are allowed an infinite number of choices. 5
Fact 4.1. The existence of a god, God, implies its uniqueness and that any
other agent is very weak. Further God is responsible for any contingent fact
and no other agent is responsible for anything.
Proof. Let God be an agent, such that for any p ∈ Φ and any situation
M , God has regulative control over p. Assume that there is an agent b
different from God and a p ∈ Φ and a situation M such that M  E[b cstit]p
or M  E[b cstit]¬p. If M  E[b cstit]p, then this taken together with
M  E[God cstit]¬p violates independence of agents, contradiction. (It
follows that b is not positively responsible for p). If M  E[b cstit]¬p, then
M  E[God cstit]p again violates independence of agents (and b cannot be
negatively responsible for p.) It follows that M  A〈b cstit〉p∧A〈b cstit〉¬p.
5 The restriction to finite choices in Chapter 2 was made to simplify the semantics of
the deontic operators. Deontic operators are not central to this chapter. Further, by
complicating the semantics of Horty’s ought to do operator it can be extended to infinite
choices, , see (Horty; 2001, Chapter 4) for details
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Therefore any agent different fromGod is very weak in every situation and not
responsible for anything. Further, if p is true with some outcome o of some
situation M then God could have prevented it by M, o  E[God cstit]¬p,
so God is negatively responsible for p. If ¬p is true with some outcome o
of some situation M , then M, o  E[God cstit]¬¬p makes God negatively
responsible for ¬p. Therefore, God is responsible for everything.
The conclusion of this argument is that either there is no god (who is om-
nipotent in every situation) or no other agent (including any human being) is
responsible for anything in the agentive sense. However, causal responsibility
for other agents is not ruled out by this argument. Also, while it is ruled out
that other agents have control over anything, it is not ruled out that God
leaves some things to chance. It is the fact that God could have seen to it
that it turned out otherwise, which makes him responsible. As a corollary
we have that if any agent has regulative control over any φ in any situation
then any other agent in that situation is very weak with regard to φ.
The strength of stit theory lies in the fact that we do not necessarily have
to accept any of the reductions represented by the positions (or any combi-
nation of them for different agents). On the contrary we can model subtle
differences between kinds of contingencies. There are some contingencies
that must be this way (presupposed in the situation, such as the presence
of oxygen in most situations involving humans). Agents can have regulative
control or only positive or negative control over other contingencies. Still
other contingencies may depend on a specific choice and there can be total
contingencies, which are independent of any choice.
4.6 Objections to the theory
How natural are the ability modalities presented here? One obvious objection
is that like the deontic modalities must and may the ability modalities seem
to operate on action types not sentences expressing propositions. Rather than
saying something about which events we enforce they say something about
our actions. One way of interpreting this is that an agent can t (where t is an
action type) in a given situation if he somehow has an action instantiating t
available to him in that situation. In Chapter 8, ability can will be interpreted
along such lines. This provides an alternative to the theory presented in this
chapter.
Chapter 5
Group responsibility
5.1 Joint agency
In this chapter a concept of group responsibility is defined. Further, indi-
vidual responsibility for members of groups is considered. In Horty (2001)
and Belnap et al. (2001) the definition of individual agency encountered in
Chapter 2 is extended to group agency.
Let M be a utilitarian strategic model as defined in Chapter 2. To facili-
tate the definitions of group agency, the following accessibility relation Ri is
defined for each agent.
Definition 5.1. Let ai ∈ Agent. Let o, o
′ ∈ dom(M).
oRio
′ iff o, o′ ∈ Aij , for some Aij ∈ Choicei.
Ri is an equivalence relation. We now define accessibility relations for
groups of agents,
Definition 5.2. Let Γ ⊆ Agent.
1. R∅ = dom(M)× dom(M).
2. RΓ =
⋂
ai∈Γ
Ri, for Γ 6= ∅.
Because of independence of agents, RΓ is an equivalence relation for each
Γ ⊆ Agent. Truth conditions for various modal operators are now given in
terms of these relations. The names of the operators are as follows. A is a
universal modality. [ai cstit] is a single agent Chellas stit operator. [ai dstit]
is a single agent deliberative stit operator. [Γ cstit] is a joint Chellas stit
operator. [Γ dstit] is a joint deliberative stit operator. [Γ stit] I call a joint
Belnap/Perloff/Xu stit operator. It is a deliberative stit version of their joint
achievement stit operator, see (Belnap et al.; 2001, p. 283). It is a joint Chel-
las stit operator with a negative condition added to it.
Definition 5.3. Let ai ∈ Agent and Γ ⊆ Agent.
1. M, o  Aφ iff for any o′ ∈ dom(M), M, o′  φ.
2. M, o  [ai cstit]φ iff for any o
′, such that oRio
′, M, o′  φ.
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3. M, o  [ai dstit]φ iff for any o
′, such that oRio
′, M, o′  φ and for some
o′′ ∈ dom(M), M, o′′ 2 φ.
4. M, o  [Γ cstit]φ iff for any o′, such that oRΓo
′, M, o′  φ.
5. M, o  [Γ dstit]φ iff for any o′, such that oRΓo
′, M, o′  φ and for no
∆ such that ∆ ⊂ Γ, M, o  [∆ dstit]φ.
6. M, o  [Γ stit]φ iff for any o′, such that oRΓo
′, M, o′  φ and for some
o′′ ∈ dom(M), M, o′′ 2 φ.
The clause ‘for some o′′ ∈ dom(M), M, o′′ 2 φ’, in the third part of the
definition is called the negative condition. The clause ‘ for no ∆ such that
∆ ⊂ Γ, M, o  [∆ dstit]φ’ in the fifth part of the definition is called the
generalized negative condition. When Γ is a singleton it corresponds to the
negative condition for the single agent deliberative stit operator.
5.2 Joint strict agency
As noted by Horty and by Belnap, Perloff, and Xu, the joint Chellas stit
operator and the joint Belnap/Perloff/Xu stit operator validate the following
formulas.
Fact 5.4. Let Γ,∆ ⊆ Agent.
1.  [Γ cstit]φ→ [∆ cstit]φ, where Γ ⊆ ∆.
2.  [Γ stit]φ→ [∆ stit]φ, where Γ ⊆ ∆.
Agents in ∆ but not in Γ are called free riders. Intuitively, a free rider
is inessential for the proposition expressed by φ to obtain. In Belnap et al.
(2001) the following definition of a member of a group being essential is
presented.1
Definition 5.5. An agent ai ∈ Γ is essential for φ at an outcome o of M iff
M, o  [Γ stit]φ and M, o 2 [Γ− {ai} stit]φ.
1 Strictly speaking, they define it for the achievement stit, here it is transposed to the
joint Belnap/Perloff/Xu stit.
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The same definition of an agent being essential can be given for the
joint deliberative stit operator replacing everywhere stit with dstit. The
authors propose a joint strict agency operator [Γ sstit] with the following
truth condition, see (Belnap et al.; 2001, p. 287).2
Definition 5.6. M, o  [Γ sstit]φ iff M, o  [Γ stit]φ and for any set ∆ such
that ∅ 6= ∆ ⊂ Γ,M, o 2 [∆ stit]φ
We have the following validities.
Fact 5.7. 1.  [ai cstit]φ↔ [{ai} cstit]φ.
2.  [ai dstit]φ↔ [{ai} dstit]φ↔ [{ai} sstit]φ.
3.  [∅ dstit]φ↔ Aφ.
4.  [Γ dstit]φ↔ [Γ sstit]φ, for Γ 6= ∅.
In view of the first two of these validities, it is natural to identify the single
agent stit operators with the corresponding joint stit operators for singletons.
Further, in view of the last validity, the joint strict agency operator can be
identified with the joint deliberative stit operator. In the following, I will
therefore restrict my attention to the joint deliberative stit operator. The
following validities ensure that every agent in the group is essential for the
joint deliberative stit operator to hold and that it is not possible to add any
free riders to the group.
Fact 5.8. Let Γ be a non-empty group of agents. Let ai ∈ Γ and let Γ ⊂ ∆.
1.  [Γ dstit]φ→ ¬[Γ− {ai} dstit]φ.
2.  [Γ dstit]φ→ ¬[∆ dstit]φ.
Proof. 1. Assume M, o  [Γ dstit]φ. Since Γ− {ai} ⊂ Γ,
M, o 2 [Γ − {ai} dstit]φ. 2. Assume M, o  [Γ dstit]φ. To obtain a contra-
diction, further assume M, o  [∆ dstit]φ. Since Γ ⊂ ∆, M, o 2 [Γ dstit]φ.,
contradiction.
For this operator, the following validities are also worth mentioning.
2 Again, they define it for the achievement stit, and I transpose the definition to the
strategic situation framework.
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Fact 5.9. 1.  [Γ dstit]φ↔ [Γ cstit]φ ∧
∧
∆⊂Γ¬[∆ dstit]φ.
2.  [Γ dstit]φ→ φ.(T)
3.  [Γ dstit]φ→ [Γ dstit][Γ dstit]φ.(4)
Proof. 1. Obvious from the truth condition of the joint deliberative stit
operator. 2. Use reflexivity of the cstit operator. 3. If Γ is empty, the
result boils down to [∅ cstit]φ → [∅ cstit][∅ cstit]φ, which holds by transi-
tivity of the R∅ relation, W ×W . So assume that Γ is non-empty and that
M, o  [Γ dstit]φ (so M, o  [Γ cstit]φ) and M, o 2 [Γ dstit][Γ dstit]φ. So
either a1) M, o 2 [Γ cstit][Γ dstit]φ or a2) M, o  [∆ dstit][Γ dstit]φ for some
∆ ⊂ Γ. If a1) there is some o
′, with oRΓo
′, and M, o′ 2 [Γ dstit]φ. So either
b1) M, o
′ 2 [Γ cstit]φ or b2) M, o′  [∆ dstit]φ for some ∆ ⊂ Γ. If b1) there
is some o′′, with o′RΓo
′′ and M, o′′  ¬φ. By transitivity of RΓ, oRΓo
′′, so
M, o′′  φ , contradiction.
If a2), we prove that this entails M, o  [∆ dstit]φ. Let o
′ be such that
oR∆o
′. It follows that M, o′  [Γ dstit]φ and by T that M, o′  φ. Thus
M, o  [∆ cstit]φ. Let Σ ⊂ ∆. Since Σ ⊂ Γ, M, o 2 [Σ dstit]φ. It follows
that M, o  [∆ dstit]φ, contradiction.
If b2), M, o
′  [∆ cstit]φ and by the obvious [∆ cstit]φ→ [∆ cstit][∆ cstit]φ
(4 for the joint Chellas stit operator), M, o′  [∆ cstit][∆ cstit]φ. By sym-
metry of RΓ, since oRΓo
′, o′RΓo. Since RΓ =
⋂
ai∈Γ
Ri ⊆
⋂
aj∈∆
Rj = R∆
it follows that o′R∆o. Hence M, o  [∆ cstit]φ. Let Σ ⊂ ∆. Since Σ ⊂ Γ,
M, o 2 [Σ dstit]φ. It follows that M, o  [∆ dstit]φ contradicting M, o 
[Γ dstit]φ.
The principle 5, ¬[Γ dstit]φ→ [Γ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ however, is not valid.
To see this consider Figure 5.1. φ is true with outcome o1, so we must have
that {a, b} is not preventing φ there that is
M, o1  ¬[{a, b} dstit]¬φ. Since we have this with o2 as well, and M, o5 
[{a, b} dstit]¬φ, we haveM, o1  [ai dstit]¬[{a, b} dstit]¬φ, which implies, by
the impossibility of free riders proved above,M, o1 2 [{a, b} dstit]¬[{a, b} dstit]¬φ.
5.3 Joint refraining
Horty considers two plausible definitions of individual refraining, see (Horty;
2001, p. 26).
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a
K1 o1: φ o2: φ
K2 o3:φ o4:¬φ o5: ¬φ
K3 K4
b
Fig. 5.1: A counter model to 5
Definition 5.10. 1. ¬[ai dstit]φ ∧ E[ai dstit]φ.
2. [ai dstit]¬[ai dstit]φ.
As Horty notes, the following validity makes the two definitions inter-
changeable.
Fact 5.11.  (¬[ai dstit]φ ∧ E[ai dstit]φ)↔ [ai dstit]¬[ai dstit]φ
The following is a naive attempt at lifting the first concept of refraining
to groups.
A group Γ refrains from φ with an outcome o of a situation M iff
M, o  ¬[Γ dstit]φ ∧ E[Γ dstit]φ.
However, with this definition the equivalence to the other obvious definition,
[Γ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ, does not hold and this for a conceptually good reason.
It happens when a subgroup of Γ is preventing Γ from seeing to it that φ,
in which case we would not say that Γ is refraining from φ. Consider the
following situation, where a father is talking to a friend, while his son is
standing by.
Example 5.1. 1. Dad: ‘We refrained as a family from buying a car.’
2. Son interrupts: ‘That is not correct. You decided that we weren’t going
to buy it, because we couldn’t afford it.’
Let us assume that there are just the father and the son in the family.
The situation can be modeled as in Figure 5.2, where φ means that a car is
bought for the family. With outcome o1, the group consisting of father and
son, does not see to it that φ. Also, there is a choice the group can make,
the one resulting in outcome o5, where the group sees to it that φ. So with
the first definition of joint refraining, the other condition is met. However,
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Father
K1 o1: ¬φ o2: ¬φ
K2 o3:φ o4:¬φ o5: φ
K3 K4
Son
Fig. 5.2: The choices of father and son
since the father is vetoing φ at o1 it is not intuitively correct to say that the
group is refraining. And for exactly the same reason the group is not seeing
to it that, the group is not seeing to it that φ, so the two obvious definitions
of refraining do not coincide.
In order to rule out these cases I propose the following definition of joint
refraining.
Definition 5.12. A group Γ refrains from φ with an outcome o of a model
M iff M, o  ¬[Γ dstit]φ ∧
∧
∆⊂Γ¬[∆ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ
In words, a group refrains from φ, if and only if, the group does not see to
it that φ, and no subgroup of the group is preventing the whole group from
seeing to it that φ. It is immediate from the definition that this concept is
equivalent to the first option given by Horty in the single agent case that is
Fact 5.13. An agent ai refrains from φ with o iff M, o  ¬[ai dstit]φ ∧
E[ai dstit]φ.
Furthermore, we get the following more general equivalence result.
Fact 5.14.  (¬[Γ dstit]φ∧
∧
∆⊂Γ¬[∆ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ)↔ [Γ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ
Proof. Left to right. AssumeM, o  ¬[Γ dstit]φ∧
∧
∆⊂Γ ¬[∆ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ
and M, o 2 [Γ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ. Then, from the first conjunct, M, o 2
[Γ dstit]φ. Further, from the second conjunct, either a1)M, o 2 [Γ cstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ
or a2) M, o  [∆ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ, for some ∆ ⊂ Γ. If a1) there is an o
′,
with oRΓo
′, and M, o′  ¬¬[Γ dstit]φ. Because of symmetry of the choice
relation, o′RΓo, and because of 4, M, o
′  [Γ dstit][Γ dstit]φ, so we have
M, o  [Γ dstit]φ, contradiction.
If a2) we have M, o  ¬[∆ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ, contradiction.
Right to left. Assume M, o  [Γ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ and M, o 2 ¬[Γ dstit]φ ∧
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∧
∆⊂Γ¬[∆ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ. Then, from the second conjunct, either a1)
M, o  [Γ dstit]φ and, from the first conjunct, M, o  ¬[Γ dstit]φ , con-
tradiction. Or a2) M, o  [∆ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ for some ∆ ⊂ Γ and, by
the generalized negative condition, M, o  ¬[∆ dstit]¬[Γ dstit]φ, contradic-
tion.
5.3.1 Arendt on collective responsibility
In everyday life, we are certainly held (personally) responsible for things we
could only achieve with other people. To put it a bit differently, we are held
responsible as members of groups. How can we account for that within our
theory of agency? To begin with, there are certain pitfalls given our account
of joint agency. Consider the following inference chain.
Example 5.2. 1. ‘Some Germans saw to the Holocaust.’
2. ‘All Germans saw to the Holocaust.’ (From 1.)
3. ‘All Germans are responsible for the Holocaust.’ (From 2.)
We will call the above Arendt’s fallacy , because Hannah Arendt discusses
it in several places, see e.g. Arendt (1964). Clearly, the joint agency prop-
erty poses a problem, if we want to lift the concept of responsibility from
individuals to groups. If I see to φ, then we see to φ (in a weak sense, which
permits free riders), but we are not both necessarily responsible for φ. If
we lifted individual responsibility to groups by the Chellas stit, then when
somebody is responsible, all are, and the concept is trivialized. As Hannah
Arendt puts it:
Where all are guilty, nobody is.(Arendt; 1968, p.147)
In the following I only consider agentive aspects of positive joint responsibil-
ity. The supposedly non-trivial work of integrating joint intentions into the
framework as well as negative responsibility for groups is left for somebody
else.
5.4 Positive responsibility of groups
As Arendt sees it, a useful concept of collective responsibility really requires
a concept of active participation. Therefore, although Arendt’s Fallacy is
about collective responsibility, it seems natural to block it at the level of
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c
K5
a
K1 o1: φ o2: φ
K2 o3:φ o4: ¬φ
K3 K4
b
c
K6
a
K1 o5: ¬φ o6: ¬φ
K2 o7:¬φ o8: ¬φ
K3 K4
b
Fig. 5.3: The choices of 3 agents
joint agency, i.e. by resisting the inference from 1. to 2 in the fallacy above.
However, if we simply generalize the concept of responsibility with the the
dstit operator, we already have a concept of active participation built into
our definition of responsibility. This idea corresponds exactly to holding a
group Γ responsible for φ at an outcome o iff. M, o  [Γ dstit]φ. It follows
immediately that Γ is responsible for φ only if every nonempty ∆ ⊆ Γ is
essential for φ.
5.4.1 Holding members of groups personally responsible
Presumably, an individual can be held responsible for φ if he is a member
of some group, Γ, which deliberatively sees to φ. The following definition
captures that intuition.
Definition 5.15. Let ai ∈ Agent. ai can be held personally responsible for
φ, iff [∆ ∪ {ai} dstit]φ, for some ∆ ⊆ Agent.
In words, to substantiate that you cannot be held responsible for φ on
account of denial of active participation, it is not enough that you are a
free-rider in some group, which sees to φ. You will have to be a free-rider of
any subgroup of that group as well. Conversely, to check if ai can be held
personally responsible for φ start with the group containing just ai, and go
through any subset ∆ ⊆ Agent. If [∆ ∪ {ai} dstit]φ is true then ai can
be held personally responsible. To illustrate this idea consider the following
example.
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In the Third Reich, at any rate, there was only one man who did
and could make decisions and hence was politically fully responsi-
ble. That was Hitler himself who, therefore, not in a fit of mega-
lomania but quite correctly once described himself as the only
man in all Germany who was irreplaceable. (. . .)Does this mean
that nobody else could be held personally responsible?(Arendt;
1968, p. 30)
I do not wish to interpret Arendt or Hitler as such, the reason for giving
the above quote is to point to something more general.3 People will some-
times argue that because somebody else might have done what they do, they
are not responsible. To illustrate this fallacy, consider Figure 5.3. We here
have three agents, Agent = {a, b, c}. Each agent faces two choices each con-
taining 4 outcomes, e.g. a must choose between K1 = {o1, o2, o5, o6} and
K2 = {o3, o4, o7, o8}. There will then be a single outcome when everybody
has chosen. Let φ mean some crime, to keep with our example the supreme
crime of genocide, and let c be a dictator, who can in fact prevent φ by choos-
ing K6, where φ is false with any outcome. None of the other agents have
this power to prevent, and c is as such necessary. He is the only agent, who is
individually (negatively) responsible for φ. Now, let us look at what groups
can achieve φ. Since either the cooperation of a or b is enough to ensure φ
each of them is ‘replaceable’ for achieving φ. However, c needs somebody to
cooperate with him. If a and b choose K2 and K4, respectively, then φ will be
prevented. Further, they may be personally responsible depending on their
choice. Consider first outcome o3. The choices made are K2,K3, and K5.
We have here that [{b} ∪ {c} dstit]φ, so b and c can both be held personally
responsible for φ. However with this outcome there is no Γ ⊆ Agent, such
that [{Γ ∪ {a} dstit]φ, so a cannot be held responsible for φ. Consider now
o1. Here ¬[{b} ∪ {c} ∪ {a} dstit]φ, because either a or b could be taken out
and φ would still be true. However, the fact that an agent is not needed to
achieve an event, does not mean that she cannot be held responsible. This is
determined by her active participation in achieving it. In this chapter active
participation is understood as the existence of some subgroup, which you
3 To mention just one point, in the quoted essay Arendt makes an intricate distinction
between being politically responsible and personally responsible, which I have no use for
at present. Among other things, political responsibility involves considering the whole
history of a nation.
5. Group responsibility 71
belong to, which deliberatively sees to it that φ. In fact both a and b belong
to such a subgroup, since [{c}∪{a} dstit]φ and [{c}∪{b} dstit]φ are true at
o1, and since these groups deliberatively see to it that φ, the agents can be
held personally responsible. So, on this account personal responsibility for
active participants is compatible with one person being a negative dictator
that is having the sole executive power to personally veto φ. Furthermore,
the fact that others might have done what an agent did even if the agent
had refrained so that the agent was not not strictly needed for the event to
obtain, does not free that agent from responsibility.
Chapter 6
Frankfurt examples
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, some examples of how the theory of individual responsibility
may be used are presented. Also, some connections to informal meta-ethics
are established. The chapter is centered around a certain cluster of thought
experiment known as Frankfurt examples or Frankfurt-Style examples. Frank-
furt examples play an important role in the ongoing debate about incompati-
bilism vs. compatibilism. In ‘folk’ philosophy this kind of thought experiment
is sometimes used instead of a theoretical argument; the Frankfurt examples
show that moral responsibility and determinism are compatible, it is claimed.
However, the intuitive understanding of thought experiments is not in itself
certain enough to establish any such conclusion. Thought experiments with-
out an explicit theory to go with them are just stories, and it is not the task
of philosophy to tell stories, cf. Plato The Sophist. Any serious compatibilist
or incompatibilist will have a theory, such as e.g. van Inwagen (1978) or
Fischer and Ravizza (1998). Given such a theory, it seems a legitimate task
to test it on various ‘hard’ cases. The Frankfurt examples may be considered
hard cases: it seems that the agent is determined and morally responsible in
the thought experiment. How can that be explained? The strategy of this
chapter will be to analyze these thought experiments within the theoretical
framework already presented in Chapter 3. It will then become clear that
they do not pose any particular problem to libertarian incompatibilism as
understood in this thesis. Further the examples help us understand various
concepts related to agency, such as overdetermination.
6.2 Factors
The thought experiments to be discussed involve certain variables in the
environment of the agent, which are important to the overall situation facing
the agent. For instance, in Locke’s example there is a ‘room’, which may
be ‘locked’ or ‘unlocked’; in the Frankfurt example there is a ‘device’, which
may be ‘implanted’ or ‘not implanted’ into the brain of the agent. Thus,
to adequately represent the examples discussed in this chapter, it will be
necessary to extend the models with a set of non-intentional, non-normative
‘agents.’ These will be called factors. The factors represent unknowns that
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might influence the final outcome of a situation. An example is the weather.
Imagine an agent considering going to the beach the next day. The weather
might be good (not too windy, not too hot, . . . ) or bad (too hot or too windy
or . . . ) If the weather is good, the trip will be pleasant, if the weather is bad,
it will be unpleasant. The ‘possible values’ for the weather, ‘good’ or ‘bad’,
correspond to the choices of an agent. They will be represented accordingly,
as a partition of the outcomes. The equivalence classes of the partition will
be called the alternatives of the factor. As a common name for agents and
factors, the term influences will be used. Formally, the factors are just like
agents, except they do not have intentions. It is also assumed that values do
not apply to factors. Thus, although it is possible to hold factors responsible
(in an agentive sense), it is not possible to hold them guilty, blameworthy or
praiseworthy. It is now possible to represent examples such as the following,
which include non-agentive unknowns.
Example 6.1 (Assassin). An assassin is about to decide whether to shoot at a
politician from afar. She knows that the wind and the way her hands tremble
will influence the final outcome of her choice. The assassin does not have a
licence to kill, and the murder or attempted murder is bad from a legal and
from a moral perspective.
6.2.1 Formalizing the assassin example
The example is formalized with the model represented in Figure 6.1. The
choices, outcomes and values of this situation are given in the informal story
and represented formally. There is an element of creativity involved in such
a formalization. Intuitively, the representation may be more or less faithful.
An explicit understanding of this relation between the stories and formal
models is beyond the scope of this thesis. There is an assassin, denoted a1,
who is confronted with the choices ‘Shoot’ and ‘Don’t Shoot.’ The atomic
propositional variable D expresses the event that the politician is shot to
death. The non-agentive factors are the wind and the hands of the assassin,
which may be steady or unsteady. Precisely how the wind factor plays a
role is not specified, so the alternatives of this factor do not have suggestive
names. The alternatives of the wind factor are simply called K1 and K2.
If the assassin chooses to shoot, then her intention is to kill the politician.
Formally, the intention set of that action is o1, IShoot = {o1}. We assume that
she is indifferent between the outcomes, if she does not shoot, IDon′t Shoot =
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Wind
K1 o1: D, u(o1) = 1 o2: ¬D, u(o2) = 2
K2 o3:¬D, u(o3) = 2 o4: ¬D, u(o4) = 2
Steady Unsteady
Hands
Shoot
a1
Wind
K1 o5: ¬D, u(o5) = 3 o6: ¬D, u(o6) = 3
K2 o7:¬D, u(o7) = 3 o8: ¬D, u(o8) = 3
Steady Unsteady
Hands
Don’t Shoot
a1
Fig. 6.1: The choice of the assassin
{o5, o6, o7, o8}. Further, the utilities represent the legal or moral value of
the outcomes, not the private utility of the outcomes for the assassin. From
the legal or moral perspective considered here, killing the politician is worst,
risking his life is bad, and not shooting is best. This is so, even if the
assassin were to get away with murder, collect the prize of two million dollars
for the murder and live happily ever after on a tropical island. According
to these values, the choice to not shoot strictly dominates the choice to
shoot. As a consequence, the assassin ought not to kill the politician, M ⊙
[a1 cstit]¬D. It can also be observed, for instance, that if the assassin
shoots and the wind behaves as in alternative K1, and her hands are steady,
then the final outcome of the situation is o1. It is also easy to determine the
various kinds of responsibility, guilt, and blameworthiness at the different
outcomes.
• The assassin is blameworthy for D at o1.
• The assassin is blameworthy for attempting D at o2, o3, o4 (since she is
guilty of attempting D and D is forbidden).
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• The assassin is praiseworthy for ¬D at {o5, o6, o7, o8}
it may be objected that not very much is required of the agents to make them
praiseworthy. Normally, we would not praise anybody for not assassinating
somebody. However, the concepts are relative to the outcomes of the given
situation. In any number of particular situations, it can be hard enough to
do the right thing.
The factors can also be used to reason about the circumstances that
played a role in determining the final outcome. For instance, the assassin did
not succeed in killing the politician with o2, because her hands were unsteady.
Had her hands not been unsteady she would have killed him.
6.3 Causal responsibility, agentive responsibility,
overdetermination
It is useful to distinguish between causal responsibility for an event and agen-
tive responsibility for an event. An agent is causally responsible for an event,
if the (physical) agent is the actual cause of the event. The concepts of re-
sponsibility (guilt, blame and so on) defined in Chapter 3 are all agentive
concepts. Causal and agentive responsibility are logically independent. For
instance, an agent may accidently bump into somebody and cause him to
fall, without agentively seeing to it that he falls. Conversely, and more con-
troversially, an agent arguably might see to it that an event obtains, although
she is not the cause of the event with the actual outcome of the situation.
Corresponding to these two kinds of responsibility there are two ways an
event can be overdetermined.
1. An event E may be causally overdetermined.
2. An event E may be agentively overdetermined.
Agents may be agentively responsible for an event, although they are not
causally responsible for it. This happens in case of agentive overdetermina-
tion. These will often also be cases of causal overdetermination. (Belnap
et al.; 2001, p. 290) consider only what is here called agentive overdetermi-
nation.1 They define overdetermination as distinct agents seeing to the same
event, and the same definition will be adopted here.
1 To be precise, the authors define overdetermination for the so-called achievement stit
and not the deliberative stit as considered here. The definition is easily transposed to
cover the deliberative stit, however.
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Agent 1
Press red o1: Bomb o2: Bomb o3: Bomb
Press green o4: Bomb o5: No bomb
Press red Press green
Agent 2
Fig. 6.2: Red button or green button
Definition 6.1. An event expressed by a formula φ is agentively overdeter-
mined with an outcome o of a situationM iff there are more than one distinct
influences a1, . . . an, such that
M, o 
∧
1≤i≤n
[ai dstit]φ
.
We thus also speak of agentive overdetermination, even if one or more
of the agents a1, . . . an are actually factors, not agents. Although agentive
overdetermination might free an agent from causal responsibility (i.e. the
agent might not be the actual cause of the event), it does not free an agent
from agentive responsibility. This is of course formally speaking immediately
clear from the definition. The following example is meant to provide some
intuitive justification.
Example 6.2 (Red button or green button). Two agents each has to press
either a red button or a green button. If an agent presses the green button,
nothing happens, except that pressing the red button afterwards will now
have no effect. If an agent presses the red button, the multi million city
Metropol is blown to pieces. The agents press their buttons independently.
The bomb is released by the first agent who presses his button, but if they
both press it around the same time, there is no way of telling which button
actually caused the release of the bomb.
This example is represented by Figure 6.2.
The atomic formula Bomb expresses the event that Metropol is blown to
pieces. If both agents press the red button, the outcome will be in the top
left box. Here, with outcome o1 and o2, the event that Metropol is blown to
pieces is agentively overdetermined. Either agent could have made his other
choice, and the city would still have been blown to pieces. However, there is
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only one actual cause of the event, say Agent 1’s button with o1, and Agent
2’s button with o2. With the concept of positive responsibility both agents
are responsible for the city being blown up. The justification is that they
both acted so as to ensure that the city is blown up. So, although nobody
might ever know ‘who actually caused it’, it is still possible to place agentive
responsibility. Further, even if there is no such uncertainty, and it is possible
to place causal responsibility, the theory still holds both agents agentively
responsible. Thus, ultimately, it is the choices of the agents that they are
held responsible for. The independence of the actions is really important.
For instance, if one agent knows that the other has pressed the red button,
then he will not be responsible for the bomb, even if he presses the red button
afterwards.
In other examples of agentive overdetermination it may be ontologically im-
possible to determine an actual cause. Two agents each simultaneously poi-
son a person with a dose sufficient for killing him . The amount of poison
actually killing the person is a mix of the two doses.
6.4 The philosophical context of the Frankfurt examples
As another example of how to apply this theory we consider Frankfurt exam-
ples, originally proposed by Harry Frankfurt in Frankfurt (1969), see also van
Inwagen (1978), Hunt (2000), Fischer (2005a), Lippert-Rasmussen (2005).
Frankfurt examples aim at showing that alternative choices are not a pre-
requisite for moral responsibility. At the heart of Frankfurt examples lie the
following two apparently contradictory claims.
Principle 6.2 (PAP). There can be no moral responsibility without alter-
native choices.
Frankfurt There are situations, where an agent is responsible for φ, although
circumstances which in no way influence the agent’s choice, nonetheless
make it impossible for that agent to refrain from doing φ.
It is claimed that there are situations as described by Frankfurt. Further-
more, this is claimed to rule out PAP (principle of alternate possibilities).
We have a theory which gives a precise meaning to the crucial concepts of
these principles: Circumstances, alternative choices, situations, refraining,
responsibility. It turns out that it is possible to consistently claim that there
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Room
Locked o1: Man Stays o2: Man Stays
Not Locked o3: Man Stays o4: Man Leaves
Stay Go
Man
Fig. 6.3: Man in a locked room
are situations as described in Frankfurt, while maintaining that moral re-
sponsibility is dependent on alternative choices. The analysis will show that
a libertarian research strategy has a lot of explanatory power, even when it
comes to examples specifically devised to refute that very strategy. First,
consider the following example by John Locke (see also Hunt (2000), Fischer
(2005a)):
Example 6.3 (Man in a Locked Room). . . . suppose a man be carried, whilst
fast asleep, into a room, where is a person he longs to see and speak with;
and be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out: he awakes, and
is glad to find himself in so desirable company, which he stays willingly in,
i.e. prefers his stay to going away. I ask, is not this stay voluntary? I think
nobody will doubt it; and yet being locked fast in, ’tis evident he is not at
liberty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone. (Locke; 1690, Bk II,ch.
XXI)
This thought experiment is often cited as a starting point for the compat-
ibilist position that agents can do something of their own free will without
being able to do otherwise. For now, it is important to note the following
features of the example. There is a man, facing a choice either to stay in a
room or to go. Further, the exits out of the the room might be locked or not.
This circumstance is an important factor in the situation, which will influ-
ence the outcome of his choice. The example is represented by Figure 6.3. If
the man chooses to leave, the intended outcomes of his choice are the ones
where he leaves, IGo = {o4}. If he chooses to stay the intended outcomes are
the ones where he stays, IStay = {o1, o3}. In other words, the intention of
the man going is to leave the room and that only happens with the outcome
o4, which only becomes actual if the room is not locked. The utilities of the
outcomes are not important to this example, so they are left unspecified.
Figure 6.3 seems to provide a fair representation Locke’s example. The
agent can choose between attempting to go and staying and the room is
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locked or not. The situation is modeled so that the room being locked or not
in no way influences the agent’s choice, i.e. his choice is independent of the
alternative of this factor.
6.4.1 Reasoning about outcomes
Now it is possible to analyze the four possible outcomes of this situation in
turn. It is easy to see that with o1, o3 the man is guilty of staying, with
outcome o2 he is guilty of attempting to leave, but not of staying, and with
outcome o4 he is guilty of leaving. His guilt at o1 (the outcome singled out
by Locke) is quite independent of the fact that the event of him staying is
overdetermined with this outcome.
o1 The agent decides to stay, the door is locked. With this outcome the
agent is (positively) responsible for staying since he sees to it that he
is staying. The fact that the door is locked is independent of this and
does not matter to his responsibility. Him staying is overdetermined,
but this does not free him from responsibility. This is the outcome
described in Locke’s example.
o2 Here the man attempts to go, but he is forced to stay, because the room
is locked. That he is guilty of attempting to leave is clear, since it
was his intention to leave, M, o2  [Man iit]Man leaves,it did not
happen, but it could have happened with his choice . If the room were
unlocked he would have left, so he does not see to it that he is staying.
It follows that he is not positively responsible for staying. Furthermore,
he could not have prevented staying by making his other choice. As a
consequence, he is not negatively responsible for staying either.
o3 The man deliberatively sees to it that he stays, so he is (positively) re-
sponsible. With this outcome the door is open.
o4 The man tries to leave and the door is unlocked so he succeeds. He could
have unconditionally prevented leaving by making his other choice, so
he is (negatively) responsible for leaving.
Now, let us consider a version of the original Frankfurt example.
Example 6.4 (Frankfurt example). A man, Jones, must decide whether to
murder or not to murder another man, Peter. A third man, Black, has built
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a device into Jones’ head, so that in case Jones decides to not murder Peter,
he will do so anyway. The device is only activated, if Jones decides not to
kill Peter. As it happens, Jones decides on his own to murder Peter, so the
device is never used. Jones is thus responsible for the murder, although he
could not have refrained from the murder.
6.4.2 Informal approaches to the Frankfurt examples
Most responses to Frankfurt’s examples have been informal. They can roughly
be divided into compatibilist responses, defending Frankfurt, and incompati-
bilist responses, attacking him. Kane summarizes the typical incompatibilist
response as follows.
. . . Suppose that A is the action that the controller wants Jones to
perform . . . and suppose Jones does A on his own without Black
interfering. Many responses to Frankfurt. . . have taken the fol-
lowing general form. If Jones is responsible in this case, it is
because he did A on his own(i.e., of his own free choice, without
interference from Black). But Jones could have done other than
that: he could have done other-than-A-on-his-own by not choos-
ing or trying to do A and forcing Black to intervene. If Black
intervened, to be sure, Jones would still have done A, but he
would not have done A-on-his-own. So, responsibility and could-
have-done-otherwise are not disconnected after all. Where Jones
is responsible (for doing-A-on-his-own), he could have done other
than that. And where he could not have done otherwise. . . , he is
not responsible.(Kane; 1998, p. 41)
The analysis to follow agrees in many ways with the type of response
presented by Kane.2 The main difference is that the formalism makes parts
of the analysis stand out more clearly.
6.4.3 Lewis’ causal responsibility approach
David Lewis gives a semi-formal account of the Frankfurt example in Lewis
(2000). The paper gives a counterfactual account of causality in light of
2 Kane thinks the response has merit, but he does not fully agree with it. I can not go
into his objections here. I refer to his book, Kane (1998)
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the problems posed by overdetermination, or as Lewis calls it, preemption.
With regard to the Frankfurt example, his main concern is to explain why
Jones’ choice causes the event of Peter’s death, although Jones is not able to
exercise any influence on that event. According to Lewis’ definition, one event
D influences another E, when there is a range of changes in D, which result
in changes of E. To keep the present terminology we might think of events
as sets of outcomes and suppose a linear temporal ordering of events. The
dependence of outcomes in one event on another event can be represented
by functions from events to events, ID : D → E, and so on. Imagine a
temporal ordering of three events, D,E, F . Assume that D influences E and
E influences F . Transitivity of influence might break down. This happens
when any outcome o ∈ E in the range of the function ID, is mapped to the
same single outcome s ∈ F by IE . No change in D will effect a change in
F , so D does not influence F . According to Lewis, the Frankfurt example is
a case in point. Jones’ choice, (D), does influence Black’s behavior, (E): if
he chooses to murder Peter, Black will not interfere; if he chooses to refrain,
Black will interfere. Further, the behavior of Black influences the murder,
(F ), since we also might assume possibilities where Black does not interfere
although Jones refrains. However, no matter what Jones chooses, Peter will
be murdered, henceD does not influence F . Therefore Lewis suggests that we
take causality to be not simply influence but rather the ancestral (reflexive,
transitive closure) of the relation given by events influencing each other.
According to that definition of causality Jones’ choice does cause the event
of the murder, although his choice did not influence it. The question remains
whether this causation is really enough to establish responsibility. Lewis
thinks it is.
The moral of the story is that preemptive causation, without de-
pendence, suffices to confer ownership and responsibility of ones
actions.
(Lewis; 2000, p. 193)
We might agree that Lewis’ definition gives reasonable necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for establishing causal responsibility for an event, and that
Lewis’ theory is very elegant for that purpose. However, when it comes to
moral responsibility or in general agentive responsibility, the theory is inad-
equate. The reason is this. Also with the outcomes, where Jones decides not
to murder Peter and Black interferes, he is responsible on Lewis’ account.
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This is as it should be, if we talk about causal responsibility, since Jones
certainly did cause the murder of Peter. He was the one firing the gun (or
whatever) causing Peter’s death. However, we would not say that Jones is
morally responsible with this chain of events. He decided not to murder
Jones, but Black interfered with his brain and made him do it. Obviously,
Jones is not to blame for the murder. Thus, if we are to assume that Lewis’
theory is to cover everything there is to say about moral responsibility it gives
wrong predictions with some outcomes of the Frankfurt example. Alterna-
tively, and this is what I prefer, we can take Lewis’ theory to be about causal
responsibility, which must be distinguished from agentive responsibility. In
that case it gives the right predictions, it seems to me. However, when it
comes to the Frankfurt example, it is not mainly causal responsibility, we are
mainly interested in , but agentive responsibility. A typical way out for the
compatibilist at this point would be to require an additional internal compo-
nent in the agent to establish moral responsibility. Thus, Jones is responsible
with the outcomes where he causes the event and his choice is based on the
process of an appropriate inner mechanism causing him to decide, see e.g.
Fischer and Ravizza (1998). This does work well in the Frankfurt examples.
However, the incompatibilist solution presented below, does not require the
introduction of such additional inner mechanisms.
6.4.4 Approaches within stit theory
Also within stit theory itself, the Frankfurt examples have been treated. This
has been done in (Belnap et al.; 2001, Chapter 9) and in the paper Paprzycka
(2002). Here I will focus on the latter.
Paprzycka’s strategy for dealing with the Frankfurt examples contains
two important components.
1. Weakening the requirement of regulative control for moral responsibil-
ity.
2. Making stit a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
Paprzycka argues that compatibilists take incompatibilists to require regu-
lative control over an event in order to establish moral responsibility. Re-
call that an agent a has regulative control over φ in a situation M , when
M  E[a dstit]φ ∧ E[a dstit]¬φ. Clearly Jones does not have this kind of
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control, he cannot prevent the murder. Thus, with this definition of respon-
sibility libertarians would have to claim that Jones is not responsible, even
if he chooses to murder Peter on his own. Certainly, Inwagen (one incom-
patibilist) has been taken by Frankfurt (one compatibilist) to think this, or
rather something even stronger than this.
A person is fully responsible, then, for all and only those events
or states of affairs which come about because of what he does and
which would not have come about if he did otherwise. . . . Perhaps. . . he
[Inwagen] construes moral responsibility in this strong sense.
(Frankfurt; 2005, p. 280)
It will be shown below that the reason why Inwagen denies agents respon-
sibility for states of affairs in the Frankfurt example is quite different from
what Frankfurt suggests. It should also be noted that Inwagen’s necessary
condition for moral responsibility is weaker than the one suggested by Frank-
furt. Inwagen requires that the agent has the ability to prevent an event to
be responsible for it. However, this does not preclude that the agent has the
further choice to leave the event up to chance. In that case the event might
have come about if he did otherwise, so he is not responsible on Frankfurt’s
definition. Paprzycka, however, suggests to loosen this negative requirement
of regulative control altogether. She suggests replacing the ability to pre-
vent in the definition of regulative control with the negative condition of the
achievement stit operator. Consequently, she suggests the following neces-
sary condition for responsibility.
Principle 6.3 (Paprzycka). One can be responsible only for what one sees
to.
Paprzycka then gives two different interpretations of the Frankfurt exam-
ples, one she calls non-reductive and one she calls reductive. Both of these
interpretations can be easily transposed to the deliberative stit, which I will
do here. The main idea is that, in order for the negative condition to be
fulfilled, there must be an alternative outcome, where the event does not
obtain. There are two obvious ways of achieving this: differentiating the
outcomes of the two actions or introducing an external agent or factor into
the situation. On the first interpretation, either Peter is murdered by Jones
on his own or Peter is murdered by Jones as a consequence of the device.
6. Frankfurt examples 84
Device
Y es o1: Peter murdered, Device off o2: Peter murdered, Device on
No o3: Peter murdered o4: Peter not murdered
Murder Don′t murder
Jones
Fig. 6.4: Frankfurt example
However, strictly speaking, Jones is not really acting at the outcome where
he murders Peter as a consequence of the device. After all he did not intend
to murder Jones at this outcome. Therefore, it is not true to say that Jones
murders Peter at this outcome. Thus the negative condition is fulfilled. I
find this analysis problematic. Although, he did not act voluntarily, I think
it is correct to say that Peter murders Jones, given his causal responsibility
for the event. Similarly, one can say that Peter bumps into Jones, and the
like, although it was an accident. However, if that is correct, the negative
condition is not fulfilled.
Paprzycka’s second interpretation requires treating Black as an agent in the
situation. Clearly Black could have chosen not to interfere, so there is a
different possibility. This is basically the approach taken below, with some
minor differences. I treat the device (not Black) as an independent factor in
the situation. I use the deliberative stit instead of the achievement stit, a
minor change. The most important difference is that I do not accept Paprzy-
cka’s principle of responsibility, since it rules out the possibility of negative
responsibility. Negative responsibility is required to get the right prediction
with the outcome where the device is not implanted and where Jones chooses
not to murder Peter. Here, Jones is negatively responsible for not murdering
Jones. Further, I include intentions.
6.4.5 Analysis of a Frankfurt example
The Frankfurt example is represented by Figure 6.4.
The scenario is formally very similar to Locke’s example. It is not entirely
correct to say that Jones has the choice to murder or not murder Peter,
at least he does not have regulative control over the event of Peter being
murdered. Rather, he has the choice to murder Peter or try to not murder
Peter. The purpose of the formulae ‘device off’, ‘device on’ is to capture
the idea that Black only shows his hand if necessary, the interference is
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counterfactual. So, there is both a distinction between the device being there
or not, and between the device being used or not resulting in four possible
outcomes.
o1 Jones decides to murder Peter on his own, the device is implanted. The
device is not activated. However, we can reason counterfactually as
follows. If Jones had decided not to murder Peter, circumstances stay-
ing the same (the device is implanted), he would have murdered Peter
anyway.3 Thus, given the circumstances, he could not have done oth-
erwise. The reason that he is responsible, however is the following. It
is a necessary consequence of his choice that Peter is murdered, and
it is also possible (given different circumstances, i.e. that the device
is not there) that he does not murder Jones. Thus he deliberatively
sees to it that Peter is murdered. The fact that the device is there
and independently ensures this event as well, does not free him from
responsibility. The device is also agentively responsible for the event.
The example is constructed so that the device is not causally respon-
sible for the murder. This is the situation described in the Frankfurt
example.
o2 Jones tries not to murder Peter, but he is forced to do so, because the
device is there. The murder is not a necessary consequence of his
choice, so he is not positively responsible. Furthermore, he could not
have prevented the murder by making his other choice, so he is not
negatively responsible. As a consequence, he is not responsible for the
murder with either of the concepts of responsibility.
o3 Jones decides to murder Peter on his own and the device is not there.
This is a normal case of homicide, Jones is positively responsible.
o4 Jones decides not murder Peter and there is no device, so he succeeds. He
is negatively responsible for not murdering Peter, since he could have
seen to the murder by making his other choice.
3 The account of counterfactual reasoning given here, is made precise in (Horty; 2001,
pp. 81-85). Since it is not essential to my argument, I refer to Horty for details. The main
idea is the following. When we evaluate a counterfactual statement, such as ‘with another
choice for agent a φ would have been the case’, we keep all other circumstances fixed and
change only the choice of that particular agent, and then we evaluate φ.
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The theory holds Jones responsible for murdering Peter with outcome
o1 and outcome o3, and frees him from responsibility for the murder with
outcome o2 and o4, and that seems to agree with libertarian intuitions. It is
furthermore clear that there is no inconsistency between outcomes of situa-
tions, where one could not have done otherwise and the principle of alterna-
tive possibilities. The reason is that the ‘could not have done otherwise’ in
the Frankfurt example is arrived at by keeping the circumstances fixed.
6.5 Frankfurt examples and negative responsibility
Compatibilists seem to focus only on positive responsibility for the obvious
reason that negative responsibility explicitly requires a ‘could have done oth-
erwise.’ At the other extreme, Inwagen, in a famous paper, only recognizes
negative responsibility, see van Inwagen (1978). He presents principles for
responsibility for actions, event particulars, and event universals or states
of affairs. Here I will only consider the latter two, since they relate directly
to the concepts of responsibility for events considered in this thesis.
6.5.1 Inwagen on event particulars
Inwagen takes event particulars to be objects individuated by different causal
histories. They correspond roughly to the individual outcomes of situations
in this thesis. Inwagen presents the following principle for event particulars.
Principle 6.4 (Inwagen, event particulars). A person is morally responsible
for a certain event particular only if he could have prevented it.
Now, regarding the Frankfurt example, Inwagen argues as follows. Since
the outcome where Jones murders Peter on his own, and the outcome where
he murders him as a consequence of the device have different causal histories
they are different event particulars. Let us call them E and D. Hence, where
Jones is responsible for E, he could have prevented it by making his other
choice, causing D instead. Inwagen’s principle is extremely week. With any
event particular that an agent brings about he prevents all others. It should
be noted, though that since Inwagen’s principle only states one necessary
condition for responsibility, it does not entail that Jones is responsible for
the murder at D. Nothing prevents the proponent of Inwagen’s theory from
requiring further necessary conditions. One of these might be a suitable men-
tal mechanism as mentioned above. Even though the principle is very weak,
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Fischer attempts to construct a counter-example to it along the following
lines, see (Fischer; 2005a, p. 296).
Example 6.5. If Black detects that Jones is about not to murder Peter, then
he will use his machine to destroy Jones’ brain and thus kill him instantly.
Fischer then states that then Jones could not have brought about a dif-
ferent event particular. Fischer seems to confuse choices with the known
consequences of choices here. Certainly, Fischer must agree that the event
where Peter is murdered is very different from the event where Jones’ brain
is destroyed. Thus, by choosing not to murder he does bring about an event
different from the one, where he murders. The event looks very different
from what it thought it would look like when he made his choice. He does no
longer exist. However that is irrelevant for Inwagen’s theory. The question
remains, though whether such a weak principle is relevant in establishing
moral responsibility. Related to this concern is another argument of Fis-
cher’s against this sort of response to the Frankfurt example, which he has
dubbed a flicker of freedom response. In the Frankfurt example, the flicker
of freedom consists in the slight difference, which there must always be in the
outcome where the device is activated and the one where it is not. If there
was not any difference, they would be the same outcome. However, Fischer
claims, this difference is not enough to base a concept of responsibility on. I
agree with Fischer on this. Certainly it is not enough to establish the nega-
tive condition for seeing to the murder, which requires that the murder might
not have taken place. However, the role the device plays in the Frankfurt
examples is as a factor independent of the choice of the agent. It therefore
seems reasonable to represent it as such, which will be done below.
6.5.2 Inwagen on event universals
Regarding event universals Inwagen presents the following principle, see (van
Inwagen; 1978, p. 210):
Principle 6.5 (Inwagen, event universals). A person is morally responsible
for a certain state of affairs only if (that state of affairs obtains and) he could
have prevented it from obtaining.
It is clear that Inwagen sees states of affairs as propositions or sets of
possible worlds, a view, which seems similar to the one adopted here. Inwagen
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does not consider values or intentions. Thus the principle seems to correspond
to the definition of an agent being strictly liable as defined in Chapter 3.
However, Inwagen wants to establish the negative conclusion that agents
can never be responsible for event universals. In order to strengthen this
claim, he presents two examples. One is a Frankfurt example. The other one
is like the following.
Example 6.6. A person is stuck on a horse. He cannot make the horse stop,
but he can make it turn left or right. However, whether he turns left or right,
the horse will end up in Rome.
Inwagen claims, it is obvious that the man is not responsible for end-
ing up in Rome. Indeed it is. Since ending up in Rome is true with any
outcome of the situation, the man cannot be responsible for it. This exam-
ple only establishes the conclusion that some agents are not responsible for
some events they cannot prevent, see also Fischer (2005a). The Frankfurt
examples are different and require another kind of argument. When it comes
to the Frankfurt example, Inwagen’s agrees with the stit analysis that the
Frankfurt example is a counterexample to his principle of event universals.
With the outcomes where Jones sees to it that Peter is murdered, he could
not have prevented this event universal. The response given in this thesis
is that with that outcome of the Frankfurt example Jones is indeed only
positively responsible. Inwagen does not seem to acknowledge a concept of
positive responsibility. Instead he claims that it is not possible to be respon-
sible for event universals at all! In conclusion, if we are talking about event
particulars, then agents always can prevent them. If we are talking about
event universals, agents can never prevent them.
However, Inwagen’s argument for the latter is faulty. He argues as follows.
Consider an outcome of the Frankfurt example where Jones murders Peter
on his own. With these outcomes Jones’ choice is a sufficient condition for
the event that Peter dies. Jones’ choice is also a sufficient condition for the
event that Peter is mortal. However, we will not say that Jones is responsible
for Peter being mortal. So far, Inwagen’s argument is fine and in accordance
with the stit analysis. Any of Jones’ choices is a sufficient condition for Peter
being mortal, for presumably, Peter is mortal with any outcome. However,
precisely therefore the negative condition cannot be fulfilled. Thus, Jones
is not responsible for Peter being mortal. This does not entail that he is
not responsible for the murder. Here the negative condition is fulfilled. In
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order to establish his conclusion that Jones is not responsible for the event
that Peter dies, Inwagen needs more. He continues by claiming that Jones
being mortal is arguably the same proposition as the proposition that Jones
dies. If this was so, Inwagen would have his conclusion that Jones is not
responsible for the event universal that Peter dies. Because by substitution
of identicals, it would entail that Jones is responsible for Peter being mortal,
which is absurd. However, Inwagen clearly commits an error in semantics
here. In any moment of Peter’s life it is true that he is mortal. It is only true
that he dies in the last moment of his life.4 Therefore Peter is mortal is not
the same proposition as Peter dies and Inwagen’s argument fails. Inwagen
presents other argument but they are all based on a similar error in basic
semantics. We conclude that Inwagen has not established that agents cannot
prevent at least some event universals from obtaining. Where does this leave
the concept of negative responsibility?
6.5.3 In defence of negative responsibility
Inwagen’s basic intuition is that responsibility is connected to the ability to
prevent. However, he fails to give an adequate theory of what that means.
Regarding event particulars his principle is too weak to be of any interest,
since it is basically true with any action of any agent. Regarding event
universals he failed to establish the conclusion he was going for. Thus a
concept of negative responsibility for events or event universals, considered as
sets of outcomes is still possible. However, one might still speculate whether
we really need such a concept. Let us take an example from the same paper
by Inwagen.
Example 6.7 (Inwagen’s Telephone Example). Suppose I look out the window
of my house and see a man being robbed and beaten by several powerful-
looking assailants. It occurs to me that perhaps I had better call the police.
I reach for the telephone and then stop. It crosses my mind that if I do
call the police, the robbers might hear about it and wreak their vengeance
on me.. . . So I decide not to get involved. . . Now suppose also that, quite un-
known to me, there has been some sort of disaster at the telephone exchange,
and that every telephone in the city is out of order. . . Am I responsible for
failing to call the police? Of course not. (van Inwagen; 1978, pp. 204-205)
4 For a formal model, one can take any finite linear or branching temporal model and
let the states be the moments of Peter’s life.
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o1: Peter murdered, r.n.g. displays 1 o3: Peter not murderedo2: Peter not murdered, r.n.g. displays 0
Pull plug Don′t pull plug
Jones
Fig. 6.5: Random number generator 1
In fact, we must model this example exactly like the Frankfurt exam-
ple, see Figure 6.4. Of course the agent could not have prevented the police
from not being called, so he is not negatively responsible. However, he is
positively responsible for failing to call the police. The compatibilist might
certainly maintain that agents can be responsible for negative facts. They
might argue as follows. It was a necessary consequence of your choice that
the police was not called. Hence you are responsible. The compatibilist can
argue convincingly that the agent is responsible for failing to call the police.
Thus, this example is not strong enough to establish that we need a concept
of negative responsibility. Establishing such a need requires an example of an
agent, who is only negatively responsible without being positively responsi-
ble. For that purpose, let us assume that there is true randomness in nature,
and that Black has access to a random number generator based on such a
random physical phenomenon. When the device is activated, the random
number generator displays a 1 or a 0.
Example 6.8 (Random Number Generator). Black has hooked up a gun to
his random number generator. If the end state is 0, the gun will not fire. If
the end state is 1 it will fire. The device will be turned on in a few seconds,
unless Jones pulls the plug. He does not pull the plug, the device displays 1,
the gun fires and murders Peter. Is Jones responsible for the murder?
With the outcome described in the story the event of Peter’s death is
in some sense random. It is not correct to say that Jones brings about the
event of the murder with his choice, at most one can say that he brings
it about that the murder might happen. Causally, the murder is due to a
truly random physical process initiated by another agent, Black. Jones did
not cause the murder anymore than the walls of the room caused it by not
collapsing. However, intuitively, Jones is responsible for the murder. Why?
Because, as a free and accountable agent, he could have easily prevented it
by pulling the plug. For a formal representation look at Figure 6.5. We are
asking if Jones is responsible for the murder outcome o1. Clearly he is not
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Device
Y es
o1: Peter murdered, r.n.g. displays 1 o3: Peter murdered, Device on
o2: Peter not murdered, r.n.g. displays 0
No
o3: Peter murdered, r.n.g. displays 1 o6: Peter not murdered
o3: Peter not murdered, r.n.g. displays 0
Pull plug Don′t pull plug
Jones
Fig. 6.6: Random number generator 2
positively responsible for the murder, it was not a necessary consequence of
his choice that Peter was murdered. However, he could have prevented the
murder, so he is negatively responsible.
What this example does is undermining positive responsibility as much as
possible, while maintaining negative responsibility in order to show the need
for the concept.
We should be able to test the claim that the agent is only negatively
responsible further by adding a Frankfurt overdetermined enforcer to the
situation. Since such an enforcer undermines negative responsibility and
since the agent is only negatively responsible, such an enforcer should free
the agent of responsibility altogether.
Example 6.9. Black has connected a random device to a gun. If it displays
a 1, Peter will be shot. If it displays a 0, Peter will not be shot. Jones must
choose whether to pull the plug or not. However, Black has implanted a
device into Jones’ head. If Jones decides to pull the plug, it will make him
pull the trigger manually, ensuring that Peter dies. Is Jones responsible at
the outcome where he presses the button and it shows 1?
Is Jones responsible for the murder at outcome o1 of Figure 6.6. Clearly
he could not have prevented it by making his other choice. On the other
hand, he did not see to it, since it depended on what the random number
generator displays. Formally, there is no doubt he is not responsible. He is
neither negatively or positively responsible. What about intuitively? It is
fair to say that Jones is in a kind of lottery situation. Since it is in no way up
to him whether Peter dies or not, it seems correct that he is not responsible
for the murder.
The strategy in this chapter has been to maintain two concepts of re-
sponsibility from Chapter 3, a negative and a positive. The theory has then
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been put to use in an analysis of the Frankfurt example. It is the purpose of
the Frankfurt example to show that PAP is not needed for a theory of moral
responsibility. We have undercut this claim in two different ways. First,
by giving a thorough formal analysis of the Frankfurt example, which shows
that there are indeed situations as described by Frankfurt. However, these do
not show that PAP is not needed for moral responsibility. On the contrary,
maintaining a theory requiring PAP, enables us to distinguish models, where
an agent brings about an event, which might have turned out differently un-
der different circumstances (The Frankfurt example), from models where the
event was necessary.
I do not agree with Inwagen that negative responsibility is all there is.
There is still a strong case to be made for maintaining a concept of positive
responsibility, see also (Fischer; 2005a, 294). Agents may be responsible for
seeing to an event, although it could not be prevented under the circum-
stances as in the Frankfurt example. The negative condition is necessary to
rule out responsibility for events, which are necessary in the situation. On
the other hand I do not agree with Paprzycka that positive responsibility
is all there is. In particular, negative responsibility cannot be reduced to
positive responsibility for negated propositions, as some authors suggest, see
e.g. Fischer and Ravizza (1998). I have argued that there are examples of
negative responsibility for an event with no positive responsibility for that
event. When these are turned into Frankfurt cases agents are not responsible
for the event at all . If this is correct, the claim that negative responsibility
is needed, is fully justified.
Chapter 7
Deontic logic for action types
An old tradition in modern deontic logic going back to von Wright’s first pa-
per on the topic, applies deontic operators to action types. On the proposal
presented here, it works in the following way. We have a non-empty set of
action tokens, which instantiate various action types. A subset of the action
tokens are singled out as acceptable or good. Informally, an action type is
permissable, if there is an instance of the type, which is good or acceptable.
An action type is required if all good action tokens are of that type. My aim
is to show that a good portion of the problems of deontic logic can be solved
by these devices. In order to operationalize this last claim, I will use this
introduction to present what have been considered bench mark cases for a
deontic logic. These cases are supposed to represent some deontic inferences
a fluent speaker probably would make in a natural language context, even if
(or perhaps especially if) that speaker has no theoretical knowledge about
deontic logic.1 Since my default belief is that natural language should be
respected as far as possible, I elevate these bench mark cases to normative
standards that a good deontic theory should meet. Here I appeal to normal
linguistic intuitions as a regulative guideline. My view is not that logical
theory should be founded on these sorts of empirical observations of natural
language phenomena. On the contrary, a good theory gives a plausible the-
oretical explanation of the inferences it validates. However, a theory should
provide a very good theoretical reason, if it diverges from natural language,
preferably a reason arising within the theory itself. Philosophical logicians
are often too eager to sacrifice natural language to save the logical theory
they have become accustomed to working with. I divide the benchmark cases
into three categories: consequences (what one should be able to infer), non-
consequences (what one should not be able to infer), and equivalences (what
should mean the same). To the best of my knowledge, there is no deontic
logic which gets all these right that is, validates or proves the consequences,
does not validate or prove the non-consequences and validates or proves the
equivalences. Most of the examples are in the tables because they play an
important role in natural language. However, most of them are also there
to highlight specific problems encountered by one or more existing deontic
1 I have not tested this statistical claim empirically, although it is easy to imagine an
experiment to test it, hence the disclaimer ‘are supposed to represent.’
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From Infer
1
You must You may run and
run or hide you may hide
2
You must You may
run run
3
You may You may run and
run or hide you may hide
4
You may run and You may
you may hide run or hide
5
You may You may run and
run and hide you may hide
6
You must You must run and
run and hide you must hide
7
You must run and You must run and
you must hide hide
8
You may run or
you may not run
9
not (You must run
and you must not run)
Fig. 7.1: Consequences
logics. For instance, Standard Deontic Logic, Horty’s stit logic, as well as al-
most all variants of dynamic deontic logic validate variants of Ross’ paradox
(1. and 2. of the non-consequences).
7.1 Overview of the chapter
First, I consider some of the bench mark cases, which have caused problems
for formal theories. In particular, I consider Ross’ paradox (Figure 7.2: 1,2),
free choice inferences (Figure 7.1: 1,3,4), and conjunction exploitation (Fig-
ure 7.1: 5). While going through the problems I review some important
contributions from the literature. After that I say a bit about action types
in philosophy and legal theory to motivate the formal theory of action types,
which will be presented. The main part of the chapter is a deontic logic of
action types. Finally I discuss some issues about expressivity and natural
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From Do not Infer
1
You must You must run or
run eat
2
You may You may
run run or eat
3
You must You must run or
run or hide you must hide
4
You may run and You may
you may hide run and hide
5
You may You may
eat or not eat run
6
You may You may eat and
eat hit the waiter
Fig. 7.2: Non-consequences
If and only if
1
You must not (you may
run not run)
2
You may not (you must
run not run)
Fig. 7.3: Equivalences
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language.
7.2 Ross’ paradox and free choice inferences
Ross’ paradox was introduced by Alf Ross, see Ross (1941). In standard
deontic logic (and many other deontic logics) the paradox crops up in form
of the following validity.
©φ→©(φ ∨ ψ)
The paradox has a dual twin.
Pφ→ P(φ ∨ ψ)
Ross’ paradox brings out differences between deontic and epistemic or alethic
modalities. For instance, the following justification of Ross’ paradox does
not work: since a disjunction gives less information than either disjunct it is
pragmatically inappropriate to give a disjunctive permission, when you can
give a categorial one. This explanation misses the problem it is supposed to
explain, which is a problem of semantics, not pragmatics. Can we infer a
disjunctive permission from a categorical one at all? There is no doubt that
we can infer a disjunctive assertion from a categorical one, the question in
pragmatics is why we do not do that very often. However, there is doubt
when it comes to permissions. Further, it is incorrect to say that a disjunctive
permission gives less information than either disjunct. The reason is that a
disjunctive permission is always a free choice permission (see below). This
implies that a disjunctive permission behaves much like a conjunction, so
that it actually gives the addressee more information about her possibilities
to act than either disjunct. Whereas the ideal of theoretical pursuits is to
narrow the possibilities down as much as possible to arrive at the truth, this
is not the case in practical life. Quite often, we would like more possibilities,
which is to say, more freedom. As an example, take an employer who tells
an employee that she may work through July. Later on he reveals that it
was actually the case that she was allowed to work through July or go on
vacation. However, he gave her the first ‘more precise information’ to respect
pragmatic principles. The employer was not lying, it is true that the employee
was allowed to work through July. Let us assume that she in fact did work
through July and that the employer strongly believed that this would be the
case when he uttered the first permission. Still, the employer has hidden
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important information about his employee’s rights from her. This would not
be the case, if he had replaced a disjunctive assertion with either disjunct.
For instance, assume that the employee asks him where the stapler is. He
cannot be blamed for answering that it is in his office instead of answering
that it is in his office or in the photo copying room, if he strongly believes it is
in his office and it is in his office. The main reason then, why Ross’ paradox
must be considered a problem, is the occurrence of free choice inferences in
natural language. The following is an example of a free choice inference.
Example 7.1. From ‘You may send the letter or burn the letter’ infer ‘you
may send the letter and you may burn the letter.’
Most accounts of deontic logic do not validate this inference. For instance,
for a normal modal logic such as standard deontic logic, we have:
2 P(φ ∨ ψ)→ (Pφ ∧Pψ)
An inference of deontic logic, which is usually considered to be unproblematic,
though, is the following, which we refer to as ‘must implies may.’
Example 7.2. From ‘you must send the letter’ infer ‘you may send the letter.’
Or, in general, for any formula φ.
©φ→ Pφ
It is now perhaps clear, how we may get problematical reasoning by com-
bining Ross’ paradox with free choice reasoning, as sketched in the following
chain of informal reasoning.
Example 7.3. 1. ‘You must send the letter.’ (Given.)
2. ‘You must send the letter or burn the letter.’ (From 1. by Ross’
Paradox.)
3. ‘You may send the letter or burn the letter.’ (From 2. by must implies
may.)
4. ‘You may send the letter and you may burn the letter.’ (From 3. by
free choice inference.)
5. ‘You may burn the letter.’ (From 4. by classical logic.)
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This is clearly unacceptable. From any obligation to do something, I get
the permission to do anything I want! Now, coming from classical logic,
one is inclined to explain Ross’ paradox away by denying the non-classical
free choice inference. The reflex response by now is to deny the free choice
inference status as an important problem, indeed it is sometimes called a
pseudo problem. This is usually followed by the remark that we can express
free choice as a conjunction of permissions, Pφ∧Pψ. However, as Hans Kamp
pointed out already in 1973, we have a strong intuition that a disjunctive
permission does entail the permission to do either disjunct, see Kamp (1973).
On a closer inspection, the degradation of the free choice inference to the
status of pseudo problem begins to sound a lot like dogmatic clinging to a
certain paradigm, i.e. the paradigm of representing deontic reasoning with
a normal modal logic or at least a monotonic one, as some of the logics
suggested by Chellas, see Chellas (1980). Reconsidering the inference above
with natural language as a guide, the problematic step does not seem to be
from 2. to 3., but rather from 1. to 2..
7.2.1 Ross’ paradox - a problem for stit theory
Ross’ paradox may be seen as a problem for stit theory, at least if stit the-
ory is supposed to reflect reasoning about norms in natural language. The
deontic logics considered in Horty (2001) as well as the extensions presented
in Chapter 2 all succumb to Ross’ paradox. We have the following validity.

⊙
[a cstit]φ→
⊙
[a cstit](φ ∨ ψ)
Of course, the free choice inference is not valid on Horty’s account. Still,
one might want to block Ross’ paradox, and it seems there is an obvious way
to do so. Simply introduce a deliberative ought operator. Supposedly, the
truth condition for such an operator should be as follows, where we limit
ourselves to finite choices.
Definition 7.1. M, o 
⊙
[ai dstit]φ iff K ⊆ |φ|M for each K ∈ Optimus
′
i
and there is an o′, such that M, o′ 2 φ
It is clear that the validity constituting Ross’ paradox is now blocked.
Fact 7.2. 2
⊙
[a dstit]φ→
⊙
[a dstit]φ ∨ ψ
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This inference is blocked with an outcome o, where we have M, o ⊙
[a dstit]φ ∧ A(φ ∨ ψ). It is easy to construct such a model, M . Let
dom(M) = {o1, o2}, V (p) = {o1}, V (q) = {o2}. There is just one agent,
a. Assume that the two actions of this agent consist of one outcome each
and that o1 has higher utility than o2. We then have M, o1 
⊙
[a dstit]p ∧
¬
⊙
[a dstit](p∨q). However, there is a good reason to reject this as a natural
solution to Ross’ paradox.2 The following is valid.
Fact 7.3.  (
⊙
[a dstit]φ ∧ E(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ))→
⊙
[a dstit](φ ∨ ψ)
This makes the following inference possible.
Example 7.4. 1. ‘You ought to send the letter.’ (Given.)
2. ‘Possibly, the letter will neither be sent or burned.’(Given.)
3. ‘You ought to send the letter or burn the letter.’ (From 1. and 2. by
the validity above.)
Since it seems quite appropriate to assume as a possibility that the letter
is neither sent or burned, the proposed solution given to Ross’ paradox does
not work. Incidently, this critique applies also to the account of solving the
paradox for imperatives by means of the achievement stit operator presented
in (Belnap et al.; 2001, pp. 83-85).
7.3 Strong permission
A tradition in deontic logic, which takes free choice permissions seriously goes
back to Anderson (1966). The idea is to define a strong permission operator
Pas follows, where  is a normal modal operator and ok is a propositional
constant, which is true iff a world is morally acceptable.
Definition 7.4. Pφ↔ (φ→ ok)
Anderson’s proposal validates the permission versions of the free choice
inferences and blocks Ross’ paradox. However, there are obvious problems
(see also Asher and Bonevac (2005)). For instance, as the reader can easily
check, if we interpret the box as a normal K operator.3 Anderson’s proposal
2 The argument laid out in the rest of this section was presented to me by Frank Veltman
in a conversation
3 Should we interpret the box this way? Since the relation between φ and ok seems to
be a causal one, ‘φ leads to an okay state’, we might need to move to conditional logic.
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validates Pφ→ P(φ ∧ ψ) and P(φ ∨ ¬φ)→ Pψ, both counter-intuitive in a
deontic context, (see Figure 7.2: 5, 6).
7.3.1 Conjunction exploitation
Moreover, Anderson’s strong permission fails to validate P(φ ∧ ψ) → Pφ
called conjunction exploitation, see (Figure 7.1: 5). In a way, this is quite
natural, when we think about the semantics of the strong permission, because
it makes sense to read it as something like ‘it is safe to.’ From ‘it is safe to
jump from a plane and wear a parachute’ it does not follow that ‘it is safe to
jump from a plane’ simpliciter - if you do not wear a parachute, for instance,
you might get in trouble. However, I do think that the failure to validate
this principle shows that Anderson’s strong permission operator does not
capture what we normally mean by a permission. For instance, the following
conjunction seems problematic.
Example 7.5. ‘You may invite Beth and Smilla, but you may not invite Beth
or you may not invite Smilla.’ (?)
How can it be that you may invite Beth and Smilla, but there is one of
them you may not invite? In other words, it seems that deontic logic should
obey the following principle of conjunction exploitation.
P(φ ∧ ψ)→ (Pφ ∧Pψ)
The converse, on the other hand should not hold. It does not follow, from
the fact that you may take an apple and you may take a pear, that you may
take an apple and take a pear.
A recent update of Anderson’s proposal, Asher and Bonevac (2005) fails
to validate conjunction exploitation. Moreover, on any such account permis-
sions and obligations fail to be duals - or we must have both a strong and a
weak permission operator. There are certainly strength differences in natural
language. For instance, ‘have to’ is stronger than ‘should’, as can be seen
by comparing the sentences, ‘you should wash your hands but you do not
have to’ which is okay to ‘you have to wash you hands but you shouldn’t’,
which seems problematic at least when the ‘have to’ comes from the same
normative source as the ‘should not’, see also von Fintel and Iatridou (2008).
However, it is not clear that natural language actually contains the distinc-
tion suggested by the theory of strong permission.
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7.4 Dynamic deontic logic
There are at least three different traditions, which all deserve the name dy-
namic deontic logic. One body of work starts with Meyer (1988), and con-
tinues with e.g. van der Meyden (1996), (see also Meyer and Veltman (2007)
for more references.)
One inspiration for this work is the following validity of propositional
dynamic logic, see e.g. (Goldblatt; 1992, p. 111).
[α ∪ β]φ↔ [α]φ ∧ [β]φ
This is valid because the relation for the modality [α∪ β] is the union of the
two relations for [α] and [β]. Since α∪ β is read ‘do either α or β’, it looks a
lot like a free choice inference. The sentence may be read ‘after you do either
α or β, φ is true, if and only if, after you do α, φ is true and after you do β,
φ is true.
In the papers mentioned above variations of dynamic logic are developed
to handle deontic inferences. Even though these logics agree with the one
presented here that modal operators should be applied to action types, Ross’
paradox is not blocked and free choice inferences are not allowed in the first
paper mentioned. I will not treat it any further. In van der Meyden (1996),
however, Ross’ paradox is blocked and free choice inferences are allowed.
Broadly speaking, van der Meyden’s logic is in the tradition of strong per-
mission. An execution of an action is represented as a sequence of states. An
action kind or type is a set of such sequences. Some of these sequences or ex-
ecutions are green or permitted. A benefit of this framework is of course that
one may speak of sequential actions, a topic not treated in this thesis. How-
ever, in other ways the expressivity of the logic is limited. It is not clear how
to talk about doing actions of different kinds simultaneously. This problem
is related to the objection to the truth condition of the free choice permission
operator stated below. A free choice permission of an action a holds, when
all executions of a are permitted. Obligation is treated as a dual to a (tradi-
tional) weak permission, giving us some of the problems of standard deontic
logic for these operators, including Ross’ paradox. Thus, we have the prob-
lem of two different kinds of permissions, without a well-founded conceptual
distinction between the two. A simple objection is that empty actions (with
no possible executions) are always permitted, but as van der Meyden points
out this can be remedied by a non-emptiness condition. However, there is
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a more serious objection, which is that the universal style truth condition
is too strong to model permission. The problem is not so easy to detect in
van der Meyden’s logic because it is not clear how to represent simultaneous
actions, or as we might say, action tokens (sequences) instantiating several
action types. Intuitively, though, an execution s is of two types α and β if
it is an element in both sets representing the types. However, if that is a
correct way of seeing it, the following problem follows.4
There are many different ways an agent may eat a pear. With some of
these action executions the agent also kills a person, since the agent eats a
pear and kills the person at the same time. However, (we may assume) it
is not permitted for the agent to kill a person. Hence this particular action
execution cannot be green. According to van der Meyden’s semantics, it is
not permitted for the agent to eat a pear!
This seems very counterintuitive, but it is a natural consequence of the
requirement that every single execution of an action must be green, for the
action to be permitted. In view of the discussion about action tokens and
action types in the following section, it seems ontologically correct to say
that a single action token may instantiate several action types. Further, it
should be enough that some ways of performing an action type is enough to
say that this action type is permitted. However, this existential nature of
permission is blocked in van der Meyden’s semantics. As van der Meyden
points out, Meyer’s logics do not have this problem, as he has an existential
style truth condition for permission. However, in view of the above, it also
seems correct to keep van der Meyden’s intuition that free choice permissions
should be allowed and Ross’ paradox blocked.
Another more recent body of work is in the tradition of dynamic epistemic
logic, see van Benthem and Liu (2007). Here the focus is on changing the
preference relation between worlds dynamically with normative utterances,
see also Yamada (2006). The implications for deontic logic are sketched, but
since the focus is on performative aspects of deontic sentences, I will not
treat it further.
4 This objection to this kind of semantics, to be precise a similar proposal of my own,
as well as the following example was presented to me by Frank Veltman.
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A third body of work starts with the work on dynamics in logical linguis-
tics, see Veltman (1996). As with the second body of work, the focus is on
the context changing potential of deontic sentences. Paul Portner writes:
. . . there seems to be no linguistically-oriented discussion of dy-
namic properties of deontic modals. . . (Portner; 2009, p. 12)
From a general conceptual perspective, however, the paper van der Torre
and Tan (1999) does approach the issues. Further, Nauze’s thesis, Nauze
(2008), fills the gap mentioned by Portner in giving deontic modalities a
linguistically-oriented treatment. The main focus of this work is on perfor-
mative aspects of deontic language and it is thus also beyond the scope of
this thesis.
7.5 Other related approaches
In the dynamic deontic logics discussed above, as in dynamic logic in general,
there are two symbols for disjunction, one for between sentences and one
for between actions. Thus natural language or gets two different formal
meanings. This is also the approach taken in this chapter. However, it has
also been suggested that disjunction always should be interpreted to allow
the free choice inference. In Zimmermann (2000) a disjunction is taken to be
a list of epistemic possibilities.
The idea to use lists is close to the one presented below, where complex
actions are considered unordered tuples. An agent may do A1 or. . . or An, iff
the agent may do all the things on the list A1, . . . , An.
However, Zimmermann acknowledges that the theory has a problem with
deontic must as in the following sentence.
Example 7.6. ‘Mr. X must take a taxi or a bus.’
The only reading his theory can get of the above implies that either Mr. X
must take a taxi or Mr. X must take a bus. This is clearly wrong. The above
means (interpreted deontically) that there are two options, each permitted,
but that Mr. X must choose one of them. The sentence should imply that
Mr. X may do either, but not that he must do one of them. This is the case
in the logic to be presented. An important concern of Zimmerman’s is that
free choice inferences may be blocked as in the following sentence.
Example 7.7. ‘Detectives may go by bus or boat - but I forget which.’
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According to Zimmermann and others, see e.g. Asher and Bonevac
(2005), this sentence does not imply that detectives may go by bus and may
go by boat, but only that they may do one of them. I conjecture that the
disjunction in this sentence is under the scope of a hidden epistemic operator,
so that the sentence could be paraphrased as follows.
Example 7.8. ‘I know that detectives may go by bus or that they may go by
boat, but I forget which.’
If that is the case, it is not strange that there is no free choice effect.
However, nothing in this chapter depends on this conjecture, because of the
following. In order to be true the sentence requires an epistemic uncertainty
about the permitted actions, which it is beyond the scope of this thesis to
cover. If we assume (as we have so far and shall again in the next chapter)
that agents know their own permitted actions and the permitted actions of
other agents, sentences such as the one above will always come out false.
Another closely related theory was developed in Jackson (1985). In that
paper, an action is always a member of a set of actions, the available alter-
native actions. The following truth condition of ‘it ought to be that A’ is
given, where A is an action.
Definition 7.5. It ought to be that A out of {A,A1, . . . , An}, iff. what
would be the case were A true is better than what would be the case were
Ai true, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Jackson’s main intuition that there are a set of available action tokens
some of which are permitted is also the main intuition behind the theory
presented here. The main difference between Jackson’s approach and the
one taken here, is perhaps the explicit distinction between action types and
action tokens introduced below. On Jackson’s proposal, deontic operators
are applied to action tokens, whereas they will be applied to action types in
the logic to follow.
7.6 Action types and action tokens
According to von Wright norms apply to action types or as he calls them,
acts, which he takes to cover act qualifying properties.
We shall say that theft, murder smoking, etc. are acts. The
individual cases that fall under theft, murder, smoking, etc. we
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shall call act-individuals. It is of acts and not of act-individuals
that deontic words are predicated.
(von Wright; 1951, p. 2)
Peter Geach has criticized deontic logic from moving away from actions
and towards applying deontic operators to formulas expressing arbitrary
propositions, see Geach (1982). Stit theory is a rather successful attempt
at taking Geach’ s objections seriously, see also (Horty; 2001, p. 4). Horty’s
distinction between ought to do and ought to be is very illuminating. How-
ever, stit theory in general has been criticized for not representing actions
directly.
No author in the Anselm-Kanger-Chellas line up through Belnap
- Davidson belongs to a different tradition - has countenanced the
existence of actions in logic: action talk, yes; ontology of actions,
no.
(Lindstro¨m and Segerberg; 2007, p. 1199)
The authors explicitly say that this remark does not apply to Horty. However,
even Horty himself states that he has no way of representing action types.
Thus stit theory at most appears to be suited for treating action tokens, cf.
Horty:
These actions are only action tokens, however - individual con-
crete actions. There is no such thing as the action type of ”open-
ing a window”, for example. There are individual, concrete open-
ings of individual windows, but nothing to group them together.
Horty (2001)
In the philosophy of action the view of treating actions as objects is
especially associated with Donald Davidson and with the event calculus. As
such it is sometimes considered opposed to the modal view on action and
agency advocated by stit theory. In my view this contrast is just a matter
perspective. We can take different perspectives on the same thing at different
times. In this chapter I take the perspective of treating actions as objects.
In general, talk about action tokens and action types is a typical example
of our mental capacity for reification through abstraction. The distinction
between action tokens and action types seems quite natural. There are many
different particular ways an agent may brush her teeth, but all of them are of
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the ‘teeth brushing kind.’ When actions are reified in this way, they can be
treated like objects with several properties. An action token may instantiate
several types, e.g. the same action token may instantiate ‘going to the beach’,
‘going for a run’, ‘getting some exercise’, ‘meeting a friend’, and so on. Some
other references for this view are, Ross (1930), Hage and Brouwer (2000).
Hage and Brouwer elaborate on the relation between action types and action
tokens in the following way (they call the latter ‘act tokens’).
Deontic sentences of the ought-to-do type typically refer to action
types. If James is not allowed to shoot John Doe, there is not
one particular act that James is not allowed to perform. It is
rather the case that James is not allowed to perform any act of
the type ’shooting John Doe’. The temptation might arise to
say that the action type ’shooting John Doe’ is the object of the
prohibition. But this would be wrong. James is forbidden to
perform individual acts, not to perform action types. Assuming
that action types are forbidden would involve a category mistake.
Actors do not perform action types, but act tokens. Nevertheless,
the prohibition refers to the type. This does not mean that the
type is forbidden, but rather that acts that are instances of this
type, are pro tanto forbidden.
Hage and Brouwer (2000)
At another place the authors write the following.
It is not impossible to say that an act token was obligatory or
forbidden, but then the natural meaning is that the token is an
instance of a type which was (for the actor) obligatory, allowed,
or forbidden.
Hage and Brouwer (2000)
It seems that the authors waver a bit between, whether it is action tokens
or action types that are forbidden. On a perhaps uncharitable reading they
say:
1. Action types cannot be forbidden.
2. The natural meaning of an action token being forbidden is to be an
instance of a forbidden action type.
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I will now state informally, how action types and action tokens are connected
to deontic operators in this thesis. Von Wright’s basic intuition is followed,
since deontic operators only apply to action types. However, unlike von
Wright’s theory, this is not a primitive syntactic relationship between oper-
ators and types. Rather the truth conditions of deontic sentences are given
via the good or acceptable action tokens instantiating these types. An action
token is a single object. However, on this theory there are also complex ac-
tions. The basic idea is that the complex actions should be constructed from
the action tokens. Here, they are unordered tuples of such action tokens.
There is a countable set of basic action types such as ‘having a drink’ and
‘eating a pear.’ Basic types, and inductively defined conjunctions and nega-
tions of these, are instantiated by single action tokens. Thus, for instance,
action types such as ‘not going to the beach’ or ‘eating an apple and going
skiing’ may only be instantiated by single action tokens (only simultaneous
actions are considered, not sequential actions of the type ‘eat an apple and
then go skiing.’) On the other hand, actions of the disjunctive type ‘going
to the beach or having a drink’ may also be instantiated by (in this case 2-)
n-tuples of action tokens, so that there is one action token of the type ‘going
to the beach’ and one action token of the type ‘having a drink.’ This is
why, (when talking about simultaneous action) it makes sense that an action
may be of the type of ’going to the beach or going to the cinema’, because
different action tokens may instantiate either disjunct, but not of the type
‘going to the beach and going to the cinema’, given that there is no single
action instantiating both of these types at once. This idea that the basic
parts of action disjunctions are simultaneously instantiated by what may be
different action tokens is what makes the disjunction behave in many ways
like a conjunction in sentences about actions and norms. This assumption
about the relation between actions and the types they instantiate is very sub-
stantial and may be disputed. However, if or when this is granted, the rest of
the material follows rather naturally, given one more substantial assumption.
The other substantial assumption is that there is always a non-empty set of
good or acceptable n-tuples of action tokens for any arity n. On purpose, I
say nothing about where this set comes from, as the very general framework
presented here may be applied to specific ways of arriving at the good. It is
now possible to define operators may and must on action types as follows.
must[t] holds if and only if, every good action is of type [t]. may[t] holds if
and only if some good action is of type [t].
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To sum up, all possibilities for developing a deontic logic for action types
have not been explored, especially not in connection with the stit framework.
The focus of this chapter is mainly to present such a deontic logic and to show
how well it deals with the deontic inferences presented in the introduction.
In the next chapter I apply the logic to the situation models which have been
considered in the rest of this thesis. The purpose of that chapter is to show
that the theory merges with the stit framework in a natural and useful way.
I will now go into more detail with the logic.
7.7 Logic
I am going to present a syntax and a semantics for deontic operators on
action types.
7.7.1 Syntax
Symbols
The logic of action types that will be presented here is meant to be applied
to reasoning about actions and norms. It is generated from a countable set
of basic action types or action predicates , T = (T1, T2 . . .). We also have the
usual boolean connectives ∨,¬,→ and so on, as well as the complex action
connectives ∪, ∩, − (for action disjunction, conjunction and negation), left
and round and square parentheses, and deontic operators may and must
Action type terms
An expression of the language is just a string of symbols. We are mainly
interested in well-formed action type terms and well-formed formulas. We
first define the set of single action type terms SATT . These will represent
the action types instantiated by single action tokens. These consist of the
basic action type terms, the conjunctive action type terms and the negated
action type terms.
Definition 7.6. SATT is the smallest set satisfying the following conditions:
1. For any Ti ∈ T , [Ti] ∈ SATT (basic action type terms BATT).
2. If [t], [s] ∈ SATT , then [(t ∩ s)] ∈ SATT .
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3. If [t] ∈ SATT , then [−t] ∈ SATT .
The complex action type terms will represent action types instantiated
by complex actions. These consist only of the disjunctive action type terms
DATT .
Definition 7.7. DATT is the smallest set obeying the following condition:
If [t1], . . . , [tn] ∈ SATT , then [t1 ∪ . . . ∪ tn] ∈ DATT .
The well-formed action type terms are just the members of DATT (note
that SATT ⊆ DATT , set n = 1 in the definition above). The arity of an
action type term is defined as (the number of ∪ occurring in it)+1. Thus,
e.g. arity([(T1 ∩ −T2) ∪ T2]) = 2. The main thing to notice is that action
type terms are constructed on two levels. On the first level, we construct
basic action type terms, as well as negations and conjunctions of these basic
action type terms. On the second level we construct disjunctions of these.
Formulas
The set of well-formed formulas WFF is defined as follows.
Definition 7.8. WFF is the smallest set obeying the following conditions.
1. If [t] ∈ DATT then may[t] ∈WFF and must[t] ∈WFF .
2. If φ, ψ ∈WFF , then ¬φ, (φ ∧ ψ) ∈WFF
The rest of the propositional connectives are defined as usual.
7.7.2 Semantics
We take action tokens as primitive objects in our ontology and we consider
only the actions of a single agent.
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Models
An action type model is a structure M = 〈W, {goodi | 1 ≤ i, i ∈ N}, V 〉,
where W (also written dom(M)) is a countable, non-empty set called the
domain of M . Informally, the domain is the set of available action tokens of
an agent. V is a function which gives to each basic action type term, [Ti],
with Ti ∈ T , a subset of the domain, i.e. V : BATT → P(W ). good
1 ⊆ W is
a non-empty set of action tokens, which we call the basic good actions. goodi
is defined as follows for each i > 1.
Definition 7.9. goodi is a nonempty set of unordered tuples (a1, . . . , ai),
such that a1 ∈ good
1, . . . ai ∈ good
1.
The following property is a consequence of this definition.
Grounded in basic good actions (a1, . . . , ai) ∈ good
i implies a1 ∈ good
1, . . . , ai ∈
good1.
We also require the following property to hold.
Complete with respect to basic good actions For each n−tuple a1 ∈ good
1, . . . , an ∈
good1 of distinct basic good actions, (i.e. i 6= j implies ai 6= aj for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n), (a1, . . . , an) ∈ good
n.
V is extended to arbitrary action types of any arity as follows. Note that
the value of the valuation of an action type of arity n higher than 1 is a set
of unordered tuples of length n: the tuples made from tokens of the type of
the disjuncts.
Definition 7.10. 1. V ([(t ∩ s)]) = V ([s]) ∩ V ([t]).
2. V ([−s]) = W\V ([s]).
3. V ([t1 ∪ . . . ∪ tn]) = {(a1, . . . , an) | a1 ∈ V ([t1]), . . . , an ∈ V ([tn])}
In the definition above (a1, . . . , an) is an unordered n-tuple. In the met-
alanguage, we sometimes write [t]a for a ∈ V ([t]) with the intuitive meaning
that a is of type [t].
For single action type terms, [t], [s], the following hold.
Fact 7.11. 1. [−t]a iff not [t]a.
2. [t ∩ s]a iff [t]a and [s]a.
3. [t ∪ s](a, b) iff ([t]a and [s]b) or ([t]b and [s]a) .
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Evaluation of formulas
The truth of a formula in an action type model M is defined as follows.
Definition 7.12. Let [t] be an action type of arity n
1. M  must[t] iff for any a ∈ goodn, [t]a.
2. M  may[t] iff for some a ∈ goodn, [t]a.
3. M  ¬φ iff M 2 φ.
4. M  φ ∧ ψ iff M  φ and M  ψ.
Validity and logical consequence are defined as follows.
Definition 7.13. A sentence is valid if it is true in all models. A sentence is
satisfiable if it is true in some model. We also say that a set Γ of sentences
is true in a model, denoted M  Γ, if for every φ ∈ Γ, M  φ. We say that
a set of sentences Γ is (jointly) satisfiable, if there is a model M , such that
M  Γ. A sentence φ is a logical consequence of a set of sentences Γ, if for
any model M such that M  Γ, we have M  φ.
Consider the following informal argument. At all times you wish to per-
form one of the (legally or morally) acceptable actions available to you. If
one of these actions instantiates the type of, say, eating an apple, then you
may eat an apple. On the other hand, if you may eat an apple, then there has
to be an acceptable action of that type. If all of the acceptable actions are of
a certain type, e.g. of not-killing, then you must not-kill. On the other hand,
if you must not-kill, then it cannot be that there is an acceptable action of
the killing type (we are thus not considering defeasible norms.) These sort
of considerations underlie the definitions above.
7.7.3 Validities
Here are some validities for this logic.
Fact 7.14. 1. must[c ∪ d]→ (may[c] ∧may[d]).
2. must[t]→may[t].
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3. may[c ∪ d]→ (may[c] ∧may[d]).
4.  (may[c ∩ −d] ∧may[d ∩−c])→ may[c ∪ d].
5. may[(c ∩ d)]→ (may[c] ∧may[d]).
6. must[(c ∩ d)]→ (must[c] ∧must[d]).
7.  (must[c] ∧must[d])→ must[(c ∩ d)].
8. may[c] ∨may[−c].
9.  ¬(must[c] ∧must[−c]).
Proof. 1. Follows from 2. and 3. by propositional logic.
2. Assume M  must[t], where t has arity n. Then for any (a1, . . . an) ∈
goodn, (a1, . . . an) ∈ V ([t]), and since good
n 6= ∅, M  may[t].
3. Assume M  may[c ∪ d]. Then there are (a, b) ∈ good2, s.t.[c ∪ d](a, b).
Hence [c]a and [d]b. By groundedness, (a, b) ∈ good2 implies a, b ∈ good1, so
M  may[c] ∧may[d].
4. Assume M  (may[c ∩ −d] ∧may[d ∩ −c]). Then there are a, b ∈ good1,
s.t. [c]a and ¬[d]a and [d]b and ¬[c]b. It follows that a 6= b (otherwise [c]a
and ¬[c]a), so (a, b) ∈ good2 by completeness. Since [c]a and [d]b, [c∪d](a, b),
so M  may[c ∪ d].
The rest of the validities can be verified in a similar way.
7.7.4 Non-validities
Here are some non-validities.
Fact 7.15. 1. 2must[t]→must[t ∪ s]
2. 2may[t]→ may[t ∪ s].
3. 2must[t ∪ s]→ (must[t] ∨must[s]).
4. 2 (may[c] ∧may[d])→ may[c ∩ d].
5. 2may[c ∪ −c]→may[t].
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Proof. LetW = {a, b, c}, good1 = {a, c}, good2 = {(a, c), (c, a)}, and goodn =
{all n-tuples of good1}, for n > 2. Let V (T1) = {a, c}, V (T2) = {b}, V (T3) =
{a}, V (T4) = {c}.
1. + 2. We have M  must[T1], and M  may[T1], but neither M 
must[T1 ∪ T2], or M may[T1 ∪ T2].
3.We have M must[T3∪T4], but neither M  must[T3] orM must[T4].
4. We have M may[T3] ∧may[T4], but not M may[(T3 ∩ T4)].
5. We have M may[T3 ∪ ¬T3], but not M may[T2].
7.7.5 Equivalences
Finally, here are some logical equivalences.
Fact 7.16. 1. must[c]↔ ¬may[−c].
2. may[c]↔ ¬must[−c].
3. may[(d ∩ c)]↔may[(c ∩ d)].
4. may[s ∪ t]↔ may[t ∪ s].
5. must[(d ∩ c)]↔must[(c ∩ d)].
6. must[s ∪ t]↔must[t ∪ s].
Proof. 1. Left to right. Assume M  must[c] and M  may[−c]. Then
there is a ∈ good1, s.t. a ∈ W \ V ([c]), but since a ∈ good1, a ∈ V ([c]),
contradiction.
Right to left. Assume M  ¬may[−c]. So for no a ∈ good1, a ∈ W \ V ([c]).
Hence for all a ∈ good1, a ∈ V ([c]), so M  must[c].
2. is similar to 1.
3. M  may[(d ∩ c)] iff. there is a ∈ good1, s.t. a ∈ V ([d]) and a ∈ V ([c])
iff. there is a ∈ good1, s.t. a ∈ V ([c]) and a ∈ V ([d]) iff. M may[(c ∩ d)].
The rest of the equivalences are similar.
7.8 How intuitively adequate is the logic?
As can be seen from the previous section the logic gets the consequences of
Figure 7.1 right with one exception. It gets all of the non-consequences of
Figure 7.2 and all of the equivalences of Figure 7.3 right. The exception is the
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following. The fourth of the validities above, (may[c∩−d]∧may[d∩−c])→
may[c ∪ d], suggests that we only have the fourth of the consequences in
Figure 7.1 in a restricted form. We would expect the consequence, (may[c]∧
may[d]) → may[c ∪ d]. The reason that we do not have this is that we are
not guaranteed that any 2 − tuple of elements of good1 are in good2. The
condition (may[c ∩ −d] ∧may[d ∩ −c]) guarantees that there are distinct
good actions of type [c] and [d], and thus the conclusion follows, by the
completeness condition. Requiring that all n − tuples of the basic good
actions are in goodn is too strong. From this e.g. must[c ∪ d] would imply
must[c] ∧must[d]. From e.g. ‘you must marry or flee the country’ it would
follow that ‘you must marry and you must flee the country’, which is clearly
not intuitive.
Thus, as far as I can see, we can only get the above restricted form and
there is still room for improvement of this logic, at least in this respect.
7.9 Natural language and expressivity
The must operator is meant to represent a strong deontic modality, equiva-
lent to have to, but weaker than ought to. As in von Wright’s original system
(and in natural language, except for pragmatic emphasis, e.g. ‘you must,
must, must come tonight!’) iterations of must do not occur. A more serious
limitation on expressivity is that we can only represent conditionals with our
operators in the following ways.
1. must[t]→must[s].
2. must[t]→ φ.
3. φ→must[s].
1. is a special case of 2. and 3. An obvious criticism is the lack of ability
to express directly some of the following sentences, where a conditional is
within the scope of a must.
1. ‘You must, if it rains, use an umbrella.’
2. ‘You must, if it rains, not use an umbrella.’
3. ‘You must not, if it rains, use an umbrella.’
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The following is a list of suggestions as to how we may first transform these
particular sentences before we perform the translation into the formal lan-
guage, which follows.
1. ‘If it rains, you must use an umbrella.’ φ→must[s].
2. ‘If it rains, you must not use an umbrella.’ φ→must[−s].
3. ‘If it rains, you must not use an umbrella.’ φ → ¬must[s].
Arguably, the second set of sentences is more natural than the first set.
If this is so, it strengthens the appeal of the formalizations given here. In the
second sentence the scope of the negation is ‘use an umbrella’, i.e. it is an
internal action type negation, in the third sentence the scope of the negation
is ‘you must use an umbrella.’ In spoken natural language we often use
emphatic intonation to indicate this scope distinction, here indicated must
and not. These considerations are similar for may. The two-fold reason for
the lack of expressivity is the following.
1. I wanted to apply must and may to action types only.
2. I do not believe that there are conditional action types, types of the
form of ‘if running, then wearing shoes’, do not seem to make any in-
tuitive sense, and I have refrained from giving them an artificial formal
meaning.
The first of these reasons, although sometimes longed for in deontic logic,
does not match up with natural language. Also, given that I do think must
andmay can be applied to conditionals, but that I do not think action types
can be conditional, this assumption would be the one to relax. For instance,
an obvious exception to 1. seems to be de re norms about objects or persons
as in the following sentence.
Example 7.9.
The president of the united states must be 31 years old, when elected for
office.
Another obvious criticism concerns contrary-to-duty obligations and de-
feasible obligations. Clearly, the semantics is not fit to deal with these cases.
There is hope, though that we can combine the logic presented here with
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techniques already known from deontic logic. Such investigations might also
shed light on W.D. Ross’ famous theory on prima facie oughts vs. all out
norms, which he defined exactly in terms of action types.
A third rather obvious criticism is that the natural language word ‘or’
has two distinct formal meanings on this theory, one as it occurs between
sentences and one as it occurs in action types. This is the price we pay for
keeping classical logic on the sentence level and getting a more intuitively
correct logic for permissions and obligations as applied to action types.
Despite these limitations, the logic of norms applied to action types pre-
sented in this chapter solve a good deal of the problems found in the literature
on deontic logic in a natural way. No doubt it has other problems of its own,
which will come to light eventually but such is life in logic. I leave the in-
tegration of the present logic with logics for defeasible and contrary-to-duty
obligations for somebody else. Also, I leave the problem of providing the
logic with a complete proof system.
Chapter 8
Action types in strategic situations
In this chapter some connections are established between the deontic logic for
action types from the previous chapter and the utilitarian strategic models
presented in the rest of the thesis. This will make it apparent how to use the
deontic logic for action types. Further, it will make it possible to compare
this logic with the logic used elsewhere in the thesis. Finally, it will enable us
to apply this logic to a problem concerning intentions encountered in Chapter
3. The basic idea is to let the actions of agents in utilitarian strategic models
with intentions play the role of action tokens. The complex actions will then
be unordered tuples of these. The basic good actions of an agent is her
optimal actions.
The main difference between the logic in this chapter and in the previous
chapter is that the operators will be relativized to an agent to allow for
several agents. Also an ability can operator is added to the logic.
8.1 Syntax
I will be rather informal. To the symbols used in Chapter 2 we add square
brackets and the action negation, conjunction and disjunction signs, as well
as three operators maya, musta, and cana for each a ∈ Agent. The basic
action types T is a non-empty subset of the propositional variables, T ⊆ Φ.
The well formed action type terms are defined as in the previous chapter.
Definition 8.1. The well-formed formulas WFF is the smallest set such
that:
1. If [t] ∈ DATT then mayi[t], musti[t], cani[t] ∈WFF , i ∈ N.
2. If φ, ψ ∈ WFF , then ¬φ, (φ ∧ ψ) ∈ WFF as well as a well-formed
formula prefixed by one of the modal operators used elsewhere in the
thesis.
8.2 Semantics
A utilitarian strategic action type model , M , is a structure 〈MS, Choice, for
each ai ∈ Agent a set {good
n
i | 1 ≤ n, n ∈ N}, VT 〉 , where:
1
1 For some applications it might easier just to take good1
i
as primitive, as a non-empty
subset of the actions of the agent, but here the goal is to emphasize the connection to stit
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1. MS is a utilitarian strategic model with intentions.
2. Choice =
⋃
ai∈Agent
Choicei.
3. VT : BATT → P(Choice).
4. good1i = Optimus
′
i, for each ai ∈ Agent.
5. goodni for n > 1 is defined as in the previous chapter for each ai ∈ Agent
and to fulfill the condition that it is complete with respect to the basic
actions.
Note that since T is just a subset of the propositional variables of the model
these will be used in two ways: they represent propositions in the model and
(enclosed in square brackets) they represent action types.
8.2.1 Evaluation of formulas
In order to establish connections with other modal operators, all formulas
will be evaluated with outcomes of situations. Conceptually this will not
make a significant difference, as we shall see. All the propositional operators
and the modal operators are evaluated as elsewhere in the thesis. The new
operators get the following truth conditions.
Definition 8.2. Let [t] be an action type of arity n.
1. M, o  musti[t] iff for each A ∈ good
n
i , A ∈ VT ([t]).
2. M, o  mayi[t] iff for some action A ∈ good
n
i , A ∈ VT ([t]).
3. M, o  cani[t] iff for some unordered tuple A = (Ai1, . . . , Ain), such
that each Aij ∈ Choicei for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, A ∈ VT ([t]) .
The above operators are settled in the situation, i.e. either they are true
with all outcomes or false with all outcomes. This is why it does not make a
conceptual difference whether they are evaluated with an outcome or in the
model as a whole. The motivation for the deontic operators is the same as
in the previous chapter. For example, an agent may perform an action of a
certain type in a situation if and only if there is a good action of that type
models.
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available to her in the situation. The motivation for the ability can operator
cani is as follows. An agent can t in a situation if and only if, there is an
action of type t available to her in the situation. Thus the truth condition
for ability can is just like the truth condition for deontic may except there is
no normative requirement on ability can. We immediately get the validities
musti[t]→ cani[t] and mayi[t]→ cani[t].
So far there is no real connection between actions and the outcomes of
actions. This connection will now be established. There are two components
to the connection. The corresponding proposition of an action establishes a
general connection between an action type and what the action achieves in
a situation. A principle of intentions gives a necessary condition of how an
action of a specific type is related to the intended outcomes of that action:
the corresponding proposition must be true with the intended outcomes.
8.3 Action types and corresponding propositions
One criterion for identifying an action is that it is done for a reason. Davidson
defines an intentional action as one done for a reason, Davidson (1963). Here
the reason for an action will be identified with the goal that the agent wishes
to achieve with the action, cf. Neth and Mu¨ller (2008). Thus it will be
assumed that to each action type there corresponds a certain state of affairs
in the world. For instance, to the action type ‘close the door’ corresponds
the state of affairs or proposition that the door is closed. How are the action
types and their corresponding propositions connected to the outcomes of
actions? On the one hand it is too strong to require that the corresponding
proposition is true with every possible outcome of that action. After all,
an agent may fail to achieve the goal of the action. The previous sentence,
however, gives a clue as to with which outcomes it is natural to require that
the corresponding proposition is true. The goal will at least be achieved
with the intended outcomes of the action. If an agent closes the door, then
the door is closed with the intended outcomes of that action. This minimal
condition will be required fulfilled in the following. To make it explicit let us
first be precise about what the corresponding proposition of an action is. We
already have the tools built into the syntax. All that remains is to connect
the action types to the propositional formulas. This will be done via the
following translation, corr.
Definition 8.3. 1. For a basic type Ti ∈ T , corr([Ti]) = Ti.
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2. corr([−t]) = ¬corr([t]).
3. corr([(t ∩ s)] = corr([t]) ∧ corr([s]).
4. corr([t1 ∪ . . . ∪ tn]) = corr([t1]) ∨ . . . corr([tn]).
Thus, for instance, corr([(T1 ∩ −T2) ∪ T3]) = (T1 ∧ ¬T2) ∨ T3. We call
corr([t]) the corresponding proposition of the type [t].
8.4 Intentions and action types
We are going to assume the following intention principle, which connects the
action types with the intended outcomes of the action tokens of that type
through the corresponding proposition of the action type. The principle
reflects that the corresponding proposition of an action type is the goal of
the action of that type.
Principle 8.4. For an atomic action Aij ∈ Choicei of type [t], IAij ⊆
|corr([t])|M
In words, for an action of type [t], the proposition corresponding to [t]
must be true with the intended outcomes of [t]. For instance, if an action is
of the type ‘close the door’, ‘the door is closed’ will be true at least with all
intended outcomes of that action.
It is easy to see that this account of action does not succumb to the
particular objection put forth by the ability sceptic of Chapter 4. Recall
that this objection says that the account of ability given by stit theory is
too demanding. Since it is always possible to imagine circumstances under
which an action does not succeed, no agent ever sees to anything with the
stit definition of ability. However, the account of action presented in this
chapter is not inconsistent with this ability scepticism. There might always
be a possible outcome of each action token of each action type, with which
the goal of that action type is not achieved. However, it will be required that
an action type at least succeeds with the intended outcomes of each action
token of that type.
8.4.1 The right way of eating a pear - is not killing somebody while
doing it!
It is time for an example. Recall that van der Meyden’s dynamic deontic
logic presented in van der Meyden (1996), has the following problem. For
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o1 : K,P, u(o1) = 1 o3 : K, u(o3) = 1 o5 : P, u(o5) = 3 o6 : u(o6) = 3o2 : P, u(o2) = 2 o4 : u(o4) = 2
A11 : [K], [P ] A12 : [K] A13 : [P ] A14
a1
Fig. 8.1: Killing and eating an pear
an action to be permitted, every possible execution of it must be permitted.
However, there are obviously right ways of executing an action of a certain
type and wrong ways of executing an action of the same type. The following
provides an example of how the present theory may be applied to a specific
situation.
Example 8.1. An agent a1 has to decide whether to kill, [K], a person or
not. Simultaneously a1 has to decide whether to eat a pear, [P ], or not. The
agent may fail to murder the person (if she decides to do it), but the agent
will succeed eating the pear (if she decides to eat it).
The situation is represented in Figure 8.1. We only represent the basic
action types an action token instantiates, since the other action types of that
action and the action types of complex actions can be calculated from the
basic action types. Formally, let T = {K,P} and M be the following.
Agent = {a1}, W = {o1, . . . , o6}.
Choice1 = {A11, . . . , A14}, A11 = {o1, o2}, A12 = {o3, o4}, A13 = {o5},
A14 = {o6}.
IA11 = {o1}, IA12 = {o3}, IA13 = {o5}, IA14 = {o6}.
VT ([K]) = {A11, A12}, VT ([P ]) = {A11, A13}, V (K) = {o1, o3} , V (P ) =
{o1, o2, o5}.
u(o1) = u(o3) = 1, u(o2) = u(o4) = 2, u(o5) = u(o6) = 3.
Since A13 and A14 strongly dominate the two other actions and they do
not strongly dominate each other, we have Optimus′1 = {A13, A14} = good
1
1.
We define good21 = {(A13, A14)}, and good
n
1 as the set of all n-tuples of good
1
1
for n > 2. Since all actions in good11 are of the type [−K], it follows that
M  must1[−K], the agent must not kill. We also have M  may1[P ]
and M  may1[−P ] and M  may1[P ∪ −P ]. We have that the agent
can kill, can1[K]. We do not have it that the agent may kill or eat a pear,
M 2 may1[K ∪ P ]. Some differences to the stit framework can now be
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o1 : P, L o2 : ¬P,¬L
A11 : [L] A12 : [−L]
a1
Fig. 8.2: Turning on the light
highlighted. First, we have M 
⊙
[a1 cstit]¬K, the agent ought to see to it
that she does not kill. However, it follows that M 
⊙
[a1 cstit](¬K ∨ P ),
the agent ought to see to it that she does not kill or eats a pear. The
deliberative stit operator suggested in the previous chapter does not help
here. We have M 
⊙
[a1 dstit]¬K. Further, with outcome o3, the person is
murdered and the pear is not eaten, so we have M  E(¬(¬K ∨P )). Hence,
M 
⊙
[a1 dstit](¬K ∨ P ).
8.5 Intended and unintended consequences of actions
In Chapter 3 a problem regarding the representation of intentions was men-
tioned. The problem is that the intention operator [a iit] is closed under log-
ical consequence. Thus agents will intend the double effects of their actions.
The present framework presents an opportunity to deal with this problem.
Intuitively, given the intention principle there is a natural way of distinguish-
ing theintended consequences of an action from its unintended consequences.
We only define intended consequences of single action types (basic action
types and their conjunctions and negations). They will be defined relative
to outcomes and agents.
Definition 8.5. Let ai ∈ Agent. φ is an intended consequence with an
outcome o ∈ Aij of some action Aij ∈ Choicei iff Aij ∈ VT ([t]) and φ =
corr([t]).
8.5.1 Davidson’s prowler example revisited
Consider Davidson’s example.
Example 8.2. A man, a1 has to either turn on the light [L] or not [−L]. A
prowler will be alerted, P , if he turns on the light.
The example is represented by Figure 8.2. Formally, let T = {L} and let
M be as follows. Agent = {a1}, W = {o1, o2}, Choice1 = {A11, A12}, A11 =
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{o1} = IA11 , A12 = {o2} = IA12 , VT ([L]) = {A11}, V (L) = V (P ) = {o1}.
2
This situation is represented in Figure 8.2. The outcomes where the light is
turned on are exactly the outcomes where the prowler is alerted, P , so we
have |P |M = |L|M . However, although alerting the prowler is a necessary
consequence of turning on the light, and although, in this situation, it is the
same event as turning on the light, it is not and intended consequence of
turning on the light. It is not something the agent does it is just something
that happens.
2 The utilities are not relevant to this example so they are suppressed.
Summary
This thesis presents new tools and improvements of existing tools for rea-
soning about actions and norms. The theoretical setting of the work is the
multi agent logic stit theory, a formal theory in the tradition of modal logic.
In this thesis, stit theory is limited to cover only strategic situations. This
basic framework is then extended in several ways throughout the thesis, but
the two most important extensions are intentions and actions types.
Intentions are an important component of informal reasoning in ethics and
law but they have not been part of stit theory so far. In this thesis intentions
are represented via subsets of outcomes of individual actions. An intention
operator, the iit operator, is added to the language.
Many natural language modalities operate on expressions denoting action
types. Until now, there has been no way to talk about action types in stit
theory. A proposal of how to do that is developed in this thesis.
In Chapter 1, some philosophical presuppositions and intuitions that have
guided the theorizing in later chapters are laid out. It is discussed, e.g. how
one can think about agents, situations and values. In Chapter 2, the basic
formal definition of a situation is presented. The specific contribution of the
chapter is a generalization of Horty’s ought to do operator by means of the
game theoretical device of simultaneously removing all dominated actions of
all agents in an iterative process. In Chapter 3, intentions are added and def-
initions of various concepts of individual responsibility relative to outcomes
of specific situations are presented. The knowledge of agents in situations is
also considered. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 treat special topics related to preceding
chapters. Chapter 4 takes a closer look at ability modalities and the meta-
physics of agency. A cube of opposition for ability modalities is presented and
different kinds of agents are defined relative to this cube. It is shown that if
an omnipotent agent (called God) exists it is unique and solely responsible for
everything. In Chapter 5, concepts of group responsibility and responsibility
of individual members of groups are suggested. In Chapter 6, the theory is
applied to a discussion of Frankfurt examples. Overdetermination of events
and the differences between causal responsibility and agentive responsibility
are discussed. Chapter 7 breaks with the framework provided by stit theory
and used in the rest of the thesis. In this chapter, the starting point is a
foundational discussion of deontic logic considering e.g. Ross’ paradox and
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free choice inferences and the role action types play in informal reasoning. A
new deontic logic for action types is then presented where deontic must and
may operators are applied to action type terms. In Chapter 8, it turns out
that the break with the stit framework can be mended by introducing action
types into stit theory. It is shown how to reason with action types using stit
models and how to reason about double effects of actions.
Resume´
Denne afhandling giver nye redskaber og forbedrer eksisterende redskaber til
at ræsonnere om handlinger og normer. Den teoretiske ramme om projektet
er multiagentlogikken stit teori, en formel teori i den modallogiske tradition.
I denne afhandling begrænses stit teorien til kun at dække strategiske situa-
tioner. Denne grundlæggende teori udvides p˚a flere m˚ader i løbet af afhan-
dlingen, men de to vigtigste udvidelser er intentioner og handlingstyper.
Intentioner udgør en vigtig del af informel ræsonnering indenfor etik og jura,
men de har indtil videre ikke været en del af stit teori. I denne afhandling
bliver intentioner repræsenteret via delmængder af udfald af individuelle han-
dlinger. En intentionsoperator, iit operatoren, tilføjes sproget.
Mange modaliteter i dagligsproget opererer p˚a udtryk, der refererer til han-
dlingstyper. Indtil nu har der ikke været mulighed for at tale om han-
dlingstyper i stit teori. Et forslag, til hvordan man kan gøre dette, bliver
udviklet i afhandlingen.
I kapitel 1 præsenteres nogle filosofiske antagelser og intuitioner, som
har været ledende i forhold til det teoretiske arbejde i afhandlingen. Det
diskuteres bl.a., hvordan man kan tænke om agenter, situationer og værdier. I
kapitel 2 gives den grundlæggende formelle definition af en situation. Kapitlets
specifikke bidrag er en generalisering af Hortys bør gøre operator via det
spilteoretiske greb, der best˚ar i samtidigt at fjerne alle dominerede handlinger
for alle agenter i en iterativ proces. I kapitel 3 tilføjes intentioner, og der gives
definitioner af forskellige begreber om individelt ansvar relativt til udfald af
specifikke situationer. Agenters viden behandles ogs˚a. Kapitel 4, 5 og 6 be-
handler specielle emner relateret til de foreg˚aende kapitler. Kapitel 4 tager et
nærmere kig p˚a abilitive modaliter og metafysik ang˚aende agenter. En logisk
kubus for abilitive modaliter præsenteres og forskellige slags agenter defineres
relativt til denne kubus. Det vises, at hvis en omnipotent agent (kaldet Gud)
eksisterer, s˚a er den unik og alene ansvarlig for alting. I kapitel 5 foresl˚as
begreber om ansvar for grupper og for individuelle medlemmer af grupper. I
kapitel 6 anvendes teorien p˚a Frankfurteksempler. Overdeterminering af be-
givenheder og forskellen mellem kausalt ansvar og agentivt ansvar diskuteres.
Kapitel 7 bryder med den ramme, som er givet af stit teori, og som bruges i
resten af afhandlingen. I dette kapitel er udgangspunktet en grundlagsdiskus-
sion af deontisk logik, der blandt andet tager højde for Ross’ paradoks og frit
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valg slutninger, og den rolle handlingstyper spiller i informel ræsonnering.
En ny deontisk logik præsenteres, hvor deontiske must og may operatorer
appliceres p˚a handlingstypetermer. I kapitel 8 viser det sig, at bruddet med
stit teori kan heles ved at introducere handlingstyper i stit teori. Det vises,
hvordan man kan ræsonnere med handligstyper i stitmodeller, og hvordan
man kan ræsonnere om dobbelteffekter af handlinger.
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